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Michel Foucault’s treatments of the Jouy-Adam case in History of Sexuality and 
in Abnormal have been the subject of much criticism. For the uninitiated, Charles-Joseph 
Jouy was a farmhand accused of (what would now be widely considered) child sexual 
assault in a rural area of France in 1867. In History of Sexuality Foucault uses this case as 
an example of shifting institutional responses and emerging figurations of sexuality and 
deviance that will shape modern thinking about sex. In so doing, Foucault brings into 
sharp focus the normalizing forces at work in constructing the pervert or pedophile, but 
he does so at the cost of obscuring the victim, Sophie Adam, in bokeh. Adam and other 
victims/survivors
2
 of sexual violence occupy a gap in Foucault’s genealogy of modern 
sexuality. My project aims to give shape to this gap, to bring Adam into the foreground, 
and to ask the questions: If Foucault had taken Sophie Adam as a subject in the History of 
Sexuality, what would this undertaking have looked like? What does Foucault’s work on 
sexuality do for Sophie Adam or for sexual violence survivors more broadly? In 
                                                 
1
 Portions of my dissertation have been previously published in Rehn-DeBraal, “Translating Foucault.” 
2
 A note on terminology: For the purposes of this project, I will use the terms “victim” and “survivor” more 
or less interchangeably. My general preference is for the term “survivor,” however I will also use the term 
“victim” when appropriate, in part to honor the right of victims/survivors to self-identity and also as a 
reminder that not everyone survivors. Neither term is perfect, as will become clear throughout my project. 
For discussion of the drawbacks of the victim/survivor binary see, for example, Orgad, “Survivor in 
Contemporary Culture,” 142–144, 151–155; Spry, “Absence of Word and Body”; Taylor, “Resisting the 
Subject,” 94.  
2 
answering these questions, my dissertation offers 1) a feminist-Foucauldian account of 
survival that articulates specific ways survivors are limited or rendered incoherent by 
normative discourses of sexuality and 2) a gesture toward positive projects that open up 
alternative modes of survival and more inclusive conceptions of sexual violence, 
selfhood, and survival. In this chapter, I situate my project within the relevant feminist, 
Foucauldian, and queer theory literature and then provide an overview of the structure 
and arguments of my dissertation. 
Situating my Project: Foucault, Feminism, and Queer Theory 
Feminist-Foucauldian Work on Sexual Violence 
For many feminists working on sexual violence, Foucault is not one of the most 
obvious allies, to say the least. His controversial statements on the legal status of rape and 
adult-child sexual relationships
3
 and his seemingly casual treatment of the 
aforementioned Jouy-Adam case have made him an unlikely candidate for this position. 
In his work on sexuality in particular, Foucault’s insistence that we critique the 
mechanisms of the perpetrator’s institutionalization—rather than the perpetrator 
himself—is understandably troubling to those who are chiefly concerned with 
accountability for sexual violence and the effects of this violence on victims and 
survivors. Consequently, feminist responses to Foucault in this area have been largely 
critical. 
I agree that Foucault’s treatment of sexual violence is problematic. But I also 
suggest that Foucault’s critique of normative constructions of sex and sexuality is 
relevant to survivors in ways that Foucault himself did not notice. Extending his critiques 
                                                 
3
See Foucault, “Sexual Morality and the Law”; Foucault, “Confinement, Psychiatry, Prison.” 
3 
to their implications for survivors can thus help us to identify and transform modern 
assumptions that limit the possibilities for survival. 
My project thus builds on and contributes to emerging feminist work that aims to 
bring Foucault into discussions of sexual violence and survival in constructive ways. 
Positive uses of Foucault in the area of sexual violence have been sparse, but there have 
been a few notable exceptions. Laura Gray and Linda Alcoff’s essay, “Survivor 
Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?” takes positive contributions from Foucault’s 
writing on discourse to produce a Foucauldian reading of sexual violence survivor 
narratives.
4
 Johanna Oksala’s book Foucault, Politics, and Violence includes a section on 
sexual violence in which she uses Foucault’s work on power to create a nuanced 
approach to thinking through the relationship between gender and violence.
5
 The 
influence of Foucault’s genealogical method is seen in Ruth Leys’ manuscript, Trauma: 
A Genealogy, and in Shani Orgad’s essay, “The Survivor in Contemporary Culture and 
Public Discourse: A Genealogy.”
6
 Drawing more directly on Foucault’s writings on 
sexuality (along with many of his other works), sociologist Vikki Bell offers a 
Foucauldian critique of radical feminist discourse on incest in her book Interrogating 
Incest: Feminism, Foucault, and the Law.
7
 
                                                 
4
 It should be noted though that Alcoff is largely critical of Foucault’s treatment of sexual violence and 
child sexual abuse. See Alcoff, “Dangerous Pleasures”; Alcoff, “Phenomenology, Post-Structuralism.” 
5
 Oksala, Foucault, Politics, and Violence, 66–79. 
6
 On Foucault’s genealogical method see, in particular, Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” 
7 
In her essay, “Two Modes of Power,” Vikki Bell also analyzes feminist scholarship on sexual violence in 
terms of Foucault’s conception of sovereign power and biopower. 
4 
Most closely related to my own project is the work of philosophers Chloë Taylor 
and Dianna Taylor. In her essay, “Foucault, Feminism, and Sex Crimes,” C. Taylor 
echoes feminist criticisms of Foucault’s treatment of Sophie Adam while also 
demonstrating positive uses of his discussion of the Jouy-Adam case for feminist work on 
sexual violence. Looking at History of Sexuality and Discipline and Punish together, C. 
Taylor develops an account of how modern conceptions of sexual identity and our penal 
system work together to construct sex criminals and produce recidivism. In particular, C. 
Taylor notes that in focusing on “victims and potential offenders” and on stricter 
sentences for perpetrators, feminists have largely neglected questions about how to deal 
with sex offenders outside the prison system.
8
 Connecting her analysis to Angela Davis’ 
critique of the prison and law enforcement as a primary response to sexual violence, C. 
Taylor advocates an approach that addresses both the damaging effects of sexual violence 
as well as the role of institutional responses to perpetrators in perpetuating and 
reproducing violence. Though C. Taylor does briefly mention some of the effects of 
modern constructions of sexuality on survivors, the focus of her essay is the treatment of 
perpetrators. 
On the other hand, Dianna Taylor deals more extensively with survivors in her 
essay, “Resisting the Subject: A Feminist-Foucauldian Approach to Countering Sexual 
                                                 
8
 Taylor, “Foucault, Feminism, and Sex Crimes,” 5. As I point out in chapter four, while it is true 
“feminists” have generally been hesitant to tackle the problems inherent in relying on law enforcement 
systems frequently shown to operate under violent and racist paradigms, it would be more accurate to say 
that white feminists have tended to neglect this issue. See for instance, Chen, Ching-In, Jai Dulani, The 
Revolution Starts at Home; INCITE!, Color of Violence; Hoffmann, “Prisons, Borders, Safety.” By 
identifying relevant links between her feminist-Foucauldian approach and the work of Angela Davis, C. 
Taylor’s essay potentially opens up powerful and fertile connections between Foucault’s work on sexuality 
and the prison system and the ongoing work of feminists of color in the areas of sexual violence, 
community responses, and prison systems. 
5 
Violence.” However, her focus is the usefulness of Foucault’s critique of modern 
subjectivity rather than the role of sex in this critique more specifically. She points out 
that sexual violence has typically been countered by projects that aim to assert survivors 
as autonomous subjects. Drawing on Foucault’s later lectures on subjectivity and 
parrhesia, D. Taylor argues that while projects asserting survivors’ subjecthood perform 
a potentially important function, their liberatory potential is somewhat illusory to the 
extent that they leave intact and reinforce a particular mode of being and self-relation. D. 
Taylor thus maintains that in inviting us to imagine alternative modes of self-relation, 
Foucault’s critique of modern subjectivity offers potential for imagining alternative 
strategies for survival and for countering sexual violence. 
As we will see in chapter three, Foucault’s critique of sexuality is intertwined 
with his broader critique of modern subjectivity. The focus of my project will be on the 
former, that is, on the role of “sex” and “sexuality” in figuring modern subjects and the 
implications of these figurations for survivors. Both critiques (of subjectivity and 
sexuality) raise at least two important, interrelated questions about how we conceptualize 
survivor identity and possible modes of survival: 1) What does it mean for the survivor 
that we attribute to human beings a particular kind of subjecthood? 2) What does it mean 
for the survivor that we view subjects as having a particular kind of sexual identity? With 
respect to the first question, we could ask, for example, what it means for survivors that 
we view human beings as having a core self, the essence of which must be searched, 
discovered, and understood. With respect to the second question, we could ask what it 
means for survivors that “sex” is posited as a key defining characteristic of one’s core 
self. 
6 
While D. Taylor brings in discussion of both questions, her primary concentration 
is on the first question. In contrast, my project focuses on the second question though it 
does include discussion of Foucault’s critique of subjectivity as important to 
understanding his critique of sexuality and as useful for imagining alternative modes of 
survival or alternative ways of relating to the survivor self. Thus, while D. Taylor focuses 
on Foucault’s critique of subjectivity more broadly, my approach deals more explicitly 
with the connection of this critique to sex and sexuality. On the other hand, C. Taylor 
engages more directly Foucault’s critique of sexuality, and we share some of the same 
insights about the impact of sexual identity on survivors. However, her focus on 
perpetrators rather than on survivors moves her in a different direction. My dissertation 
thus draws on the work of C. Taylor and D. Taylor but extends their projects by further 
developing a critique of modern conceptions of survival in more detail and by 
incorporating discussion of Foucault’s critique of the concept of “sex” itself as well as his 
work on madness. In so doing, I develop additional nuances for feminist-Foucauldian 
approaches to sexual violence and survival. I also argue that Foucault’s account can help 
us to point to not just the ways that survivors are restricted or marginalized within 
modern discourses of sexuality but also the ways that particular survivors are 
marginalized within dominant discourses of sexual violence and survival. 
Foucault, Queer Theory, and Survival 
By developing the connections between contemporary treatments of survival and 
Foucault’s critical work on sexuality, I also aim to more clearly situate survivors within 
Foucault’s positive philosophy and other positive projects that draw on Foucault. History 
of Sexuality is generally cited as laying important groundwork for queer theory, where 
7 
writers have taken up some of the themes that will come up in this project (namely, 
sexuality, identity, and normativity). Yet, Foucault’s legacy of seeming disregard for 
survivors in History of Sexuality places queer survivors who might otherwise draw on 
this text and its applications in a position of friction with queer theory’s Foucauldian 
roots. 
Unsurprisingly, given the pervasiveness of sexual violence, queer writers are 
nonetheless addressing experiences of sexual violence and creating positive revisions of 
survival in their works, whether autobiographically, fictionally, or theoretically. Dorothy 
Allison, for instance, writes candidly about lesbianism, incest, child sexual abuse, and 
survival throughout her fiction and essays. In her book, Between the Body and the Flesh, 
Lynda Hart develops the complexities of identity, truth, and knowledge around survival 
in the context of queer communities and queer writing. Ann Cvetkovich’s book on 
lesbian and queer trauma, An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public 
Cultures, includes a chapter on sexual violence and incest. In Public Sex, Pat Califia 
discusses childhood experiences of emotional incest and bondage, discipline, dominance, 
submission, sadism, masochism (BDSM) communities as offering spaces for himself and 
others to work through “old wounds.”
9
 A forthcoming anthology titled Queering Sexual 
Violence, edited by Jennifer Patterson, is also slated to be published this year.
10
 
Many of these projects, though they engage Foucault only tangentially, where at 
all, speak to concerns that are raised throughout my dissertation. In offering a 
“Foucauldian” re-reading of the Jouy-Adam case that undermines Foucault’s dismissal of 
                                                 
9
 Califia, Public Sex, 55, 158–167. 
10
 See http://queeringsexualviol.wix.com/qsvanthology. 
8 
Sophie Adam and survivors more generally, my project demonstrates that queer projects 
of survival can in fact be compatible with and traceable through Foucault. By bringing 
these works together with Foucauldian analysis I hope to help highlight the intersections 
between Foucault, feminist philosophy, and queer theory and to add History of Sexuality 
as a more prominent resource for interdisciplinary projects on survival. 
In addition, Lynne Huffer has recently argued that where queer theory’s use of 
Foucault has focused on History of Sexuality, his earlier work in History of Madness has 
been overlooked as a crucial document in Foucault’s thinking about sexuality.
11
 In my 
dissertation I also look to History of Madness as a resource for positively rethinking and 
refiguring survival in the present, thus contributing to further projects that bring together 
History of Madness and contemporary work on queer theory and sexuality. And 
following queer theory’s emphasis on intersectional and interdisciplinary approaches to 
sexuality I also recommend connections between queer projects on survival and critical 
race theory work on identity as well. 
Sexual Violence and Philosophy 
As I will demonstrate, the issues that I take up in my dissertation with respect to 
identity, knowledge, and sexuality are connected to fundamental questions about what it 
means to be human; these questions thus have a wide philosophical reach. The difficulties 
and incoherencies that my project addresses in these areas are not entirely unique to 
survivors. Rather, these questions are part of broader postmodern critiques of identity and 
knowledge more generally. Given that my project aims to bring together work from 
several disciplines and sub-disciplines—feminist philosophy, Foucault and Foucauldian 
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 Huffer, Mad for Foucault. 
9 
scholarship, critical race theory, and queer theory—my dissertation should provide 
multiple entry points for readers of different interests and backgrounds. And given the 
pervasiveness of sexual violence, and especially increasing recognition of the history of 
sexual harassment and violence in philosophy departments,
12
 it is all the more urgent that 
philosophers take up projects dealing with sexual violence and survival. 
Methodology 
My project has three interrelated components. First, because feminist-Foucauldian 
approaches to sexual violence are under-theorized, part of my project entails the 
development of an integrative lens through which to analyze normative conceptions of 
sexuality, identity, and knowledge in relation to sexual violence and survival. This 
component is accomplished through close reading and explication of Foucault’s major 
works on sexuality in conjunction with secondary criticism in order to establish key 
guiding insights of Foucault’s approach. These insights are then analyzed and evaluated 
in light of feminist concerns about sexual violence.
13
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 See, for instance, Haslanger, “Women in Philosophy? Do the Math”; Kukla, “Chatting with Kate 
Norlock”; Reilly-Cooper, “Some Thoughts on ‘Groping’”; Saul, “Philosophy Has a Sexual Harassment 
Problem.”Haslanger, “Women in Philosophy? Do the Math”; and the frequently updated blog What is it 
Like to be a Woman in Philosophy?, http://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com. 
13
 The primary texts of Foucault’s on which I have chosen to focus are History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, History 
of Madness, and one section of Abnormal (which helps to clarify Foucault’s perspective on the Jouy-Adam 
case in History of Sexuality). I also refer to relevant interviews where appropriate to help clarify points and 
fill in gaps. 
 
Readers may notice Use of Pleasure and Care of the Self (the second and third volumes of History of 
Sexuality) missing from this list. In their continuation of the critique of the desiring subject and exploration 
of alternative modes of self-relation that Foucault begins in the first volume of History of Sexuality, these 
texts have potential value for positive projects on survival once we have demonstrated the relevance of 
Foucault’s critique of sexuality for survivors. However, though I refer briefly to the second volume as it 
pertains to Foucault’s overall approach to sexuality, I do not really engage the last two volumes in my 
dissertation. 
There are two main reasons for limiting the scope of my project in this way. First, Foucault’s extensive 
discussion of classical Greek and Roman sexual practices between men and boys as a source of insight in 
10 
Second, I draw out the theoretical implications of the first component by applying 
a feminist-Foucauldian approach to contemporary examples of survival and to Foucault’s 
own texts.
14
 In particular, I offer a re-reading of the Jouy-Adam case that explores the 
ways in which normative assumptions about sex and sexuality impact not just the 
pedophile (whom Foucault does address) but also the young girl (whom Foucault does 
not address). I then look at other philosophical and narrative accounts of sexual violence 
and survival to analyze the underlying conceptions (sometimes explicit, sometimes 
implicit) of sexuality, sexual acts, knowledge, and identity in view of the insights gleaned 
from Foucault. I also use Foucault’s distinction between “tragic” and “critical” views of 
madness and mental illness in History of Madness to help rethink how we approach 
contemporary survivor narratives. 
The third component involves moving beyond the critique established through the 
first two components to articulate alternative conceptions of survival and create a positive 
feminist-Foucauldian approach to sexual violence and survival. To help with this, I 
                                                                                                                                                 
these two texts is likely to be profoundly alienating to many contemporary survivors (among others). I am 
not convinced that these examples are necessary to getting across Foucault’s positive philosophy or to 
advancing the conversation such that the benefits of sustained engagement with these texts would outweigh 
its alienating effects. Second, where the relevance of History of Madness to Foucault’s positive philosophy 
has been largely overlooked (Lynne Huffer develops this point in Mad for Foucault), omitting the last two 
volumes allows me to focus instead on the connections between History of Sexuality and History of 
Madness, an area of Foucauldian scholarship that is less developed.  
14
 Of course, there are some ironies in performing a feminist- “Foucauldian” analysis of Foucault’s own 
treatment of the Jouy-Adam case, raising questions about what it means for an approach to be 
“Foucauldian.” I am also writing from a post-Foucault present and am thus applying Foucault’s critique of 
a particular kind of subjectivity to a present subjectivity that, given Foucault’s influence over the past few 
decades, has been to some degree shaped by Foucault. (Thank you to Hanne Jacobs for raising this point.) 
 
Yet, as I argue Foucault’s insights have not made their way very far into discourses on survival because of 
his controversial treatment of sexual violence in his texts and interviews. It should nonetheless be noted 
that in calling my approach—at least partly—“Foucauldian” I do not endorse all of his positions, as I am 
sure will become clear. In saying that some of Foucault’s own analysis is inconsistent with other parts of 
his philosophy, for instance, I am interpreting and privileging some aspects of his works over others and 
endorsing perhaps one of many possible “Foucaults.” 
11 
explain some key points of Foucault’s positive philosophy as it connects to sexuality (and 
the offshoots of his positive suggestions as they pan out in queer theory) to consider what 
analogous movements would look like for survivors. In so doing, I analyze feminist and 
queer accounts of survival that address concerns raised through my rereading of Foucault 
and demonstrate how they are connected to Foucault. Finally, I synthesize these insights 
and offer my own suggestions for approaching sexual violence, survival, and survivor 
identity given the points developed throughout my dissertation. 
Chapter Overview 
In chapter two, “Foucault’s Lacuna: Sophie Adam,” I begin by outlining what we 
know about the Jouy-Adam case from Foucault’s discussion of it in History of Sexuality 
and in Abnormal. I look at some of the salient criticisms and defenses of his treatments of 
the case and further the discussion by returning to the unstranslated primary source from 
which Foucault drew his information about the case, Rapport Médico-Légal sur l’État 
Mental de Charles-Joseph Jouy [Medical-Legal Report on the Mental State of Charles-
Joseph Jouy]. Analyzing the original source and comparing it to Foucault’s presentation 
of the case, I find that some of his more inflammatory comments in Abnormal can be 
explained by contextualizing them with regard to the original document and by adjusting 
parts of Arnold I. Davidson’s Abnormal translation accordingly. On the other hand, the 
primary source document also brings to light new information about the case that makes 
Foucault’s inattention to Sophie Adam more troubling in other respects. 
As I will argue, the gap in History of Sexuality with respect to Adam is 
nevertheless illustrative of the place of survivors in certain contemporary narratives of 
sexual violence. As queer theorists Lee Edelman and Pat Califia point out, potential 
12 
victims (particularly children) are often used as justification for policing the sexuality of 
adults in ways that do not actually serve children or victims/survivors well. For instance, 
“family values” or the possibility that a child might witness “gay” relationships is used to 
argue against public displays of affection or full political rights for same sex couples. If 
Foucault could show that Adam is not actually well served by the institutional forces at 
work on Jouy (and that she is perhaps even harmed by them) then he could potentially 
help dismantle this false anchor. 
I think that Foucault does try to accomplish this by minimizing the seriousness of 
the sex acts that took place between Adam and Jouy and by implying that Adam was not 
harmed by them.  However, this is the wrong move in my view. To show that the ways in 
which Jouy is policed is not actually about protecting Adam or other children, Foucault 
need not imply that the institutional response is disproportionate to the crime or that there 
was little or no reason to police the sex acts referenced. Rather, I think Foucault’s 
account would be better served by demonstrating that the particular methods of policing 
Jouy are potentially harmful to Adam. By not attending to Adam and to the possibility 
that she was harmed by her interactions with Jouy, Foucault replicates the child-as-gap 
narrative rather than disrupting it. 
Ultimately, I find that Foucault’s inattention to survivors in History of Sexuality 
represents a missed opportunity for him to further develop his critique of modern 
sexuality and to link his projects with feminists working on sexual violence and survival. 
In chapter three, “Sexuality and Survival in History of Sexuality” I offer a feminist-
“Foucauldian” rereading of the Jouy-Adam case and contemporary narratives of survival 
in light of what History of Sexuality tells us about discourse, power, and modern 
13 
conceptions of sex and sexuality. Extending Foucault’s critique to survivors will 
demonstrate that survivors have a significant interest in Foucault’s projects and that 
feminist approaches  to survival that do not engage Foucault are likely to miss the impact 
of modern conceptions of sexuality on survivors and the stake that survivors have in 
challenging them. 
In particular, my feminist revision of Foucault’s project will show that normative, 
sex-centric conceptions of identity magnify the (already significant) damages incurred in 
experiences of sexual violence. Additionally, these conceptions complicate the 
identification of instances of sexual violence by keeping the identities of accusers and 
accused in the balance. These effects are exacerbated in cases where survivors’ memories 
are uncertain, as is often enough the case given the nature of trauma. Modern treatments 
of “sex” as a coherent and essential category construction also hinder identification of 
sexual violence when experiences do not clearly fit with modern ideas of what constitutes 
“sex.” In general, modern conceptions of sex and sexuality often do not fit neatly with 
survivors’ described experiences, and they thereby marginalize many survivors and limit 
their possibilities for survival. Challenging these conceptions thus has the potential to be 
empowering for survivors. 
 In my fourth chapter, “Queering Identity for Survivors and Other Positive 
Projects,” I consider the question of how to challenge normative conceptions of sex and 
sexuality given what Foucault has told us about the disciplinary functions and 
entrapments of discourse. One of the hints that Foucault leaves us in History of Sexuality 
is that “the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire 
14 
but bodies and pleasures.”
15
 In chapter four I look at interpretations of the phrase “bodies 
and pleasures” within queer theory and Foucauldian scholarship and consider its 
implications for positive projects on survival. In particular, I demonstrate the 
unarticulated connections between queer interpretations of “bodies and pleasures” and 
queer positive projects on survival analyzed and articulated by Ann Cvetkovich to 
demonstrate how they are connected through Foucault. 
In addition, I look at Dianna Taylor’s positive feminist-Foucauldian rethinking of 
survival in her essay, “Resisting the Subject.” Though D. Taylor does not explicitly 
engage History of Sexuality or queer theory in her published essay on the topic, her 
project also speaks to concerns developed through my rereading of History of Sexuality 
and concerns raised by Cvetkovich. Bringing these works into conversation with each 
other, I aim to open up additional spaces for interdisciplinary projects on survival. For my 
own part, I suggest that feminist-Foucauldian and queer projects on survival will benefit 
from looking to critical race work on racial identity. In particular, I turn to Lani Guinier 
and Gerald Torres’s metaphor of the miner’s canary and their conception of political race 
for insights on how we can rethink survival in light of Foucault’s critique of modern 
sexuality. 
Part of Guinier and Torres’s approach involves identifying common interests 
between groups in order to articulate broader goals. In chapter five, “Madness, 
Knowledge and Survival,” I look at some of the obstacles to “linking fates” with 
survivors. Taking Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray’s provocative suggestion that when 
looked at through the lens of Foucault’s work on discourse, survivor speech is best 
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represented as “the discourse of the mad,”
16
 I look to Foucault’s earlier work in History 
of Madness to help theorize some of these obstacles. In so doing, I argue that Foucault’s 
analysis of tragic madness in the Renaissance demonstrates that survivor discourse points 
to a kind of unsayable knowledge that challenges dominant assumptions about modern 
sexuality and subjectivity. Recognizing this knowledge compels communal responses to 
sexual violence and the challenges posed by survivor discourse. 
                                                 
16








FOUCAULT’S LACUNA: SOPHIE ADAM 
In this chapter I examine Foucault’s treatment of the 1867 case of Charles-Joseph 
Jouy and consider what it tells us about the place of sexual violence victims/survivors in 
History of Sexuality. Much has already been said about what is troubling in Foucault’s 
presentation of Jouy’s case in this text and in his lecture on it in Abnormal. In both pieces 
Foucault has been accused of trivializing an incident (or incidents, as we learn in 
Abnormal) of child sexual abuse. Where some have defended or otherwise tried to 
account for Foucault’s treatments of the case, the main points of contention have 
concerned whether Foucault’s language is actually trivializing, whether these were 
indeed incidents of sexual violence, and whether the girl in the case, Sophie Adam, 
experienced the incidents as traumatic. 
To my knowledge no one has returned to the original French report cited by 
Foucault to gauge whether his discussion of the case is at least consistent with the 
recorded evidence.
1
 As I will show, when we do review the primary source Foucault is 
possibly redeemed on some points. Yet, it also becomes clear that he has manipulated and 
omitted some important details. These omissions skew the evidence toward Foucault’s 
reading of Sophie Adam as unaffected by the incidents. In point of fact, Adam reports 
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physical pain and confusion about what happened, though it is not entirely clear what she 
thought or felt about the events otherwise. In addition, the report does not explicitly refer 
to any of the incidents between Jouy and Adam as “rape,” perhaps accounting for 
Foucault’s description of one of the incidents as “almost rape, perhaps [moitié viol, peut-
être].”
2
 However, inclusion of the evidence Foucault omits and attention to the historical 
context of the terminology used in the report suggest, in my view, that Jouy did rape 
Adam according to contemporary understandings of the term. It would seem then that 
faced with an audience that is more apt to sympathize with Adam than with Jouy, 
Foucault has attempted to tip the scales in Jouy’s favor, perhaps in order to more freely 
criticize the medical and legal apparatus “treating” the pedophile. Unfortunately, this 
strategy has instead made readers less sympathetic to Foucault.
3
 
In this chapter I offer a feminist-Foucauldian rereading of the Jouy-Adam case to 
point to what I think Foucault himself misses in his analysis due to his focus on Jouy. I 
begin by laying out the relevant details of Foucault’s presentation of the case in History 
of Sexuality and Abnormal, and I look at the main objections to these presentations as 
well some of the more recent defenses or explanations of Foucault’s approach. Next, I 
analyze the original case report in comparison with Foucault’s discussion of it, noting 
relevant consistencies and differences and ultimately suggesting an alternative reading 
from the one that Foucault offers. Finally, I argue that although Foucault does not 
explicitly theorize the place of victims/survivors in modern thinking about sexuality and 
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perversion, his relative silence about Adam in History of Sexuality is nonetheless 
elucidative, if inadvertently so. In Foucault’s narrative victims and survivors occupy 
essentially a gap in the text. As I will argue, this gap can help us to elucidate the role of 
survivors in some of the discourses that Foucault traces, where victims/survivors (or 
potential victims/survivors) function to theoretically anchor systems of surveillance and 
normalization that are in fact often far removed from the interests of actual victims or 
survivors. 
The Jouy-Adam Case: Foucault’s Telling and Feminist Responses 
Let us turn then to the moment in the first volume of History of Sexuality in which 
Foucault recounts the tale of the “simple-minded [simple d’esprit]” farmhand named 
Charles-Joseph Jouy.
4
 Foucault tells us that at the edge of a field Jouy “obtained a few 
caresses [obtenu quelques caresses] from a little girl” and that he was subsequently 
reported.
5
 Foucault uses this story to draw our attention to a shift in how events like this 
one are framed. This is a moment in which modern understandings of child sexual abuse 
get defined as such, but more significantly for Foucault, it is a moment that illustrates a 
shift in how we think about sexuality broadly speaking.
6
 Foucault’s primary concern is 
not that Jouy is held accountable for his actions but that he is not just held accountable. 
That is, Jouy is not simply found guilty and punished for his crime; instead, he becomes 
an object of scientific scrutiny and examination. He is passed among authorities: the 
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 The Jouy-Adam case is of course not the definitive moment in which this shift took place, but is rather for 
Foucault an event (or series of events) representative of an ongoing shift in how we think about sexuality 
around the time of the case. I talk more about the role of dates in History of Sexuality in Chapter Three. 
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mayor, judges, doctors, researchers, and “experts.” His every inner thought, even his 
skeletal structure and anatomy are measured, analyzed, and studied. Careful observers 
entangle him in discourses that attach new weight and significance to his sexual 
transgression. 
Foucault’s treatment of this case warrants careful consideration not only because 
of the critical attention it has received from feminists but also because of its role in 
Foucault’s critique of modern sexuality. In the next chapter, I develop Foucault’s critique 
of the Jouy case (and the role of this case in his critique of modern sexuality) in more 
detail. For now, I will first address (and ultimately echo and expand) some criticisms of 
Foucault’s treatment of the case and then consider what these criticisms can tell us about 
the place of victims/survivors in the genealogy of sexuality that Foucault traces. 
Part of what many readers have found troubling about Foucault’s account in 
History of Sexuality is that Sophie Adam is largely absent from it. In fact, she is not 
actually named in History of Sexuality, and she seems to be significant primarily insofar 
as her implied testimony marks the point by which Jouy is identified as deviant. Foucault 
does not relay here the conversation that leads Adam’s parents to report the farmhand; he 
only relays that Jouy is reported, turned over to the mayor, to the courts, and so on. 
Foucault’s narrative, at least in History of Sexuality, continues unfolding without her. As 
noted, Foucault’s inattention to Adam has been the subject of much criticism. Kate Soper, 
for instance, is critical of Foucault’s focus on Jouy,
7
 and she claims that Foucault’s 
general style of “clinical detachment” conceals “a somewhat less than objective male-
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centeredness of outlook,” or “covert androcentricity.”
8
 Along similar lines Laura 
Hengehold argues that Foucault’s preoccupation with Jouy rather than with Adam 
“implies that ‘men’ are the primary targets of the deployment of sexuality, and that men 
are the persons who need to be protected from its inquisition.”
9 
She maintains that 
although Foucault does identify “hysterization of women’s bodies” and “pedagogization 
of children’s sex” as two of four major trends that emerge around sex/sexuality in the 
eighteenth century,
10
 his failure to attend to Adam leaves his account lacking recognition 




Foucault’s case is further damaged by his apparent reluctance to condemn sex acts 
between children and adults by his remarking on the “pettiness [caractère minuscule]” of 
the legal, clinical, theoretical investigation into “these inconsequential bucolic pleasures 
[infimes dèlectations buissonnières].”
12
 Linda Alcoff takes issue with Foucault’s 
minimization of the event and his description of the acts as “barely furtive pleasures [ses 
plaisirs à peine furtifs] between simple-minded adults and alert [éveillés] children.”
13
 She 
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writes, “If such relations were reciprocally desired and pleasurable for both parties, why 
did there need to be an exchange of a ‘few pennies’ to ensure the girl’s participation? 
Whose point of view is silently assumed when one determines that the prostituting of 




In Alcoff’s view, Foucault makes unwarranted assumptions about the significance 
(or insignificance) of what happened to Adam without providing any evidence. She 
charges him with “manifest[ing] unfortunately typical male and adult patterns of 
epistemic arrogance.”
15
 Rereading Foucault’s description of the story in a feminist 
context, Soper offers a parenthetical reinterpretation of the event’s significance, asking 
Has Foucault offered us the true moral of this tale? Could it not be that 
what is significant about his discourse upon it is the extent to which it may 
be exonerating, displacing and repressing the ‘event’ that it is really about: 
this ‘alert’ (terrified?) little girl, who runs to her parents to report her 
‘inconsequential bucolic pleasures’ (her distress at being slavered over in a 
ditch by a full-grown, mentally disturbed male?), thus summoning forth a 
‘collective intolerance’ (alarm and sympathy?) over an episode remarkable 
only for its ‘pettiness’ (for the fact that something of this kind was for 
once accorded the attention it deserved?)?
16
 
Soper thus similarly takes issue with Foucault’s seeming assumption that Adam was 
unharmed by her interactions with Jouy, and she reframes the events in terms reflecting 
contemporary perspectives offered by survivors themselves. 
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Others have maintained that when read closely, Foucault’s language is not as 
dismissive as it may initially appear. Mark G.E. Kelly suggests that Robert Hurley’s 
translation of “caractère minuscule” as “pettiness” is partly responsible for the negative 
reactions to this passage, though the latter carries a different connotation than Foucault 
may have intended. Kelly points out that the term “petty” could be taken to mean that the 
medical and judicial procedures for dealing with Jouy “were pointless and should not 
have taken place.”
17
 Yet, a more literal translation to “miniscule character” could 
communicate that Foucault “is merely noting how painstakingly the medical and juridical 
establishment dealt with such a commonplace act.”
18
 Additionally, “inconsequential 
bucolic pleasures” might better be translated as “tiny delights in the bushes”
19
 in Kelly’s 
view, suggesting that Foucault is not asserting that the pleasures are necessarily without 




Where contemporary understanding of sex acts between adults and children is that 
they are abusive and that they typically have devastating effects on children, these 
adjusted translations may not do much to convince readers that Foucault is not still 
minimizing child sexual abuse and its effects. On the other hand, some have argued that 
Foucault is not speaking from a contemporary perspective here. The fairytale-esque style 
of his description of the case in History of Sexuality could potentially be taken as 
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evidence of nostalgia for an earlier time where children masturbating adults in the 
countryside could be described as “barely furtive [à peine furtifs] pleasures.”
21
 However, 
Spencer Jackson claims that Foucault’s shift in tone in this section indicates a stylistic 
break in the text and that Foucault himself is not necessarily the narrator of this scene. 
Rather, we could view Foucault here as taking on the language of a different time and 
place in order to bring us into a moment where our current understandings of sexuality 
and sexual violence are not yet fully formed.
22
 
There are, in my view, some problems in the way that Foucault goes about 
transporting us into this moment. If the Jouy-Adam case is indeed representative of an 
instance (or a time) in which sex acts between an adult and child were not devastating or 
traumatic for the child, as it seems Foucault wants to suggest, then this example could be 
taken to imply that such acts need not be experienced as devastating or traumatic. In a 
contemporary context in which victims/survivors have frequently had their experiences 
minimized or disbelieved, raising this possibility without any qualifications is troubling, 
especially given that the time from which Foucault (or his narrator) speaks is one in 
which women and children had fewer rights, and their complaints, interests, and 
perspectives were taken much less seriously in general. Foucault’s refusal to then move 
back out of this voice in his discussion of the case to clarify what its implications actually 
are for “similar” cases in the present (where victims/survivors do report harm from adult-
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child sexual relationships) thus makes readers understandably reluctant to take this move 
with him. 
In contemporary contexts, of course, the assumption is that any sexual 
relationship between adults and children is necessarily coercive. Foucault wished to 
challenge this assumption, as evidenced by his remarks in a 1978 interview discussing a 
petition to decriminalize “non-coercive” sexual relationships between adults and 
children.
23
 Absent a more nuanced analysis of Adam’s agency and experience (or the 
experiences of survivors more broadly) Foucault’s challenge has the potential to do a lot 
of damage. Simply repealing age of consent laws in a climate in which identity is deeply 
enmeshed with sexuality, in which children do not have full legal status—and in which 
children generally do experience sexual contact with adults as traumatic—is irresponsible 
at best. While Foucault’s project does raise the possibility that adult-child sex acts are 
historically constituted and need not be viewed as inherently traumatic or violent, we 
should not thereby assume that they could or should be experienced otherwise in the 
present or that they should not be criminalized. As Chloë Taylor puts it, 
It is difficult to know how traumatizing rape would have been for a 
peasant girl of this era. Yet even if rape by an adult was less traumatizing 
to Adam than it would be for Foucault’s readers today, this is not only 
because sex has become caught up with identity but is indicative of the 
fact that many girls and women now have greater expectations of 
controlling their bodies and sexual encounters than they have had 
historically….The possible lack of trauma on the part of rape victims in 
earlier eras…does not demonstrate that women over react to rape today, 
but is testimony to the historical abuse of women: so habituated were they 
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to the idea that their sexual destiny was not their own, that even the 
extreme expression of this fact may not have been traumatic.
24
 
At the same time, to respond to Foucault’s treatment of the Jouy-Adam case by asserting 
Adam as necessarily harmed or victimized by the incidents raises another set of issues. C. 
Taylor also points out that in their responses to Foucault’s treatment of the case some 
feminists have made unwarranted assumptions in the other direction, assuming that the 
events were necessarily traumatic for Adam based on their own experiences or the 
experiences of other women a century or more and an ocean away.
25
 
In fact, we know very little about Adam or what the apparent ordinariness of these 
events meant for her, how she moved among these many narratives, or what sense she 
may have made of this curious incident around which so much apparently hinged. In 
Foucault’s lecture on the case in Abnormal (published well after History of Sexuality, 
Vol.1 but delivered prior to it)
26
 we learn additional bits and pieces about Adam, 
including her name. We find out that she is known for masturbating boys on the side of 
the road, an act that is apparently not uncommon among “badly brought up children” in 
the town of Lupcourt in 1867.
27
 It is further reported that Adam’s father “complains a 
great deal about his daughter who is most undisciplined despite all the beatings she has 
been given” and that “the population of Loupcourt [sic]…keenly desire that the little 
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Adam girl be confined in a house of correction until she comes of age.”
28
 In addition, 
Foucault reveals here that the incident between Jouy and Adam was not limited to her 
masturbating him at the edge of a field, as suggested by the brief History of Sexuality 
account, but that at another time and place (a ditch outside a fair) “something happened: 
almost rape, perhaps [moitié viol, peut-être].”
29
 In his description here, as in History of 
Sexuality, Foucault seems to take for granted that Adam does not experience the incident 
as traumatic, in this case because Jouy “very decently [très honnêtement]” gives Adam 
some money that she immediately takes “to the fair to buy some roasted almonds.”
30
 
Foucault also observes that Adam and a friend “laugh [racontent en riant]” and “boast 
[s’en vantent]” to a stranger about masturbating Jouy and that Adam “says nothing to her 
parents simply to avoid being given a couple of wallops [une paire de taloches].”
31
 He 
even goes so far as to suggest that perhaps “it was Sophie Adam who dragged [entraîné] 
Charles Jouy…into the ditch.”
32
 
Dianna Taylor notes that Foucault’s treatment of the case here carries “an attitude 
of classic victim-blaming” in which Foucault employs common rape apologist tactics 
such as calling attention to Adam’s sexual history, suggesting that it was she who 
seduced Jouy, and presenting her visit to the fair as evidence that she was undisturbed by 
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 Ibid., 294–295[278].  
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 Jana Sawicki likewise describes Foucault’s discussion as “smack[ing] of 
masculinist incredulity about the seriousness and reality of rape,” and she expresses 
concern over the fact that Foucault omits the second incident (the rape) in his History of 
Sexuality discussion of the case.
34
 Chloë Taylor refers to Foucault’s treatment of Adam in 
Abnormal as “the most objectionable instance of Foucault’s trivialization of rape.”
35
 
Indeed, Foucault’s reluctance to call the incident rape without equivocation is 
unsettling, and given Foucault’s objective of destabilizing our assumptions about sex, 
probably intentionally so. But it is also confusing. The intention of this phrasing and the 
source of ambiguity for Foucault are not entirely clear. Does Foucault doubt that a sexual 
act was performed against Adam’s will? Is it unclear whether a sexual act happened? 
Does he contest the concept of sexual force itself?
36
 Foucault’s parenthetical suggestion 
that perhaps Adam dragged Jouy implies that it is possible we are underestimating 
Adam’s agency in the situation. It could also be that Foucault’s phrasing points to 
ambiguity in the primary source. In the next sections, I look to the original report in order 
to help determine what it is that Foucault means when he says that Jouy “almost, partly, 
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Almost Rape, Perhaps? 
The primary source is a fourteen page medical-legal report on Jouy’s psychiatric 
state authored by doctors Henry Bonnet and Jules Bulard and published in 1868 (within a 
year of the reported crime). As mentioned, the original report does not actually refer to 
any of the incidents as “rape.” Foucault’s tentative application of this term in the 
Abnormal account should therefore be viewed as an attempt to recategorize the event 
according to a more contemporary understanding of this term. Bonnet and Bulard tell us 
simply that Jouy is charged with “attentants aux moeurs.”
38
 This term is translated as 
“offences against decency” by French historian Georges Vigarello, who describes it as a 
somewhat ambiguous umbrella term that emerged in the French Penal Code of 1810.
39
 
Offenses against decency were typically sexual in nature and included “affront, indecent 
assault and rape…adultery, incitement to immorality and bigamy.”
40
 Thus, the term 
“offense against decency” does not tell us whether Jouy was officially charged with rape. 
This omission could be explained by the fact that the doctors’ focus in the report 
is on Jouy’s culpability rather than his crime. Their task is to assess Jouy’s intellectual 
and moral capacities and to make a judgment as to whether he should be considered 
morally responsible for his actions. Ultimately they conclude that Jouy is a “semi-
imbecile [semi-imbécile]” who lacks control over his base instincts, and they recommend 
that he be exonerated and housed at their asylum.
41
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It is also likely that Jouy was not officially charged with rape. Though Bonnet and 
Bulard’s focus is not on classifying Jouy’s specific crime, the report does contain details 
that can help us to sort out what might have happened. As I will explain shortly, it is 
likely that Jouy’s offense would have been categorized as indecent assault rather than as 
rape, though signs point to the likelihood that what happened would be considered rape 
according to current standards. Internal tensions regarding the nature of Jouy’s crime thus 
help to explain Foucault’s use of the phrase “almost rape,” which captures some of these 
tensions. I will argue, however, that unqualified use of this phrase to describe what 
happened is possible in contemporary contexts only if we ignore Sophie Adam’s reported 
version of the events, as Foucault seems to do. 
For their part, Bonnet and Bulard describe the incident between Jouy and Adam 
as follows: “He [Jouy] convinced the young Sophie Adam to follow him on the road to 
Nancy and, with her consent, performed a sexual act that does not seem to have been 
successfully completed [Il décida la jeune Sophie Adam à le suivre sur la route de Nancy 
et, avec son consentement, exerça un rapprochement sexuel qui ne semble pas avoir 
abouti].”
42
 Two details in particular stand out in this description: namely, that the 
incident was viewed as consensual and that in some sense or another it was not 
“completed.” To better understand what these judgments mean we should contextualize 
them in terms of how sexual assault, rape, and consent were understood in 1867 France. 
Indecent Assault vs. Rape in 19th Century France 
In the decades preceding the Jouy-Adam case, French definitions of sexual 
violence were beginning to shift in a few significant ways. In particular, the Penal Code 
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of 1810 introduced the term “indecent assault (attentat à la pudeur),” which widened the 
range of sexual crimes to include “violence of a sensual nature distinct from rape” by 
criminalizing “acts ‘carried out with violence on a person with the intention of offending 
their modesty.’”
43
 Though application of this provision in court was not immediate, it did 
pave the way for new discussions, questions, and rulings about what constituted a sexual 
crime. Courts began to hear cases from men and women who had been subjected to 
unwanted kissing, touching, or stripping of their clothing.
44
 
Who Dragged Whom? Violence and Consent 
When evaluating these cases, much attention was paid to the question of whether 
or not the act(s) were “carried out with violence,” as mentioned in the code. In the early 
part of the 19th century, violence was primarily interpreted as direct physical force, 
making rulings difficult in cases where there was no clear evidence of physical force or 
harm. For instance, in 1826, a nun reported that a man had “entered her room [at the 
convent] and kissed her ‘on the lips,’ on the pretext of ‘being an angel.’”
45
 In determining 
how to rule on the case, questions centered on whether “the victim [had] been seized hold 
of and manhandled” or whether she had “only been insulted.”
46
 In the end, the court 
lacked the language or precedent to classify the actions of the accused as violent, and he 
was eventually acquitted. 
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In the years between 1820 and 1860, France began to see attempts to account for 
subtler forms of coercion and to create a more nuanced understanding of violence or 
force. In particular, concerns arose around assaults against children in which defendants 
were found innocent due to the absence of clear physical force. Following one such 
verdict in 1827, a local law journal published statements saying “it is certain that the 
majority of assaults committed on young children are not accompanied by any violence” 
and lamenting the failure to “recognize also a sort of violence exerted on [children’s] 
minds…and on the purity of their childhood.”
47
 Courts began to echo these sentiments, 
and the influence of this growing recognition of non-physical force or coercion between 
adults and children can be seen in the 1832 revision of the Code of 1810. According to 
this new revision, physical violence was not required for conviction in cases involving 
children under the age of eleven: “Any indecent assault, consummated or attempted 
without violence on the person of a child of either sex aged less than 11 years, will be 
punished by imprisonment.”
48
 In 1863, just four years before the Jouy-Adam case, the 
age was raised to thirteen.
49
 Around this time, courts were also beginning to acknowledge 
the role of imbalances in authority, intelligence, and social position in creating non-
physical pressures or relationships of coercion between adults as well.
50
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According to the original report, Adam was eleven years old at the time of the 
incident.
51
 Thus, she would presumably have been considered below the age of consent. 
Bonnet and Bulard’s judgment that Adam consented would thus seem to be at odds with 
the law of the time. This discrepancy could reflect the slow transition between law and 
practice. It could also be indicative of the low estimation of Jouy’s intelligence, which 
apparently raised doubts about Jouy’s actual advantage in his relationship to Adam. 
Foucault’s seeming ambivalence about whether or not to call what happened “rape” could 
thus be influenced by the report’s characterization of Adam as a rebellious young girl 
with a sexual history (and presumably, sexual knowledge) in contrast to its 
characterization of Jouy as a “childish [puéril]”
52
 farmhand in whom “the moral sense 
is…insufficient to resist animal instincts when they can be exercised without violence [le 
sens moral est…insuffisant pour résister aux instincts animaux lorsqu’ils peuvent 
s’exercer sans violence].”
53
 Use of the phrase “without violence” here is particularly 
noteworthy. Elsewhere in the report Bonnet and Bulard similarly express their judgment 
that Jouy would not force himself on someone: “Not being wicked, if he had met the 
least resistance, he would have quickly renounced the act to which bad instincts pushed 
him [N’étant pas méchant, s’il avait rencontré la moindre résistance, il aurait bien vite 
renoncé à l’acte auquel le poussaient de mauvais instincts].”
54
 Jouy also maintains that 
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Adam “did not resist [n’a pas résisté].”
55
 She is considered, essentially, a passive 
participant. 
Given the context in which Bonnet and Bulard are writing, the absence of a more 
nuanced discussion of agency, consent, and coercion is not all that surprising. These 
concepts were still emerging (at least around conceptions of sexual acts and sexuality), 
and just four years earlier Adam’s age would have placed her right at the age of consent 
according to the law. Foucault’s seemingly uncritical acceptance of the terms by which 
the doctors characterize Adam and frame her experience of the event is less defensible. 
To his credit, Foucault writes that Adam “more or less lets it happen [se laisse plus ou 
moins faire],”
56
 which could indicate some level of uncertainty about the degree to which 
she did not resist. On the other hand, how do we move from the claim that Adam did not 
resist (or that she more or less lets it happen) to Foucault’s aside that it could have been 
Adam who dragged Jouy into the ditch that day? Notably, nowhere in the report does it 
say that either Jouy or Adam were dragged. However, Jouy does report that it was he who 
followed Adam down the road rather than the other way around. According to Bonnet 
and Bulard, 
In his examination in front of the examining judge, Jouy confesses very 
frankly and naively to the facts of which he is accused. He says that on the 
day of the fest of Lupcourt little Adam asked him for four sous. He 
responded that he would give them to her if she would permit him to do 
that; she did not respond, but headed down the road to Nancy where the 
accused followed, and she permitted it.
57
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[Dans son interrogatoire devant M. le Juge d’instruction, Jouy avoue très-
franchement et en toute naïveté les faits qui lui sont imputés. – Il dit que, 
le jour de la fête de Lupcourt, la petite Adam lui ayant demandé quatre 
sous, il répondit qu’il les lui donnerait si elle voulait se laisser faire ça; 
elle ne répondit pas, mais se dirigea sur la route de Nancy où l’inculpé la 
suivit, et elle se laissa faire.] 
If we accept Jouy’s account (though for whatever reason, as mentioned, Bonnet and 
Bulard say that Jouy convinced Adam to follow him),
58
 there is at least some basis for the 
suggestion that Adam was an active participant, perhaps even leading the way. Yet, 
Foucault’s use of the term “dragged” is still puzzling given that it would imply an even 
greater degree of agency or enthusiasm to Adam than even Jouy does in his own account. 
Jouy maintains that it is he who proposes the act and that Adam simply begins walking 
without saying a word. For this reason, I would suggest that the term “entraîné” which 
Graham Burchell translates as “dragged”
59
 would be better rendered as “led.” While both 
meanings are possible, Foucault’s question of whether it was Adam who led Jouy or the 
other way around is a tension that does arise in the primary source; whereas there is no 
contextual basis to suggest that one or the other was “dragged.” 
It seems that part of the reason that Foucault describes the event as “almost rape” 
then is because the primary source suggests that she may have been an active participant 
and because he thus wants us to question the assumption that Adam had no agency in the 
situation and that the sexual act took place against her will. Based on Jouy’s account and 
the doctors’ judgment that Adam did not resist (and that this apparent lack of resistance is 
a relevant detail), Foucault’s uncertainty about whether the event can rightly be called 
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rape is thus not anachronistic. But, again, I would argue that raising the possibility of 
Adam’s consent in a contemporary context without qualification is reckless given the 
complex power dynamics involved in relationships between adults and children. Thus, if 
presumed consent is the reason for Foucault’s use of the phrase “almost rape” then his 
use of this phrase without qualification is problematic in the context in which he is 
writing. 
What Happened? Attempted Assault vs. Rape 
It is also possible that Foucault’s ambivalence about whether Jouy raped Adam 
stems from uncertainty about whether penetration occurred. What should we make of 
Bonnet and Bulard’s statement that the act was not successfully completed? In addition to 
broadening the definitions of sexual assault, the Code of 1810 also explicitly established 
the seriousness of attempted rape or assault. Increasingly, attempted rapes were classified 
under the general heading of indecent assault (attentat à la pudeur) described above. 
Explaining this application of the term, Emile Garcon writes, “the word assault (attentat) 
in its original meaning was synonymous with attempt.”
60
 
It is likely then that if Jouy’s attempt had been unsuccessful, it would have been 
categorized as indecent assault rather than as rape or even as attempted rape. In fact, in 
the early part of the 19th century it was common for sexual crimes against children to be 
classified as indecent assault instead of rape, even when there was evidence that 
penetration had occurred. In part, this classification functioned to downplay the 
seriousness of the crime. It also seems to have resulted from a widely held myth that 
children could not be raped by adults owing to their small size: “The case law of the first 
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decades of the nineteenth century simply reveals the conviction that the disproportion 
between the sexual organs of an adult and those of a child made the intromission of the 
virile member impossible: the conviction, in other words, that child rape did not exist.”
61
 
Thus, Bonnet and Bulard’s judgment that the sex act (penetration?) was not completed in 
the Jouy-Adam case could be informed as much by this myth as by actual evidence.  
And in fact, some of the details of the case, omitted in Foucault’s discussion, do 
not very well support the description of the sexual encounter between Jouy and Adam as 
consensual or uncompleted, in spite of the doctors’ statements. For instance, Foucault 
notes that Adam does not initially report the incident to her parents and that “it is only 
some days later that the mother, when washing the little girl’s clothes, suspects what 
happened.”
62
 Foucault does not mention what precisely was found in Adam’s laundry, 
presumably leaving us to assume that what the mother finds in the clothes is semen. But 
according to the original report it is not just semen that is found in Adam’s clothing but 
also blood. This is an important detail suggesting that penetration did occur or that some 
form of physical force was employed, or both.
63
 
Additionally, Adam is reported to have described the event in the ditch as follows: 
Jouy proposed to Sophie Adam…that she come with him on the road to 
Nancy; there he lifted her skirts and tried to insert his penis in her genitals. 
The girl cannot say if the insertion took place; all she knows is that it hurt 
badly and that she felt a liquid flow between her legs. 
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[Jouy aurait proposé à Sophie Adam…de venir avec lui sur le chemin de 
Nancy; là il lui aurait levé ses jupes et cherché à introduire sa verge dans 
les parties sexuelles. La jeune fille ne peut dire si l’introduction a eu lieu; 
tout ce qu’elle sait c’est que cela lui a fait bien du mal et qu’elle a senti un 
liquide couler entre ses jambes.]
64
 
That Adam reports pain and confusion about what took place makes Foucault’s 
minimization of the event all the more perplexing and worrisome. In the original legal 
and cultural context of the case, one can see how the doctors could report these details 
and yet still describe the incident as consensual and unsuccessful, particularly given the 
myth that child rape did not exist. It is more difficult to imagine, as a contemporary 
reader, how Foucault could construe such a report from an eleven year old as anything 
but rape. 
Notably though, as mentioned, Foucault does not include Adam’s age in either of 
his treatments of the case. Omitting Adam’s age, her reported version of the story, and 
the presence of blood ostensibly bolsters his portrayal of the institutional response to 
Jouy as disproportionate to his crime. Along these lines, it is also worth noting that when 
Foucault says that Adam and her friend “laugh [racontent en riant]” and “boast…without 
difficulty [s’en vantent…sans difficulté]”
65
 to an adult about masturbating Jouy, Foucault 
is taking quite a bit of artistic license here. The original report states simply that Adam 
and her friend “went on to recount the thing [elles allèrent ensuite raconter la chose]” to 
another villager “saying to him that they had made maton (curdled milk) with Jouy’s 
penis [disant qu’on avait fait du maton (lait caillé) avec la verge de Jouy].”
66
 The 
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villager’s response to the girls is, in the original report as in Foucault’s account, that they 
are “little horrors [petites rosses].”
67
 But the tone of the conversation is not entirely clear. 
The villager’s response could be taken as jovial, or it could be taken as dismissive and 
insulting. In either case, we do not know that the girls’ revelation was necessarily 
lighthearted (let alone whether such lightheartedness of tone was consistent with their 
experience of the events). 
Foucault does thus seem to manipulate the evidence in order to better situate 
himself to critique the pathologizing, psychiatrizing, and institutionalizing forces at work 
in policing Jouy’s sexuality. Yet, it is certainly possible to acknowledge that sexual 
violence has serious consequences for victims and survivors while also acknowledging 
weaknesses in our current systems for dealing with perpetrators. Indeed, as I argue in the 
next chapter, the normalizing discourses of sexuality that cast Jouy as a deviant can in 
fact function in detrimental ways for victims and survivors as well. The aim of chapter 
three will thus be to pick up where Foucault leaves off by extending his critique of 
modern sexuality to its applications for those who have experienced sexual violence. 
Before moving into Foucault’s critique of sexuality and my extension of Foucault’s 
project, however, I will consider how Foucault’s actual narrative about Jouy and 
perversion positions survivors with respect to sexual norms. In other words, what 
discourses about survivors are created and/or reproduced through Adam’s relative silence 
in History of Sexuality? 
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Survivors as Lacunae 
Given Foucault’s general perceptiveness to the way that relationships of power 
shape truths and discourses—and given Adam’s age, gender, her reputation as a 
hypersexual misfit, and the fact that money was exchanged—it is curious that Foucault 
does not explicitly address the power dynamics that shape Adam’s role in or response to 
these events and the recording thereof. Though Jouy and Adam are both enmeshed in 
normalizing discourses, and though Adam is clearly pathologized in Bonnet and Bulard’s 
report, Foucault simply does not seem particularly interested in studying the shape or the 
shaping of her pathology. In his Abnormal account, as noted, he reproduces uncritically 
the doctors’ and townspeople’s characterizations of Adam as a sexually precocious 
troublemaker. In History of Sexuality, where Adam is not actually named, Foucault more 
or less glosses over Adam altogether. Yet, Adam (and children like her) are ostensibly the 
ones for whom Jouy and other pedophiles are policed. 
Whatever Foucault’s reasons for not attending to Adam or other victims and 
survivors in his History of Sexuality account, this omission creates a lacuna in his 
genealogy. I would argue that this gap in Foucault’s text does not run counter to the 
narratives of sexual deviance that he analyzes. Instead, the gap inadvertently alerts us to a 
particular role that the child victim (or potential child victim) plays in anchoring and 
justifying systems of surveillance of adult sexuality that do not necessarily serve the 
children they are supposed to be in place to protect. 
Centering the Perpetrator 
In the Jouy-Adam case, certainly Bonnet and Bulard do not give the impression of 
being particularly concerned about Adam’s well-being or any harm done to her. As 
40 
previously noted, their focus is on analyzing Jouy’s pathology, rooting out to whatever 
extent possible its causes, signs, and manifestations. While containment and prevention 
of child sexual abuse is presumably the goal of this analysis, one can see how the study of 
the sexual criminal is already beginning to take on a life of its own, becoming a fixation 
and fascination in which the child is all but forgotten altogether. 
In contemporary contexts, consider, for instance, the television program To Catch 
a Predator, which ran from 2004 to 2007. On the show, host Chris Hansen confronts men 
who solicit underage girls and boys online when they show up to a camera-filled house to 
meet what turns out to be an undercover agent. Ostensibly, prevention and the well-being 
of potential victims is the impetus for the types of undercover stings and policing of 
online forums that the show portrays. However, it is worth considering the net effect of 
the program on survivors and the role victims (or potential victims) play in the show. The 
clear focus of To Catch a Predator is the public humiliation of the criminal. The show 
plays on viewers’ curiosity (how will the pedophile explain himself?), desire for justice 
(the bad guy has been caught and shamed), interest in separating themselves from the 
morally/sexually perverse (“they” are easily identifiable, and “we” are not like “them”), 
or self-castigation/solidarity (in the case of viewers who identify with the perpetrators), 
and probably more than a little schadenfreude. Victims and survivors themselves are 
rarely represented on the program, in part because the victims in these particular cases are 
entirely hypothetical. 
Nonetheless, some survivors may find consolation in seeing would-be 
perpetrators apprehended and called out in public, particularly given that many child 
victims do not have the opportunity to confront their abusers and in many cases their 
41 
abusers may not have faced any visible consequences for their actions at all. Steven A. 
Kohm informs us that some self-disclosed abuse survivors are in fact volunteers for 
Perverted Justice, the organization that worked with To Catch a Predator and that 
regularly baits and identifies online predators to police, employers, and families. Kohm 
writes, “For at least some volunteers, rooting out and publicly humiliating online 
predators is a personally cathartic experience and a chance to fight back against their own 
victimization.”
68
 Survivors’ presence on the show thus takes place largely behind the 
scenes. 
And in fact, there could be good reasons for the show not focusing on survivors or 
victims. As many feminists have pointed out, preventive measures aimed primarily at 
making women and children less vulnerable to rape risk perpetuating the myth that 
victims are at least partly to blame for their rapes. These measures, depending on how 
they are presented, can also end up putting the burden for change primarily on vulnerable 
populations, rather than on those who commit acts of sexual violence or who contribute 
to normalizing a culture of sexual violence. Focusing on offenders puts the onus for 
change on those responsible for violence. The study of sexual criminals may thus have a 
direct impact on survivors if by identifying why certain people commit sexual assaults, 
we are then able to prevent additional assaults. 
However, the effectiveness of branding sex offenders through shows like To 
Catch a Predator and other court-enforced registry procedures is a source of 
disagreement. Chloë Taylor contends that when sex offenders’ names and photos are 
posted on websites, neighborhood flyers, and billboards, for instance, the effect is the 
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production and reinforcement of a self-identity grounded in delinquency and otherness, 
which can contribute to the likelihood of the perpetrator committing additional crimes. In 
her view, “these disciplinary measures do not so much fashion the subject away from his 
crime as constitute him in terms of it, producing a subject bound to re-offend as an 
expression of his very being, thus leading directly to recidivism.”
69
 If some of our current 
disciplinary approaches to perpetrators do indeed increase recidivism as C. Taylor claims, 
then these systems arguably perpetuate and reproduce sexual violence rather than reduce 
it, thereby making potential victims and survivors less (rather than more) safe. 
In the case of To Catch a Predator, the risk of being caught and humiliated is at 
least not a deterrent for some of the men who show up at the houses admitting to having 
seen the show or to having been previously caught by police officers or even by 
Perverted Justice.
70
 It is also possible, as one author Lindsey Paige Hoffman suggests, 
that by “broadcasting the guilty faces of hundreds of men from coast to coast, of all races, 
classes, and professions” the show could have the unintended effect of “normalizing a 
sickness.”
71
 That is, the program may actually send the message to the predator “that his 
urges are, in fact, normal—look at all the other guys who have them!—and reassure him 
that, really, the only thing he has to worry about is getting caught.”
72
 While Hoffman’s 
point is well taken, there could be something to be said for destigmatizing the “urges” she 
describes if it would mean that would-be predators were more likely to seek help and 
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refrain from abusive acts. Yet, by intensifying the spectacle of humiliation around 
catching the predator (having the decoy greet the unsuspecting predator first, blindsiding 
him with a man in a suit who has come to ask him a barrage of embarrassing questions 
about what he is doing there and what he has in that bag, building to the reveal that he is 
on hidden camera and that this footage will be broadcast publicly, and finally telling him 
that he is free to leave at anytime, only to surprise him with cops with tasers outside) one 
wonders how inspired “potential predators” will be to out themselves by clicking on the 
help links posted on To Catch a Predator’s website.
73
 
Additionally, some have argued that the show is counterproductive to the degree 
that it perpetuates the myth that strangers pose the greatest threat to children when it 
comes to sexual violence. Studies have shown that eighty to ninety percent of acts of 
sexual violence against children are committed by family members, friends, and 
acquaintances.
74
 Certainly, children are vulnerable to online predators and assaults by 
strangers, and efforts to address and eliminate this type of violence are essential. A 
danger arises, however, if viewers take away from To Catch a Predator the idea that the 
majority of offenders are strangers lurking in shadows in the darkest corners of the 
internet. This assumption can result in decreased receptivity to survivors’ identification of 
friends and family members as perpetrators.
75
 It may also be a problem if viewers assume 
that by monitoring children’s online activity the hard work is completed and children are 
safe. 
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Child as Placeholder 
Thus, although To Catch a Predator presumably has as its impetus care for the 
well-being of victims and potential victims, it seems as though this mission is at least 
partly overshadowed by a fascination with the predator that has a momentum all its own. 
The child is conceptually indispensable to justifying the surveillance of the predator. Yet, 
as the surveillance moves beyond what is actually necessary to protect the child, it 
becomes clear that the child is merely a placeholder concealing some other motives or 
interest in disciplining aberrant sexuality for its own sake (a point which is especially 
salient when the harmed child is entirely hypothetical, as in the case of To Catch a 
Predator). 
This move becomes clearer when we consider how the innocent child is 
frequently presented as a justification for policing innocuous sexual acts, as Lee Edelman 
does in No Future. For instance, Edelman points out that right-wing arguments against 
gay people’s rights to marriage, raising children, and serving openly in the military are 
frequently couched in terms of family values and potential harm to children.
76
 Yet, it is 
not entirely clear how equal rights for gay people will actually harm children. Edelman 
writes, “On every side, our enjoyment of liberty is eclipsed by the lengthening shadow of 
a Child whose freedom to develop undisturbed by encounters, or even the threat of 
potential encounters, with an ‘otherness’ of which its parents, its church, or the state do 
not approve, uncompromised by any possible access to what is painted as alien desire, 
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terroristically holds us all in check.”
77
 In these instances, the hypothetical child—always 
presumed to be heterosexual (or at least a future heterosexual)—who will be harmed by 
seeing the open existence of adults in consensual same sex relationships thus functions as 
a stand-in for a politics and belief system that has little to do with protecting children. 
In addition, Pat Califia highlights the fact that the policing of public sex acts is 
often justified by concern for children who may accidentally witness something they are 
not supposed to. Califia notes, however, that some spaces deemed “public” should more 
accurately be termed “quasi-public.”
78
 He argues that often “if people are going to see 
what is going on in these places”—locked bathrooms, cars, or closed booths in adult 
bookstores, for instance—“they must intrude. They must actively look for things that will 
offend them, either by penetrating physical barriers, by setting up covert surveillance, or 
by posing as potential participants.”
79
 Policing of quasi-public sexual acts may thus be 
viewed in some cases, though perhaps not all, as part of a trend in which children are 
used as an excuse to regulate “deviant” sexual acts though the policing may not actually 
serve children at all. And in fact, queer public spaces often provide sources of community 
and healing for adult survivors.
80
 
Role of Survivors in History of Sexuality 
Returning to History of Sexuality, we can see that Foucault’s relative silence with 
regard to Sophie Adam’s place in the history of sexuality could in part be indicative of 
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the fact that the discourses through which the pedophile’s sexuality is constructed and 
magnified render her role as primarily symbolic. That is, it is her testimony that is used to 
classify Jouy as a deviant and to set in motion a series of examinations and investigations 
into Jouy’s deviance. Yet, Adam is not present to this investigation in any significant 
way, whether as an object of study or as someone whose well-being is appreciably served 
by it. If Jouy’s sexuality and the sexuality of the pedophile or pervert are overdetermined 
(as will be explained in more detail in the next chapter), then Adam’s and that of the 
victim/survivor are underdetermined, at least in this context.
81
 The survivor is—in this 
discourse and in discourses like it, as in Foucault’s text—represented by a gap. Thus, 
Foucault’s inattention to the construction of sexuality for Adam or for victims and 
survivors inadvertently reveals something crucial about the construction of survivor 
identity, though this does not place Foucault beyond criticism for his failure to attend to 
victims and survivors in his text. 
 What would it mean then for Foucault to extend his critique of sexuality to Sophie 
Adam? I suggest that drawing out Adam as a crucial character in unfolding discourses of 
normative sexuality can help us to better understand the impact of these discourses on 
survivors. In the next chapter I offer a re-reading of the Jouy-Adam case and 
contemporary survival through Foucault’s critique of sex and sexuality. 
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SEXUALITY AND SURVIVAL IN HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 
In the previous chapter we saw that Sophie Adam and survivors occupy a gap in 
Foucault’s study of sexuality. In this chapter I lay out Foucault’s critique of “sex,” 
sexuality, and the repressive hypothesis in History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, and I offer an 
amended reading of the Jouy-Adam case and contemporary survival narratives through 
the framework Foucault offers in this text. In particular, I develop my arguments about 
the impact of modern discourses of “sex” and sexuality on survivor identity and on the 
identification of instances of sexual violence. In explicating Foucault’s framework I will 
draw on historical and contemporary examples to help illustrate his points and to 
demonstrate the ubiquity and continued relevance of the trends that he describes. 
Foucault’s Critique of the Repressive Hypothesis and the Concept of “Sex” 
Foucault begins History of Sexuality by hooking the reader with a familiar story: 
humans are suffering from repression of their sexuality, and they need only become more 
open about sex in order to free themselves. According to this story (the repressive 
hypothesis), taboo, denial, and prohibition have limited the range of sexual acts one can 
acceptably desire, participate in, or talk about since the Victorian age. To lift these 
restrictions and live a more liberated, authentic life, one need only unlock one’s 
subterranean desires (through self-discovery and talk therapy, perhaps), engage in more 




(rendering productions like The L Word, Sex and the City, and The Vagina Monologues 
inherently transgressive and therefore liberating). 
Yet, Foucault quickly clues in the reader that the purpose of History of Sexuality 
will not be to tell this particular story. Rather, Foucault’s aim will be to undermine this 
telling of the story and to demonstrate how the repressive hypothesis itself functions to 
regulate individuals and populations while convincing us that we are liberating ourselves. 
Where the repressive hypothesis and a focus on what is being prohibited or left unsaid 
come to monopolize our understanding of the history of sexuality, we miss important 
insights about what is being said and the function of other methods of power at work in 
shaping “sex” and who we are. A large part of Foucault’s project in this text is thus to 
draw attention to a different sort of trend in discourses about sex that is not best captured 
by the logic of the repressive hypothesis and that in fact benefits from the construction of 
the repressive hypothesis itself. 
In building his case, Foucault provides evidence that in recent centuries rather 
than silence there has actually been a “discursive explosion” around sex and an 
“institutional incitement to speak about it” led in part by the repressive hypothesis.
1
 In 
particular there has been a proliferation of discourses dealing with “perversion,” that is, 
with any form of sexuality that deviates from heterosexual, monogamous, procreative sex 
acts between married adults.
2
 In these discourses, Foucault identifies several functions of 
power that are productive or creative rather than repressive. As Johanna Oksala puts it, 
power functions in these contexts primarily by “produc[ing] through cultural normative 
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practices and scientific discourses, the ways in which we experience and conceive of our 
sexuality.”
3
 In developing Foucault’s explanation of the productive components of power 
at work here, I will first define some key elements of his framework for this discussion. I 
will then consider more specifically his response to the repressive hypothesis. 
 Contextualizing Foucault’s Critique: Biopower, Discourse, and Repression 
Toward the end of History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 Foucault describes his conception 
of biopower. He contrasts this modern form of power with a simpler form best 
exemplified by the control a sovereign exercises over his subjects. In the latter case, 
power is wielded by a single individual, and this power manifests itself primarily in terms 
of a debit or “deduction [prélèvement].”
4
 That is, the sovereign enforces rule and 
maintains power mainly by subtracting or taking away (property or life itself) through 
taxation, execution, or military deployment. Biopower, on the other hand, is more diffuse, 
and its aim is not to take away but “to administer, optimize, and multiply [life].”
5
 
Biopower functions to track, manage, and regulate groups of people and individual 




Crucial to the development of biopower is the emergence of the “norm [norme]” 
as a disciplinary mechanism, particularly around the nineteenth century.
7
 Mary Beth 
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Mader emphasizes the importance of recognizing Foucault’s technical use of the term 
“norm” to indicate a “statistical sense of a norm as the mean of a normal curve.”
8
 Though 
the statistical “norm” itself is ostensibly descriptive—plotting data and charting trends—
it performs a prescriptive function, “normalizing” individuals in relation to the curve. 
Mader helps us to see why this is case. According to one view, statistical norms are not 
inherently value-laden; they do not tell us whether it is “good” or “bad” to be statistically 
“normal” in various contexts. As Michael Warner puts it, “It is normal to have health 
problems, bad breath, and outstanding debt….It is not normal to be a genius, die a virgin, 
or be well endowed. That, again, tells us nothing about what one should want.”
9
 In this 
view, the norm only takes on an evaluative or prescriptive function after the fact. 
But Mader points out that the posing of a statistical norm actually requires an 
evaluative move that is concealed when the norm is characterized as purely descriptive. 
That is, “identifying” the normal curve involves comparing and analyzing various sets of 
data to determine what constitutes a “normal distribution” for some set of data, such as 
mortality. When mortality data is charted and the patterns differ—among, say, the 
population as a whole, segments of the population that have syphilis, and segments that 
do not—one  curve or set of data is chosen as the one to which the others need to 
conform. Inherent in this statistical/mathematical move is a subjective/evaluative decision 
about which curve represents the ideal or “normal” one and what the normal distribution 
should look like. As Mader puts it, “The identification of normal and abnormal precedes 
                                                 
8
 Mader, Sleights of Reason, 50. For example, Foucault writes that biopower “effects distributions around 
the norm” (Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 144. 
9




the identification of the norm.”
10
 Thus, the normal curve is not an inherently objective 
explanation of data that only takes on an evaluative or normalizing function once it is 
applied or interpreted. The norm itself is representative of an interpretative, evaluative 
move masked as a descriptive one. 
Foucault tells us that in the shift from sovereign power to biopower, “the law [loi] 
operates more and more as a norm….The judicial institution is increasingly incorporated 
into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are 
for the most part regulatory.”
11
 In this schema, rather than discipline and order taking 
place primarily or solely through legal prohibitions or direct commands from a central 
source, humans regulate each other and themselves in accordance with norms. As a 
contemporary example of biopower, consider the Body Mass Index (BMI), which uses an 
individual’s height and weight to track whether one’s body falls into a statistically 
determined “healthy” range. The BMI functions as a norm that is employed by 
institutions and internalized by individuals in order to regulate the diet and exercise of 
bodies, presumably to ensure a healthy, productive population. 
When thinking about the discipline and care of the body and the kind of power 
that is being exerted in the case of the BMI, we can see that the BMI is creative insofar as 
it produces and shapes certain kinds of bodies in accordance with an ideal. We can also 
see that power in this case comes from multiple directions—doctors, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, First Lady Michelle Obama (via the Let’s Move 
campaign), family members, and oneself. Discipline in such cases occurs through 
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complex and shifting relationships of power. David Halperin thus describes Foucault’s 
model of power as follows: “Power, then, is not to be understood according to the model 
of a unidirectional vector from oppressor to oppressed. Rather, it’s a fluid, all-
encompassing medium, immanent in every sort of social relation—though unevenly 
concentrated or distributed, to be sure, and often stabilized in its dynamics by the 
functioning of social institutions.”
12
 It is with this conception of power—as disperse, 
creative, and formative, rather than as unilateral and repressive—that Foucault 
approaches his study of sexuality. 
And in fact, “sex” plays an important role in biopower, in Foucault’s view. 
Wittily, he uses the phrases “sovereignty of sex [souveraineté du sexe]” and the “austere 
monarchy of sex [austère monarchie du sexe]”
13
 in this section, suggesting that “sex” has 
taken the place of the sovereign in this mode of power. Rather than serving a king, 
individuals are preoccupied with discovering the truth about sex and about their own 
sexuality. As we will see later in this chapter, “sex” functions as a target for the 
management of bodies and populations. Individuals’ and families’ “private” lives become 
a matter of “public” concern as sexual data is solicited in service of moral ideals or 
population control exemplified by the normal curve. Though the repressive hypothesis 
claims to liberate us from such controls, it keeps sex at the center of things, thus holding 
us to the same “master.” This point will become clearer in the sections that follow. 
It is also important to understand the role of discourse in Foucault’s conception of 
power. Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray define discourse in Foucault’s use as referring not 
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just to “speech or a collection of speech acts” but also to the rules (explicit and implicit) 
that “structure what it is possible to say” in various contexts.
14
 In other words, the content 
of what one is allowed or expected to say, the terminology one can use and expect to be 
understood, who is permitted to speak and with what authority, and the organizing 
structure of any given speech will all vary depending on whether this speech takes place 
in a classroom, a courtroom, a living room, a newspaper, an e-mail, or a diary. 
We should also note that Foucault’s approach to the relationship between 
discourse and reality fits into broader postmodern or poststructural approaches to 
knowledge. Rather than assuming that there are truths about sex that simply need to be 
discovered and put into language, Foucault maintains that discourse and the distribution 
of various kinds of discourse shape our understanding and concept of “sex” itself. He 
writes, “This oft-stated theme, that sex is outside of discourse and that only the removing 
of an obstacle, the breaking of a secret, can clear the way leading to it, is precisely what 
needs to be examined.”
15
 In examining this theme, Foucault demonstrates that our 
understanding and experience of “sex” are produced through the circulation of various 
discourses and that the distribution of a discourse depends on complex relationships of 
power between individuals and institutions.
16
 
In the case of BMI, for instance, there are a variety of “texts” in circulation. There 
is the formulation of the BMI itself—the rules of its calculation and the division of results 
into categories. Then there are defenses and criticisms of the usefulness of the BMI, 
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claims about the moral or medical meaning, causes, and effects of falling into each 
category, and rules and instructions for maintaining or changing categories. These “texts” 
are articulated in a variety of contexts—e.g., medical journals, scientific studies, 
government websites, blog posts and podcasts, diet plans and cookbooks, doctors’ offices 
and exam rooms, political debates and food stamp legislation, academic classrooms, 
magazines, advertising casting sessions, kitchen tables, and dressing rooms. The degree 
to which any of these “texts” is circulated or accepted will depend on the status of 
existing discourse and on individual and institutional interest, access, authority, and 
material resources.
17
 We can see just from this one example that the systems of power 
and discourse at work in how we shape and relate to our bodies are extremely complex. 
With regard to the repressive hypothesis it is not altogether surprising then that at 
the opening of History of Sexuality Foucault does not attribute the narrative of repression 
to a single opponent. Rather, he opens by telling us that this is how “the story goes,”
18
 
relying on readers’ familiarity with the narrative given its ubiquity. He does gesture 
briefly to Sigmund Freud and Wilhelm Reich, and it is clear that psychoanalysis figures 
heavily in the web of discourses that Foucault aims to critique. For Anglophone readers 
the repressive hypothesis will likely call to mind Freud’s theory of repression wherein 
certain desires or memories are held in the unconscious mind due to some obstacle that 
impedes an individual from consciously acknowledging them. Mark G.E. Kelly draws 
our attention to the French distinction between psychological repression (refoulement) 
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and social repression (répression), and he points out that it is the latter that Foucault uses 
in signifying the repressive hypothesis.
19
 
Proponents of theories of social repression, such as Reich, hold that the primary 
forces acting to restrict sexuality are social rather than psychological. They argue that 
because Freud does not advocate free expression of repressed desires but rather careful 
management of them, his approach is too conservative and does not do enough to liberate 
individuals. They thus view Freud as contributing to social repression of sexuality. Given 
the wide influence and popularity of psychoanalysis at the time of Foucault’s writing, 
particularly in France, most French readers would have been well acquainted with the 
conversations to which Foucault alludes.
20
 Whether current readers are familiar with the 
origins of these conversations, the narrative of Victorian era repression and sexual 
liberation are arguably pervasive enough that they are sometimes still taken in by it in 
Foucault’s opening to History of Sexuality.
21
 
Let us turn then to Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis. In the next 
sections I look at three key pieces of this critique: 1) the identification of counter-
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examples demonstrating the production, codification, and multiplication of discourses 
about “sex,” 2) a critique of normative assumptions about the concept of “sex” itself, and 
3) an analysis of specific methods of power illustrating how various systems (including 
the repressive hypothesis) function to produce and manage sexuality rather than repress 
or liberate it. 
Talking Sex: Counter-Examples 
Foucault says that one question he will pose in History of Sexuality is whether 
“sexual repression [is] truly an established historical fact.”
22
 In responding to this 
question, Foucault does not deny that there has been a history of prohibitions against sex: 
laws forbidding particular acts; religious tenets declaring certain behaviors, thoughts, and 
desires sinful; and codes of decorum limiting where, when, and how sex can be spoken 
about. He also allows that these strictures may have intensified in the past few centuries. 
Yet, it would be a mistake to thereby conclude that people have been thinking or 
speaking any less about sex; focusing on rules and prohibitions creates an incomplete 
picture. As mentioned, Foucault observes a converse trend: widespread preoccupation 
with sex manifested through increased institutional imperatives to talk about and study 
sex.  
For example, Foucault cites the Catholic confessional as one space where 
extended discussion of sex has proliferated as parishioners are not only permitted but 
commanded to search themselves for and confess any signs of sexual impurity to a priest. 
It is true that the emphasis on providing detailed descriptions of sexual acts in the 
confessional did decrease following the Council of Trent in the seventeenth century, and 
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less explicit language was increasingly employed to refer to sexual sins less directly. Yet, 
Foucault notes that at the same time “the scope of the confession…continually 
increased.”
23
 Churchgoers were encouraged to confess not just to acts but to the minutiae 
of their every sexual thought and desire: “a shadow in a daydream, an image too slowly 
dispelled, a badly exorcised complicity between the body’s mechanics and the mind’s 
complacency: everything had to be told.”
24
 Religious attention to sexual sins thus did not 
so much repress thought or conversation about sex as it promoted keen awareness of 




Additionally, Foucault calls attention to medical, psychiatric, criminal, and social 
treatment of sexuality (especially from the eighteenth century onward) as areas where 
production of discourse about sex has continued in increasingly meticulous ways. For 
instance, great attention has been given to studying, describing, cataloguing, and 
diagnosing sexual disorders. Legal definitions of sexual crimes have expanded, leading to 
closer surveillance of a wider scope of sexual acts. Social concerns about population 
control and limiting sexual acts to procreative married adults have involved extensive 
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 Interestingly, shortly after taking office in 2013, Pope Francis himself (channeling Foucault?) declared 
that the Catholic Church has continued to put disproportionate emphasis on sex-related issues (abortion, 
same sex marriage, and contraception) and that “a new balance” is needed in presenting the church’s 
message. Spadaro, “A Big Heart Open to God.” 
26




These initiatives do not repress or eliminate “sexuality” but rather produce it as a 
central and permanent fixture in our cultural and ontological landscape. What is more, by 
maintaining that we are repressed, the repressive hypothesis ensures the continued 
proliferation of discourse on sex as it “sees” sex everywhere and tells us that more talk 
about sex is the key to our liberation. Foucault thus famously remarks on the irony of “a 
society…which speaks verbosely of its own silence” and he wonders “why we were so 




It is in this context that Foucault introduces the nineteenth century case of 
Charles-Joseph Jouy. As mentioned in chapter two, Foucault uses this case primarily to 
talk about the kinds of discourse that are produced about Jouy and how he is figured 
through them as a criminal, sexual deviant, and object of scientific study. In particular, 
Foucault says, “The thing to note is that [the doctors] went so far as to measure the 
brainpan, study the facial bone structure, and inspect for possible signs of degenerescence 
the anatomy of this personage…that they made him talk; that they questioned him 
concerning his thoughts, inclinations, habits, sensations, and opinions.”
28
 As with the 
shift in the scope of confession, it is worth noting the wide range of evidence that is 
thought relevant to explaining Jouy’s sexuality. Though Foucault does not mention it 
here, Bonnet and Bulard also gather information on Jouy’s childhood and upbringing, and 
they include in their analysis statements from the mayor and one of Jouy’s former 
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employers concerning his character and mental/moral capabilities.
29
 Use of this range of 
data suggests a belief that Jouy’s sexual deviance permeates, or can be expected to 
permeate, every aspect of his being from his childhood to his physical makeup. 
For contemporary readers the usefulness of phrenology for creating a meaningful 
criminal or psychological profile will likely be suspect.
30
 However, extensive 
interviewing of Jouy and his acquaintances probably does not seem that unusual. In terms 
of the narrative of repression though, there is something interesting going on here. On the 
one hand, Jouy’s actions are being restricted, and sexual acts between adults and children 
are being prohibited. Yet at the same time, wide-ranging discourses are being created by 
different types of experts (doctors, law enforcement officials, judges) producing various 
kinds of knowledge about Jouy (medical, moral, psychological, sexual). Rather than 
being silenced or having his sexual thoughts and desires entirely suppressed, Jouy is 
instead compelled to speak and to provide evidence—actively through his own testimony 
and indirectly as a character in others’ testimony and through his body itself. This 
evidence is meant to speak to an inner life or essence that will help interested parties 
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Of course, that Jouy was studied and written about does not necessarily mean that 
his case would have been spoken about freely among just any company. Foucault 
speculates that “during this same period the Lapcourt schoolmaster was instructing the 
little villagers to mind their language and not talk about all these things aloud.”
32
 Yet, 
even though the case may have been regarded as an impolite topic of conversation in 
some contexts, the doctors’ recording of the town’s reactions suggest that Jouy and Adam 
were nonetheless subjects of widespread gossip and speculation, whether in hushed tones 
or not.
33
 What is more, institutional interest in and moral value placed upon rooting out 
sexual deviance gives speech about Jouy’s case and sexuality special significance. To 
chatter about Jouy’s crime is not to engage in mere idle gossip but to contribute to an 
important, meaningful, and morally justified discourse. 
What is especially key for Foucault in the previous examples is not just that sex 
continues to be talked about in spite of prohibitions but that discourse about sex is viewed 
as being especially important or meaningful. Gayle Rubin refers to the high value placed 
on sex as exhibiting a “fallacy of misplaced scale” in which “sexual acts are burdened 
with an excess of significance.”
34
 Rather than ask whether ascribing such importance to 
sex is necessary or desirable, the repressive hypothesis reinforces the view that sex is a 
primary defining characteristic of what it means to be human, such that our liberation is 
at stake in speaking or not speaking about sex. In fact, Foucault suggests that the apparent 
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need to pose a political reason and moral justification for speaking about sex may 




We can see then that if the repressive hypothesis supposes that we can liberate 
ourselves by simply speaking more openly about sex, then this is a proposal doomed to 
fail. This proposal conceals the ways sex is already being talked about, the high value 
already placed on sexual discourse, and the disciplinary functions of existing speech 
about sex. Many who are marginalized based on their sexuality are already acutely aware 
that “transgressive” speech and liberation do not always go hand in hand. Ladelle 
McWhorter recalls that when she first read History of Sexuality in 1983 she was already  
intimately acquainted with the grim realities consequent upon sexual 
confession....This was painfully obvious to me: Unless you’re straight-
straight-straight, if you’re honest about your sexuality, liberation is not 
what follows; lockup is. The truth does not make deviants free. For any 
sexual deviant, confession, whatever its benefits, comes at an extremely 
high price. To name oneself queer in our society is to put one’s job, one’s 
family, one’s freedom, and even one’s life on the line.
36
 
While the climate for “coming out” as LGBTQ has improved to some degree in the last 
three decades, McWhorter’s point is still pertinent. Confessing one’s sexuality opens one 
up to other disciplinary mechanisms. David Halperin writes, “If to come out is to release 
oneself from a state of unfreedom, that is not because coming out constitutes an escape 
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from the reach of power to a place outside of power: rather, coming out puts into play a 
different set of relations and alters the dynamics of personal and political struggle.”
37
 
It is crucial then to look more closely at these power relations and to ask whether 
the discourses that challenge sexual repression are really doing something different. 
Thus, Foucault poses the question “Did the critical discourse that addresses itself to 
repression come to act as a roadblock to a power mechanism that had operated 
unchallenged up to that point, or is it not in fact part of the same historical network as the 
thing it denounces (and doubtless misrepresents) by calling it ‘repression’?”
38
 In other 
words, when we claim to be resisting repression is it possible we are really just trading 
one set of norms or form of discipline for another, while convincing ourselves that we 
have escaped them? 
(Not) Taking Sex for Granted: Foucault’s Critique of “Sex” Itself 
When we do look at how “sex” is being talked about we can see that the 
repressive hypothesis assumes that sex is a naturally existing phenomenon, that our 
primary relationship to this phenomenon is defined by desire, and that sexual desire is 
something that can (and must) be discovered and explained through discourse. As 
mentioned, Foucault maintains that “sex” is produced through discourse rather than 
simply described through it. He questions the assumption that sex itself is a biological 
given, and discourages us from thinking of biology as being prior to or separable from 
historical and cultural context.
39
 Foucault’s position is that “sex [sexe]” is in fact a 
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“fictitious unity,” through which it is “possible to group together, in an artificial unity, 
anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures.”
40
 
In building his case, Foucault points out that the term sexe (much like the English 
term “sex”) has multiple meanings. It can refer, for example, to the biological categories 
of male and female, a woman, genitalia, or intercourse.
41
 Through its proximity to 
biological concepts and reproduction “sex” thus acquires “a guarantee of quasi-
scientificity.”
42
 In other words, the givenness of sex has the backing of scientific 
authority. Within the logic of the repressive hypothesis, the assumption is that “sex” is a 
naturally existing phenomenon. If the term sex is invented, what it describes is not. Sex, 
the story goes, is simply a term that points to a group of naturally existing and inherently 
connected phenomena. 
Within this logic, we might wonder how one could even go about contesting the 
view of sex as natural and transhistorical. For example, it seems fairly obvious that 
though the values placed on “sex” may change through time, the biological act of “sex” 
(penile-vaginal intercourse) will remain. Yet, as Foucault points out, our concept of sex 
goes beyond reference to a single, clearly defined act or organ or essence. It incorporates 
sex/gender, various parts of the body, different kinds of touch or types of penetration, and 
multiple conceptions of arousal, attraction, orgasm, pleasure, intention, desire, 
orientation, and (sometimes) love. 
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Even what constitutes a sex act itself is debatable. Questions and disagreements 
among LGBTQ populations about how to define virginity outside of heterosexual 
relationships are reflected on multiple online forums.
43
 Ambiguity about what counts as a 
sexual act among heterosexual couples has also come up in some mainstream movies and 
television shows. In the film Mean Girls, high schooler Regina George laments of her ex-
boyfriend “I gave him everything! I was half a virgin when I met him.”
44
 In an episode of 
How I Met Your Mother, controversy arises over whether Lily technically lost her 
virginity to her college sweetheart Marshall as previously claimed when it is discovered 
that her high school boyfriend may not have “[dived] all the way into the pool” but he 
may have “splashed around in the shallow end.”
45
 Consider also the controversy over Bill 
Clinton’s saying that he “did not have sexual relations” with Monica Lewinsky though 
they had engaged in oral sex acts.
46
 
The artificiality of definitions of sex is further apparent if we consider the ways 
that the meaning of similar actions changes depending on context. For example, while 
having one’s prostate checked in a doctor’s office is supposed to be nonsexual, the same 
procedure performed in pretty much any other setting would be considered sexual by 
most.
47
 The sexual (or nonsexual) nature of a foot rub may similarly vary depending on 
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location and the perspectives of the people involved (which may also differ). Sleeping in 
the same bed, taking off one’s shirt, dancing, kissing, spanking, showering (the examples 
multiply invariably) can all be sexual or not depending on context.
48
 
What these examples help to show is that the term “sex” brings together multiple 
elements of human experience (for instance, gender, reproduction, physical touch, desire, 
relationships, rites of passage, and sleeping arrangements) and then represents them as 
being intrinsically connected, as naturally belonging to a singular group of inherently 
related experiences. But what Foucault demonstrates is that the term “sex” does not 
simply point to a preexisting phenomenon; discourse about sex actively shapes our 
understanding and experience of these phenomena. Through the concept of “sex” bodies, 
sensations, gestures, and relationships are imbued with particular meanings. In saying 
that “sex” is therefore “a fictitious unity,” Foucault is not thereby saying that we do not 
experience these phenomena as connected, but rather that such experiences are not 
necessarily transhistorical or inevitable but shaped by circumstance and context.
49
 
A weakness in the repressive hypothesis is that it takes for granted that there 
exists in each of us an innate sexuality. The proposal that we can free ourselves by 
expressing this sexuality more openly leaves our assumptions about sex and our 
relationship to sex unchallenged. By raising doubts about the innateness of sexuality and 
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suggesting that “sexuality” is produced through discourse, Foucault is instead able to 
identify processes of power by which certain assumptions about sex are produced. 
Productive Techniques of Power around Sex 
Here then let us consider four main techniques of power that Foucault discusses in 
the context of sex: surveillance, production of pleasure, concentration of sexuality at 
particular sites, and incorporation of sex and selfhood.
50
 These examples help to illustrate 
specifically how “sex” and “sexuality” are produced and maintained, which will allow us 
to see more clearly how and why the repressive hypothesis fails, both in terms of 
diagnosing the circumstances of our sexuality and in offering a solution. 
Surveillance 
With regard to surveillance, Foucault notes what happens when adults become 
particularly concerned with eliminating children’s masturbatory habits during the 
nineteenth century. At first glance, it would seem as though what is at work in this 
context is primarily a prohibition, an attempt to disallow and/or deny the existence of 
sexuality among children. However, Foucault points out that the apparent need to stop 
children from masturbating lends itself to the production of a system of surveillance, and 
it creates a justification for being particularly involved in children’s sexuality. In fact, it 
becomes the job of parents and others to catch the child masturbating or at least to elicit 
from the child a confession.
51
 As Foucault puts it, “In appearance, we are dealing with a 
barrier system; but in fact, all around the child, indefinite lines of penetration were 
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 Thus, rather than detaching the child from sex, this system figures the child 
as a sexual being whose sexuality must be the object of constant observation, concern, 
and intervention from parents, educators, doctors, and caregivers. The irony in these 
systems of surveillance is that they shape children’s sexuality as something that either 
does not exist or is to be hidden all the while guarding against it and searching it out. 
Foucault is skeptical as to whether the actual goal of surveillance is to eliminate 
masturbation among children, as this seems like an initiative that is “bound to fail.”
53
 
Along these lines, Ladelle McWhorter suggests that “the war on masturbation continued 
not because it helped prevent masturbation, but because it enabled something else, 
namely, the infiltration of the family by the medical profession (among others) and, 
generally, the extension of extralegal mechanisms of control through some of the 
heretofore most private corners of human existence.”
54
 That is, by setting elimination of 
behavior as the explicit goal of surveillance, institutions gain access to the family 
whereby private behavior can be monitored and managed. 
As a contemporary example, consider the industry of surveillance, parental 
controls, and parenting advice surrounding children and teens’ online and texting habits, 
particularly with regard to sexting, access to pornography, and vulnerability to sexual 
predators. Setting aside questions about the value or effectiveness of such controls, 
Foucault’s aim here is that we consider whether repression is the appropriate way of 
describing the type of power that parents exert over children and teens in these cases. 










While the controls may initially appear to have a primarily deductive function 
(eliminating access to particular kinds of discourse, people, information, or materials), 
the controls also create opportunities for parents to access and regulate their children’s 
sexual thoughts, knowledge, and experiences through monitoring of e-mail accounts, text 
records, and search histories. These interventions inadvertently amplify and widen the 
audience for and attention to children and teens’ sexuality. 
Another example worth considering is the advent of the Christian “purity ball,” 
inspired by a desire to ensure sexual abstinence among young women. Participation 
involves a father or other “godly male role model” vowing to protect the virginity of his 
daughter (or other young woman aged twelve and older) and solidifying this vow by 
attending a fancy soiree together.
55
 To simply view the prohibition of premarital sex 
among teenagers as repressive is to miss how the daughter’s (hetero)sexuality is produced 
here as an object of knowledge and moral-religious concern for the father or father-
figure. 
Interplay of Power and Pleasure 
Additionally, Foucault claims that systems of sexual surveillance create pleasure 
for both the observer and observed, such that there is a disincentive to eliminate them. He 
writes, “These attractions, these evasions, these circular incitements have traced around 
bodies and sexes, not boundaries not to be crossed, but perpetual spirals of power and 
pleasure.”
56
 For example, in the case of To Catch a Predator and related sting operations 
discussed in the previous chapter, we might wonder if the play of power between 
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predator and undercover agent is responsible for the creation of pleasures that keep both 
sides invested in the process. As mentioned, some of the undercover agents for To Catch 
a Predator are themselves survivors of sexual violence who find catharsis in baiting and 
catching sexual predators online. Without diminishing or discounting a sense of justice as 
motivation, it is worth noting that these agents are essentially pretending to be minors 
while participating in sexually charged exchanges with potential predators. It does not 
seem a stretch to imagine that some of the agents are drawn to such projects by curiosity 
or a desire to participate in a morally sanctioned role play that would otherwise be 
forbidden, or that some of them may end up experiencing pleasure in these interactions 
themselves. A similar trend may also emerge among psychiatrists or priests, for example, 




On the other side, Foucault suggests that the observed may experience pleasure in 
the play of power involved in having an audience, shocking or titillating the listener, 
evading discovery, and being discovered.
58
 To be sure, a cursory study of romance 
clichés in television shows, novels, and movies will demonstrate that for many, the thrill 
of secrecy and potentially being caught in a forbidden or hidden affair only multiplies the 
pleasures for those involved. Additionally, while confession in various contexts (e.g., 
religious, judicial, medical, or therapeutic) may initially be externally motivated, Chloë 
Taylor points out that the act of confessing can come to be experienced as something 
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pleasurable in itself as “confessants become convinced by the authoritative claims that 
confession [is] for their spiritual, psychological, and even their physical health.”
59
 
With regard to the sexual offender, many of the predators featured on To Catch a 
Predator are not deterred by the threat of being caught for a first or second or third time. 
If Foucault is correct, then the prospect of being caught could in fact be an incentive for 
some predators. One wonders, for instance, about the man who shows up to the To Catch 
a Predator sting house before police have finished arresting the previous perpetrator. 
Seeing police and a man in handcuffs in front of the house, this next visitor initially 
drives past the house and circles the block. Yet, apparently against his better judgment, 
he returns to the house after a quick phone call to the undercover “teen,” satisfied with 
the explanation that the cops are just dealing with someone next door. It is difficult to say 
whether it is a desire to confess, the thrill of potentially being caught, or sheer 
desperation that pushes the man to show up at the house in spite of recent police 
presence. When asked he says simply, “I’m stupid. I knew better when I drove by I just 
knew better” and “I was bored.”
60
 Many of the men do in fact stick around to answer host 
Chris Hansen’s questions, some to defend or deny their actions, others to confess.
61
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The repressive hypothesis furthers the association of confession and pleasure by 
presenting confession as transgression, as a personal or political good. Yet, the degree to 
which confession actually frees the predator, patient, or “sinner” from the constraints of 
power is clearly suspect. Rather, by encouraging continued expression and proliferation 
of sexual discourse, the repressive hypothesis ensures that sexual deviance can be 
identified and managed by individuals and institutions. 
Localized Concentrations of Sexuality 
In many of the above examples we can see that certain locations and rituals, such 
as the Christian confessional or the doctor’s visit, become “sexually saturated” in the 
nineteenth century.
62
 What is significant here according to Mark G.E. Kelly “is the 
extraordinary attention paid to sex” and the “extension and profuse complexity” of 
mechanisms of control employed.
63
 On the one hand, at a superficial level we are meant 
to believe that sex has been relegated entirely to brothels, madhouses, and the parents’ 
bedroom.
64
 However, the repressive hypothesis tells us that many supposedly nonsexual 
sites and relationships are, in fact, highly sexually charged. Prohibitions against incest, 
premarital sexual acts, and masturbation among children might lead us to think of the 
home, for example, as being a sexually neutral, protected space.
 
Yet, the systems of 
surveillance mentioned, the importance placed upon puberty, and the great deal of 
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attention focused on designing homes to separate boys from girls and adults from 
children all work together to sexualize rather than desexualize the family.
65
  
Rather than recognizing how the extensive discourses surrounding sex and the 
family produce the home as a site of extreme sexual saturation, the repressive hypothesis 
maintains that we are in denial about the sexual nature of the family and that liberation 
lies in recognizing the family unit as inherently sexual. Psychoanalysts suggest that we 
have missed, for instance, that “the parents-children relationship [is] at the root of 
everyone’s sexuality.”
66
 The repressive hypothesis thus does not disrupt but extends the 
networks of power that shape the family as inherently sexual and that therefore mandate 
access to the family in order to regulate it.  
As we have seen, similar trends and networks of power surface in religious and 
medical contexts as well. In these cases sexuality (especially deviant sexuality) becomes 
a permanent fixture to be managed rather than something to be eliminated or suppressed. 
Sexuality as Self-Constituting 
Similarly, Foucault says that sexuality is not just fixed in spaces and practices but 
is also constructed as being fixed in individuals, particularly in individuals deemed 
sexually “deviant.” Interpretations of what Foucault means here vary. Most notably, 
Lynne Huffer has recently called into question the Anglo-American trend of reading 
Foucault’s section on the “incorporation of perversions and a new specification of 
individuals”
67
 in terms of an opposition between acts and identities. Huffer raises 
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compelling points about the weaknesses of the acts-identities reading both in terms of 
consistency with the text and in terms of its political potential. Nonetheless, I will argue 
for the continued relevance of the acts-identities reading given its influence in American 
thinking about politics, identity, and sexuality in queer theory and in studies of Foucault. 
Yet, while my project leans heavily on the acts-identities reading, I maintain that Huffer’s 
reading merits attention and ultimately offers important insights and cautions. I will look 
first at the acts-identities interpretation and then at Huffer’s critique. 
Acts-Identities Reading 
According to the popular Anglo-American reading, Foucault’s argument in this 
section
68
 is that in the nineteenth century a shift occurred in how we think about people 
who engage in “deviant” sex acts. Prior to this shift, the act of sodomy, for instance, was 
treated as simply an act. When the term “homosexual” was introduced, sodomy became 
not something that one did but something that one was, a part of one’s very nature. 
According to Robert Hurley’s translation, Foucault writes that “the nineteenth-century 
homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to 
being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology….Nothing that went into his total 
composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him….The 
sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species.”
69
 
Following this narrative, sexuality is not inherently central to understanding who we are, 
but comes to occupy such a place when it is taken up through specific discourses. In these 
discourses, sex is not viewed as one of many things we value but as one of the most 
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important things, and our relationship to sex is viewed as a primary characteristic in 
classifying individuals and defining who we are. In this construction, the heterosexual 
person is defined by his/her desire for “normal” sex, the queer person by his/her desire 
for “deviant” sex, the abstinent or asexual person by the lack of desire for sex, and the 
sexual predator by his/her perverse or sociopathic relationship to sexual desire. And the 
effects of this construction are particularly intense for individuals whose sexuality is 
deemed “abnormal.” 
We have seen the incorporation of sexuality and identity in Jouy’s case as 
Foucault explains it. The doctors are interested in Jouy’s biological makeup and the full 
range of his thoughts and desires precisely because they view sexual deviance as a 
character trait that permeates the whole self. Again, Foucault argues that the type of 
power at work here does not eliminate sexual deviance but instead “give[s] it an 
analytical, visible, and permanent reality.”
70
 Treatment of sexual acts as indicative of an 
innate disposition and set of desires suggests that sexuality is fixed and unchanging. In 
the case of the sex offender, Chloë Taylor demonstrates that contemporary treatments 
tend to regard the offender as having deviant impulses that cannot be eliminated but that 
can only be managed and controlled. Popular narratives figure the offender as someone 
who may cease committing violent acts but who will nonetheless continue to be viewed 
as a deviant person—or more accurately, as “a monster or non-human animal.”
71
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Indeed, for anyone whose sexual activity or desires deviate from the norm (where 
“normal” sex acts have typically been defined as heterosexual, monogamous, vanilla) 
sexual identity usually has the effect of being totalizing. Consider for instance the 
(problematic) use of such characteristics as one’s mannerisms, haircut, athletic prowess, 
or taste in music to ascertain whether someone is gay or straight. This construction 
figures sexual identity as being such a fundamental part of a person’s essence that the 
many seemingly unrelated aspects of one’s personality, tastes, and life choices are 
supposed to be reflective of one’s sexual desires. The offshoot of this treatment of sexual 
“deviance” as permeating the whole self is the theoretical justification of continued 
institutional interest in the many facets of individuals’ private lives. Indications or hints 
of abnormality are sought out in order to identify and manage them, both in ourselves and 
in others. 
Yet, the assumption that everyone must identify according to sex and that sex is at 
the heart of understanding who we are is not obvious to everyone and may in fact be 
viewed as restrictive. McWhorter writes, “For years I had wondered why categorization 
of people on the basis of their sexuality was so prevalent a practice. Why was sexuality 
so important? I could see no logical or ontological reason for its significance, and yet 
there was tremendous pressure on everyone to take on some sexual identity, to submit to 
sexual classification, to confess their sexual desires.”
72
 The repressive hypothesis 
reinforces and extends the mandate to identify by figuring sex (and more confession, 
more discourse) as crucial to understanding and living as our authentic selves. In so 
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doing, the repressive hypothesis misses the ways in which sexuality is constructed for us, 
and it fails to challenge the assumption that sexual identity is natural or essential.
73
 
Movements to undermine the givenness and coherence of modern constructions of 
sexual identity and to develop alternative ways of relating to the self have thus followed 
from Foucault’s critique, namely under the heading of queer theory or queer politics. I 
will say more about these alternatives in chapter four. 
Huffer’s Reading    
Huffer’s criticism of the acts-identities reading takes two main forms. First, she 
takes issue with the common practice of reading Foucault’s mention of the year 1870
 
as 
his pinpointing a specific moment in history when the “homosexual” was invented.
74
 She 
argues that when Foucault invokes this date (the date of publication of an article by Carl 
Westphal) he is doing so ironically. This irony is indicated by his referring to Westphal’s 
article with the French “fameux.” Though translated simply as “famous” in the Hurley 
edition, Huffer points out that “unlike célèbre, which carries the ‘straight’ meaning of 
famous, fameux is almost always tinged…with a slightly derisive irony.”
75
  Thus, 
Foucault does not intend for this date to be taken literally. In addition, she argues that 
there are verb tense problems in Hurley’s translation that unnecessarily skew toward 
reading the “sodomite” and “homosexual” as existing at entirely discrete moments. Yet, 
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Huffer is right to caution that the shift Foucault charts here would not have been 
instantaneous and that it is unlikely Foucault would propose a clean break between the 
era of the sodomite and that of the homosexual. Still, it is not clear that Foucault means 
us to take his reference to 1870 entirely ironically. Chloë Taylor, for instance, is not fully 
convinced by Huffer’s argument. Taylor writes that Foucault’s use of the term fameux 
“might just mean that he found [Westphal’s article] obnoxious—it does not mean that 
Foucault’s argument in this passage is in jest.”
77
 She goes on to suggest that we could just 
as easily take his language here to mean “that he might have chosen another text or 
another event within that approximate period to make the same point.”
78
 Given that 
Foucault includes a date at all it seems fair to read him as at least pointing to a general 
time period in which this shift becomes particularly palpable.
79
 Even so, Huffer’s point 
that we must think of the “ancient sodomite” and “modern homosexual” as being 
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 Though interestingly, Huffer notes, Foucault gets the publication year wrong. It is 1869 not 1870. Huffer, 




“temporally coextensive” is well taken.
80
 Particularly given Foucault’s analysis of the 
diffuse way in which power moves through various discourses, we should be careful not 
to cast a single event as causing an immediate wholesale shift in how we understand 
sexuality. It seems unlikely that Foucault means to do so. 
Second, and with potentially greater consequence, Huffer is critical of the 
tendency to read Foucault as “contrast[ing] earlier sexual acts with later sexual 
identities.”
81
 She highlights the fact that in the passage typically cited in order to draw 
this claim, Foucault does not actually use the term “identity,” and she maintains that 
Foucault in fact “saw identity, in its personal or political meanings, as a specifically 
American obsession.”
82
 Identity in this American sense typically indicates a characteristic 
or set of characteristics that tie individuals together and shape how we relate to ourselves 
and others; gender, race, and sexuality are common examples. The American concept of 
identity is additionally linked to a sense of group membership that frequently forms a 
basis for political action stemming from shared interests (e.g., feminist, civil rights, or 
gay rights movements). Following along these lines the Anglo-American acts-identities 
reading tends to see Foucault as primarily challenging the mandate to identify as gay, 
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However, Huffer argues that to read this sense of identity into History of Sexuality 
is to misunderstand the nuances of what Foucault is actually saying here. Rather than 
contrast acts and identities, Foucault is pointing to a shift in how we conceive of 
subjectivity and ethical responsibility, a shift from being the “author” of one’s actions to 
being a “character” or “puppet” shaped by normative discourses. Working with her re-
translation of the “acts-identities” passage and reading it in the context of Foucault’s 
work in History of Madness, Huffer holds that what Foucault is marking here is “a 
weakening, a diminishment” of a “thicker set of experiences called sodomitical 
practice.”
84
 This weakening occurs when the “homosexual” and “sexuality” are 
formulated through psychoanalytic and medical discourses. Huffer writes that 
psychological “knowledge diminishes that complex, erotic, relational experience of what 
will become sexuality by capturing it and pinning it down as a ‘figure’ it can use.”
85
 
According to Huffer, this shift echoes the break that Foucault traces between madness 
and reason in his earlier work in History of Madness, which I discuss in more depth in 
chapter five. For now, we can see at least that in Huffer’s view, Foucault is marking a 
significant shift in how we conceptualize and experience ourselves as subjects. The 
“homosexual” is not just an identity, in the American sense, but a fundamentally different 
kind of subject, a subject with a sexuality. This subject, which Huffer also refers to as a 
“subject-turned-object,”
86
 has the sense of being a moral agent with a rich, complex 
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interiority. But this sense of agency is a bit of an illusion, concealing the processes of 
power by which we are constituted as particular kinds of self-regulating subjects.
87
 
By way of getting at what Huffer means here, it will be helpful to return to the 
repressive hypothesis. This hypothesis supposes that the mind is composed of conscious 
and unconscious elements. We can act to explore the depths of our inner psyche and 
liberate ourselves from the social or psychic pressures that keep these unconscious 
elements at bay. Yet, in so doing we take for granted the existence of the conscious and 
unconscious mind. In this construction we are agents, but we are agents acting within a 
framework not of our own making. The repressive hypothesis does not question the 
process by which we come to orient and understand ourselves in terms of psychic depth, 
in terms of a specific psychoanalytic perspective. This psychoanalytic perspective 
organizes individuals to behave and understand themselves in particular ways, namely to 
be subjects with desires and intentions, agents whose agency is directed toward 
uncovering the truth about our sexuality. Thus, the repressive hypothesis takes for 
granted the process by which we come to pass our experiences of bodies and pleasures 
through the language of sexuality, interiority, and desire.
88
 
Whether this more robust sense of what is diminished when “acts” become 
“identities” is entirely missing from queer theory and Foucault scholarship is debatable.
89
 
But Huffer’s close reading is especially helpful in terms of getting at the complexities of 
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what Foucault means when he refers to “an incorporation of perversions and a new 
specification of individuals.”
90
 By making explicit a distinction (which sometimes gets 
collapsed) between subjectivity and identity in a flatter sense, Huffer helps to clarify 
important terms and cautions us against oversimplifying Foucault’s critique. In taking 
Huffer’s cautions seriously I do not think that we need necessarily abandon the language 
of acts and identities, which I will argue has continued value for discussions of sexuality 
and sexual violence. We should acknowledge, however, that in using this language we 
are working with a specifically Anglo-American reading of Foucault.
91
 
Summary of Foucault’s Critique 
As we have seen, Foucault thus draws attention to and critiques several 
assumptions within modern constructions of sex and sexuality. Namely, he argues that 
the primary forms of power at work on sex/sexuality are not repressive but productive. 
He also challenges the framing of “sex” in terms of desire and the understanding of sex as 
natural, necessary, and integral to identity and self-understanding. In the sections that 
follow, I consider the implications of these points for Sophie Adam and for contemporary 
survivors and demonstrate why survivors have an important stake in Foucault’s critique 
of sex and sexuality. 
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Rereading Foucault: Sophie Adam, Sexual Violence, and Survival 
In chapter two we saw that in the Jouy case, as told by Foucault and by doctors 
Bonnet and Bulard, Sophie Adam functions primarily as a gap or placeholder. Her major 
discursive contribution is to describe what happened with Jouy so that a judgment can be 
made about his pathology and moral culpability. While Jouy becomes an object of 
psychiatric and scientific interest, swept up into a seemingly endless parade of discourse, 
Adam is beaten by her parents and most likely (if the town has any say in it) sent to a 
house of corrections. This, of course, is not to say that psychiatry will not eventually get 
hold of her too.
92
 But in this particular moment, 1867 rural France, Jouy’s pathology is 
complex and interesting; Adam is a promiscuous child in need of correction. 
When we extend Foucault’s critique to the discourses and power dynamics 
involved in shaping and producing Sophie Adam’s identity and sexuality, it becomes 
clear that Adam’s sexuality is nonetheless being managed as well. And, as I will argue, 
Adam is also limited by the institutional responses and discourses of perversion 
surrounding Jouy. When we move to contemporary contexts we can see that modern, 
normative conceptions of sexuality are limiting for contemporary survivors as well. 
Sophie Adam—La Petite Rosse? 
As we saw in the last chapter, when Sophie Adam and her friend reveal to an 
adult that they have been “making maton (curdled milk) with Jouy’s penis [avait fait du 
maton (lait caillé) avec la verge de Jouy],” the adult tells them simply that they are “two 
rotten little beasts [deux petites rosses].”
93
 This interaction is indicative of the general 
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response to Adam at least as articulated in Bonnet and Bulard’s report. Adam is not seen 
as an eleven year old victim of a forty year old child molester or rapist, as she would be 
in contemporary contexts, but as a sexually precocious problem child. It is not clear that 
Adam experiences herself as a victim either. At least, the doctors report that she does not 
tell her parents about either incident with Jouy for fear of punishment.
94
 As previously 
mentioned, it is the mother who finds blood and other stains in Adam’s clothing and then 
confronts her about it. Foucault points out that this discovery itself is probably no 
accident; parents during this time were encouraged to examine their children’s laundry 
for evidence of masturbation.
95
 Thus, the climate in which Adam moves is one of 
surveillance and suspicion. Adam also has a negative reputation among the townspeople 
who wish to see her locked up.
96
 She is described by her father as “undisciplined 
[indisciplinée]”
97
 and by the mayor as exhibiting “thoughtlessness in her conduct 
[légèreté dans sa conduite].”
98
 And Jouy reports that he had previously seen Adam on the 
road masturbating a young teenage boy, which Bonnet and Bulard take as an example of 
“lax morals [moeurs…relâchées]” in the town of Lupcourt.
99
 
When Adam’s parents discover and report Jouy’s crime, it may therefore not be as 
much to protect Adam as to try to curb her “promiscuous” behavior. Foucault speculates 
anyway that her parents had “given up on” disciplining Adam and had opted instead to 
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“[plug] into another system of control and power,” namely going after Jouy through law 
enforcement channels.
100
 Similarly, McWhorter speculates that the Jouy-Adam case had 
“become a matter of intense official curiosity and activity—not because newly 
enlightened officials cared about the well-being of little girls but because they wanted to 




In fact, the central questions in the report and investigation are not ones of well-
being or harm (whether physical, psychological, or emotional). Legal and psychiatric 
discourses set the terms of the discussion, which centers on culpability (and measuring 
culpability in terms of responsibility for acts). Authorities want to know why Jouy chose 
an eleven year old. Was it because of circumstance or some innate perversion? Did he 
physically force himself on her? (Would he force himself on someone?) Does he 
understand the moral implications of his actions? Does he have a history of 
masturbating? Did he “complete” the sexual act? What specifically were the sexual acts 
involved? Of Adam they want to know: Did she resist? Does she have a history of 
engaging in similar behavior (and so it was not necessarily Jouy’s idea)? What does the 
mayor think of her (is she an innocent victim or no)? 
Of course, ultimately, the doctors find that Jouy “chooses” Adam because he has 
seen her masturbating boys before and because he is “made fun of [se moquait de lui]” 
when he approaches women his own age.
102
 He knows that what he has done is wrong, 
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yet he lacks self-control and a thorough understanding of the wrongness of his actions 
outside fear of punishment.
103
 Further, he is not the type of person who would force 
himself on someone.
104
 Though they do not say so explicitly, the doctors’ inclusion of 
Adam’s sexual history in their report suggests that they view her past experiences as 
relevant to determining whether force was used in this case. It is also possible that this 




Contemporary analyses of Adam’s case would likely employ more complex 
notions of force and coercion and would also consider the cumulative effects of 
normalized domestic violence on Adam’s experience of her own body. But this is not the 
language that was available to Adam, and it seems unlikely that there were any venues 
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for her to tell any version of the events (to herself or others) outside the one shaped by 
blame and punishment. We do know from the original report that Adam indicated some 
physical pain and confusion about what happened.
106
 But in the context of the 
investigation these details matter only to the degree that they help (or do not help) the 
doctors determine precisely what sex acts occurred. Because the discourses surrounding 
the case are concentrated on Jouy’s culpability, we know very little about how Adam 
experienced these events, especially given that she experienced them in a context very 
different from ours. Given the authorities’ focus on determining whether Adam freely 
chose to participate in sex acts with Jouy or whether he forced himself on her, the 
question of Adam’s well-being is almost an afterthought. 
The story of Jouy and Adam thus reminds us that modern normalizing discourses 
on child sexual abuse begin with a focus on the perpetrator. The climate in which many 
modern survivor narratives emerge is one characterized by specific medical and judicial 
discourses that aim not to serve the victim or survivor but to make a decision about 
whether or not a perpetrator should be locked up. As I will argue, this context helps to 
explain the limits of some of our present concepts for thinking through sexual violence 
and survival. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the questions asked in the Jouy-Adam case 
primarily concern intention, character, force, and cognitive capacity and therefore assume 
and produce certain kinds of subjects. Adam and Jouy are supposed to be coherent 
subjects whose actions follow a teleological progression from desire to knowledge of 
desire to decision to action. When it comes to Jouy, Foucault draws our attention to this 
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framing and its disciplinary role in shaping particular subjects. He shifts our focus from 
uncovering the truth about Jouy’s sexuality to exposing the assumptions embedded in this 
undertaking. 
Yet, Foucault’s approach to Adam actually reinforces the line of questioning and 
assumptions about sex and sexuality that he sets out to challenge. Where the 
contemporary presumption is that Adam has no sexual agency or desire, Foucault 
suggests the possibility of a narrative in which Adam is an “alert [éveillés]”
107
 child who 
laughs about masturbating Jouy and leads him to a ditch to have sex with him in 
exchange for some pennies which can be traded for almonds.
108
 The trouble with 
Foucault’s posing this possibility—or one of many troubles with it—is that it reinforces 
the framing of the incidents as primarily a problem of culpability and desire (or lack 
thereof, as the case may be). Foucault’s argument that the institutional responses to Jouy 
are excessive is partly augmented by his suggestion that Adam probably wanted these 
things to happen and was unharmed by them. Foucault thus gives us a different possible 
answer to the question of whether Jouy raped Adam (“almost, partly, or more or less 
[moitié, en partie, peu ou prou]”).
109
 In so doing, Foucault moves the focus away from 
the truth of Jouy’s sexuality, but he shifts the same set of questions onto Adam. Foucault 
essentially draws feminists and others into a debate about the truth of Adam’s intentions, 
wishes, and her (limited) capacity for consent. Further, he effectively forces readers into 
the position of reasserting the significance of sex in order to defend the importance of 
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taking sex crimes and child sexual abuse seriously. Foucault’s treatment of the case thus 
initiates a string of discursive responses that continually reproduce the framing of 
sexuality (as identity, desire, fixed, important, knowable) that he critiques. 
Thus, if Foucault’s challenge to our assumptions about children’s lack of sexual 
agency is transgressive then it is transgressive in the same way that all speech about sex 
is supposed to be transgressive according to the repressive hypothesis. Foucault’s 
treatment of Adam continues rather than disrupts the discourses that frame sexual 
violence in terms of culpability and intention. Following Foucault’s own response to the 
repressive hypothesis we might instead shift the discussion to ask why it is so important 
to determine Jouy’s degree of culpability, or at least why it is Jouy’s culpability that 
primarily determines the meaning of the events at hand. I do not mean to suggest that we 
ought to abandon questions of accountability for sexual violence. But we should also ask 
about the value and effects of introducing survivor narratives through a framework that 
centers on culpability and normative understandings of sexuality fashioned around 
identifying deviance and perversion. 
When we do look at the effects of this framing on Adam we can see that the 
assumption that sexuality is innate pushes the narrative in the direction of evaluating 
character and reputation in order to determine what happened. In the Jouy-Adam case, no 
one seems to doubt that a sex act occurred. Jouy confesses, and there is the evidence in 
the laundry. But Jouy’s status as “the village idiot” (and Adam’s as a sexual 
troublemaker) also likely play a role in the readiness of authorities and townspeople to 
believe that the events occurred at all. As to the question of consent and force, the report 




someone, he did not. And because Adam is sexually precocious, he would have had no 
need to. Phrased this way these conclusions will seem absurd to many contemporary 
readers. For one, we have a different view of the capacity for children to consent to sex. 
Second, the relevance of victims’ sexual history to evaluating sexual assault claims has 
been extensively challenged. Yet, as I will argue, the remnants of this construction are 
still present in current responses to victims/survivors to the degree that the perceived 
characters of victims and alleged perpetrators continue to play a role in whether or not 
victims’ claims are believed. 
Contemporary Discourses of Survival and Sexuality 
In the next sections I look at three main areas of Foucault’s critique as it pertains 
to contemporary survival: 1) the role of sexual identity in determining how experiences 
of sexual violence are framed and whether or not victims/survivors are believed, 2) the 
role of sexual identity in shaping what it means to be a victim or survivor of sexual 
violence, and 3) the role of conceptions of “sex” and “sex acts” in determining how we 
identify acts of sexual violence. 
Role of Sexual Identity in Epistemic Responses to Sexual Violence 
Given the understanding of sex as identity-constituting, victims’ and survivors’ 
narratives are saddled by the ontological consequences of their claims. In a context where 
deviant sex acts are supposed to say something about the person who commits them—
where these acts mark the deviant in a totalizing way—one cannot speak about sexual 
violence without scripting the identity of another. We saw that in the Jouy-Adam case, 




person who would rape a child. To classify the incident as a rape, the stakes of 
identifying Jouy as a monster or deviant must not be too high. 
In contemporary contexts we know that survivors’ claims of sexual violence are 
still frequently dismissed when these claims conflict with what others—family members, 
colleagues, friends, juries, law enforcement officials, or the public—believe to be true 
about the identity of the accused. It can be more difficult for survivors’ claims to be 
accepted when an alleged perpetrator holds a position of epistemic or moral privilege, 
such as when the accused is white, affluent, well educated, well employed, or just a 
seemingly “good” or “normal” person.
110
 
Additionally, where the accused is a family member, partner, friend, or other 
trusted person, the survivor and others must make sense of how the perpetrator can 
occupy seemingly mutually exclusive categories, such as loved one and rapist. Many 
incest survivors in particular report difficulty integrating the seemingly incompatible 
roles that perpetrators play. Gizelle, who was raped by her father, says, “I split my father 
into two different people….The man who came down and sat at the kitchen table was my 
father. The man who came in the middle of the night and molested me was a shadow. I 
made him into someone else.”
111
 Similarly, an anonymous survivor says, “When my 
father would come into my room at night, I would think, ‘That’s not my father. That’s an 
alien being.’ I’d look at these people doing these things to me and think, ‘Invaders have 
taken over their bodies.’”
112
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In some cases, the difficulty of reconciling the images survivors have of their 
abusers with the images they have of child molesters or rapists functions as an obstacle to 
acknowledging abuse or trauma. Randi Taylor, another incest survivor, explains her story 
as follows: 
I never saw anyone like me in the incest books. I never saw anyone who 
said she had a good relationship with her father. All the perpetrators 
looked like angry, ugly, mean people, and yet my father appeared to be a 
loving, charming, wonderful man. I loved and adored him. He treasured 
me….My sister started reading books about incest, and then she came to 
me and said, “What Dad did to us was incest.” I said, “Maybe for you, but 
not for me. I love my father. He loves me. He never did anything to hurt 




In Taylor’s case in particular we can see that her understanding of her own experience 
hinges on whether or not she is able (emotionally or cognitively) to make the identity of 
child molester fit the image she has of her father. In fact, survivors’ framing of their own 
experiences often begins with what it says about the perpetrator. Becky Birtha writes, “I 
am not able to call myself a survivor of incest. Reluctantly, I do say I am a victim of 
childhood physical abuse. Even to name it ‘child abuse’ is hard—seems harsh and unfair 
to my parents, particularly my father.”
114
 Another woman who suspects she was abused 
says, “I had the symptoms. Every incest group I went to, I completely empathized. It rang 
bells all the time. I felt like there was something I just couldn’t get to, that I couldn’t 
remember yet. And my healing was blocked there. Part of my wanting to get specific 
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memories was guilt that I could be accusing this man of something so heinous, and what 
if he didn’t do it? How horrible for me to accuse him!”
115
 
The difficulty of resolving conflicting images of abusers shows up in family 
responses to incest as well. Incest survivors frequently report being disbelieved and 
ostracized by their families when speaking out about their abuse. When Laura Davis, co-
editor of Courage to Heal, disclosed that she was sexually abused by her maternal 
grandfather, her mother reportedly screamed at her, “My father would never have done 
anything like that!”
116
 Another woman who was molested by her stepfather is told by her 
mother, “He’s so good to you. You’re just making this up.”
117
 These sorts of responses, 
framed in terms of identity and character, are common. The disinclination to believe that 
a family member or loved one is perverse or capable of sexual violence is such that incest 
survivors often face disbelief even in cases where the evidence against a perpetrator is 
strong. One survivor, Judy Gold, says, 
The one thing that brought it all into focus—and it was the hardest thing—
was a memory that I had always wet my pants. I used to hide all these 
sticky underpants in my closet as a little girl. And now I know I didn’t pee 
in my pants at all. My father had ejaculated on me….My grandmother 
found piles of them in my closet and she showed them to my mother, who 
accused me of wetting my pants. I told her I hadn’t done it, but she 
wouldn’t believe me. She punished me for denying it….As I pieced this 
together in therapy, I realized she had to have known the difference 
between urine and semen.
118
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Gizelle, reports that in spite of her needing stitches and her sheets being covered in blood 
and vomit, her mother refused to believe that she had been raped by her father. Instead, 
her mother beat her and told her that she was a “lying, evil, dirty, filthy child.”
119
 
Part of what these disturbing examples demonstrate is that when someone is raped 
or sexually abused by someone known to the victim or the listener, the most immediate 
reaction typically centers on the aggressor. Can we believe that this person would rape or 
assault someone (/me)? If not, if we cannot make the identity of sexual predator fit the 
accused, then another set of questions follows. Could there have been a 
miscommunication? Is the speaker (/am I) lying, confused, somehow responsible for 
what happened? Even where the intent of disclosure is to ask for help or support, this 
disclosure usually sets in motion a set of juridically oriented discourses focused on the 
guilt or innocence of the accused (and the accuser). Foucault’s use of the Jouy-Adam 
case helps us to see why this is the case. Modern discourses concerning sexual violence 
emerge in the context of law enforcement and psychiatric study of the criminal and 
deviant. These discourses are thus not necessarily designed to serve the victim or 
survivor. In this context claims to trauma or harm tend to be secondary to and determined 
by judgments about who is at fault. Though the truth value of survivors’ claims is 
important—both in terms of accountability and in terms of acknowledging the realities of 
trauma—we can see how the juridical framework for responding to claims of sexual 
violence, in centering culpability rather than harm, may nonetheless have limited value 
for the health and well-being of survivors. 
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Additionally, we can see in these cases the effects of modern conceptions of 
sexuality that treat sexual deviance as an identity that is totalizing. The expectation is that 
sexual deviance is so enveloping that someone who commits abusive sex acts must be 
wholly abusive and perverse, such that we should be able to easily recognize child 
molesters, pedophiles and rapists. The underlying assumption is that if perpetrators do 
practice kindness or charity or exhibit “normal” sexual desires in other areas of their lives 
these expressions cannot be authentic and we should be able to see through them. If we 
cannot recognize someone as sexually deviant, he/she must be incapable of committing 
an act of sexual violence or abuse. Or, if someone we love or respect does commit an act 
of sexual violence, this act must negate whatever good things we may have thought about 
him/her. We may even wonder if there is something wrong with us for liking this person 
or for not recognizing him/her to be a “pervert.” 
Of course, the disinclination to believe accusations against people whom we 
esteem cannot be entirely attributable to the way we think about sexuality and identity. It 
is disruptive to our belief systems to learn that someone we hold in high regard has 
committed an act of violence and caused serious harm to us or someone else. But the 
view of sexual deviance as totalizing makes it especially difficult to conceive of 
perpetrators other than as one-dimensional beings. A group of writers representing 
Communities Against Rape and Abuse (CARA) argue that where sexual “aggressors are 
perceived as ‘animals,’ unable to be redeemed or transformed…these extreme attitudes 
alienate everyday community members—friends and family of survivors and 




aggressors accountable for abusive behavior.”
120
 If naming an act abusive, traumatic, 
violent, coercive, or nonconsensual is to simultaneously identify someone as deeply and 
irreconcilably, monstrously deviant then in cases where that identity does not quite seem 
to fit the effect is one of cognitive dissonance. In these instances the view of sexual 
deviance as totalizing functions as an added obstacle to recognizing acts of sexual 
violence. To identify incidents or behaviors as traumatic carries with it the burden of 
identifying a perpetrator as deeply morally flawed, even sociopathic, often at the expense 
of obscuring the perpetrator’s other character traits, whether negative or positive. In cases 
where conflicting identities are too difficult to reconcile, or where one’s emotional or 
material well-being is dependent on the perpetrator’s being a partner or provider and not 
a pervert or rapist, the costs of simply naming sexual violence are very high.  
We can see the effects of discourses of perversion and sexual identity not just in 
cases where the perpetrator is known to the listener or survivor but also in cases where an 
accusation disrupts assumptions about other identity groups to which the accused may 
belong. Survivors whose abusers are women, for instance, often face added difficulties in 
acknowledging their own experiences and having their stories heard or understood. One 
woman who was sexually abused by her mother writes “I find that when I tell my story, a 
lot of people are uncomfortable. People have all these squirmy reactions. It’s almost as if 
they don’t quite believe it….When you talk about women as sexual abusers, it blows a lot 
of myths: Women aren’t sexual. Women are gentle. Women are passive. How could a 
woman do that to a child?”
121
 Men who report having been abused or assaulted by 
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women often face similar obstacles. Mike Lew, author of a support book for male 
survivors of child sexual abuse writes, “A boy faces a particular form of confusion and 
isolation when he is sexually abused by a woman. Sexual activity between older women 
and young boys is rarely treated as abusive. It may be ignored, discounted, or disbelieved. 
Men (even boys) are supposed to be the sexual aggressors, strong enough to protect 
themselves against unwanted attention from members of the ‘weaker sex.’”
122
 The myth 
that women are sexually passive and incapable of committing sexual abuse or assault 
creates added obstacles for men (and women) who hope to have their claims of sexual 
trauma believed and taken seriously. Julia Serano adds that pervasive narratives that 
figure men as predators and women as prey also have “the effect of rendering invisible 
instances of man-on-man and woman-on-woman harassment and abuse.”
123
 Challenging 
essentialist views of sex and gender thus continues to be an important part of 
acknowledging the realities of abuse and making survivors’ stories intelligible.
124
 
In cases where a perpetrator’s identity is consistent with dominant narratives, 
survivors’ claims may be more readily believed. Yet, at the same time victims/survivors 
may also worry about how their claims feed into or support harmful identity stereotypes. 
Given pervasive, racist stereotypes of men of color as violent, some survivors report 
ambivalence (both self-imposed and in the form of pressure from others) about reporting 
sexual violence when their perpetrators are men of color if doing so will feed into 
harmful narratives about race and sexual violence. Max S. Gordon suggests that one of 
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the reasons why many have been quick to defend Bill Cosby in the wake of an emerging 
history of sexual assault allegations is in part be his status as a father figure: “For many 
of us, it is impossible to imagine Bill Cosby is guilty, because he is, or was at one time, 
considered to be ‘America’s Dad.’”
125
 But he also considers the role of race: “It’s not that 
we don’t know there is sexual abuse and pathology in the black community, but as there 
aren’t enough positive representations of black men in our culture, it is seen as a betrayal 
to make it harder on them by talking about, and demanding an end to, their sexual 
violence.”
126
 Similarly, Soledad, a Chicana survivor of incest says that race factors into 
her reluctance to talk about being abused by her father: “Admitting any problem would 
reflect badly on our whole culture. And that’s why it’s still hard for me to talk about it. I 
don’t want anyone to use this against people of color, because there are so many negative 
stereotypes of Latinos already. People are already more willing to trust white men than 
they are men of color. And I don’t want to promote more mistrust of men of color.”
127
 
In addition, in a context where sexual violence is framed in terms of desire, 
whether claims of sexual violence are believed will also hinge on assumptions about the 
identities of victims. Where men, women of color, and sex workers, for instance, are 
hypersexualized in popular discourses, the assumption is that people belonging to these 
identity groups are always consenting and therefore cannot be raped.
128
 Similarly, where 
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dominant narratives tell us that only certain kinds of bodies are desirable, victims may 
also face increased disbelief if they do not fit the narrow model of a proper object of 
sexual desire. Alcoff and Gray observe that “older women and women who are not 
conventionally attractive often have a harder time getting acceptance for their 
accounts.”
129
 Samhita Mukhopadhyay writes that “the sentiment that no one would rape 
you, continues to silence women of color.”
130
 And Kate Harding reports that fat women 
are frequently told online that they “would be lucky to even get raped by someone.”
131
  
Again, these examples demonstrate that where our understanding of sex is 
grounded in particular discourses of identity and perversion, identification of an event as 
constituting sexual trauma will frequently be determined, whether directly or indirectly, 
by our narratives about the accuser and the accused. In the latter case, survivors or others 
may decide that what ultimately matters is not the perpetrator but the harm done. We 
have seen shifts in conversations about sexual harassment, for instance, where defining 
factors have changed to center on how an action is interpreted or received rather than 
how it is intended. And in therapeutic contexts, the focus will generally be on the 
survivor’s experience and understanding of what happened and on the process of healing. 
Yet, it would still be difficult to bypass modern discourses about perpetrators and deviant 
sexuality altogether. Most survivors will have to pass through these discourses in one 
form or another, even if to eventually reject or disregard them or put them on hold. 
Identifying as a Victim or Survivor 
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How one identifies or is identified after experiencing sexual violence is, of course, 
varied and complex. Though victims and survivors obviously do not “choose” their 
experiences, sexual violence does nonetheless tend to be identity-constituting for victims 
and survivors as well.  
Ann Cvetokovich proposes in fact that there are parallels “between coming out as a 
‘lesbian’ and coming out as an ‘incest survivor,’” as both constitute sexual identities and 
“both kinds of coming out can be so devastating to families (both in theory and 
practice).”
132
 I would add that because survivors occupy an identity position that falls 
outside of what is supposed to be the “norm,” victim and survivor identity have the effect 
of being viewed as totalizing. One anonymous survivor says, “I don’t run around telling 
every soul I meet that I’m an incest victim, because I don’t want that to be my 
definition.”
133
 Novelist and essayist Dorothy Allison similarly describes how speaking 
about incest leads her to be seen by others: “When I finally got away, left home and 
looked back, I thought it was like that story in the Bible, that incest is a coat of many 
colors, some of them not visible to the human eye, but so vibrant, so powerful, people 
looking at you wearing it see only the coat.”
134
 As Allison points out, there is a tendency 
for incest in particular to mark survivors in such a way that it becomes all or most of what 
others see. The survivor becomes “that damaged one” or “the one whose father raped 
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her,” and this identity may obscure all others, so that her interests, choices, and desires 
are interpreted primarily through the lens of the effects of trauma. 
Though Allison’s example deals with how survivors are seen by others, this can 
also be a useful way of thinking about how sexual violence shapes one’s relationship to 
oneself. When sex and identity are inextricably linked in such intense ways, 
fundamentally changing one’s identity becomes a condition of recognizing and naming 
sexual violence. And we could argue that the aftereffects of this violence are amplified in 
a context where sex and identity are intertwined. Along these lines, Chloë Taylor writes 
that when 
sexual experience is caught up with identity, one reason that rape is so 
terribly traumatic is that it undermines and determines their [women’s]
135
 
very sense of who they are….The experience of having been raped, or of 
having had sex with an adult when she was a child, will henceforth be a 
determining factor in her sexuality, and in turn her sexuality will be 
central to her sense of being. As a result of supposedly therapeutic 
discourses, rape and child-adult sex have a different and arguably more 
monumental impact today than in earlier times.
136
 
There is some danger in making these claims if they are taken to undermine survivors’ 
claims that sexual violence is fracturing to their core sense of self or if taken to discount 
survivors’ testimonies to the devastating effects of sexual violence. C. Taylor thus goes 
on to caution that Foucault’s critique of sexuality should not lead us to conclude that 
“victims today simply need to take [rape] less seriously,” particularly given that to do so 
would mean to return to an age in which violence against women was commonplace, 
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“placing the burden of change once more on women.”
 137
 And she adds that “the de-
normalization of violence…is a positive historical development.”
138
 
Thus, although Foucault’s critique of sexuality suggests that our experiences of 
sexual violence are not necessarily transhistorical, the contextual nature of trauma and 
sexuality should not be taken to undermine the seriousness of sexual violence. It is a fact 
of our time that sexual violence, abuse, and coercion are intensely damaging to those who 
experience it. Dianna Taylor accordingly concludes that Foucault’s critique challenges us 
to think “about how to mark significance without making a violation constitutive of who 
one is [and] how to de-center an event without minimizing or dismissing it as 
‘inconsequential.’”
139
 In the next chapter I talk more about how we might accomplish 
this. 
In the meantime, in determining how to describe seemingly ambiguous incidents 
or memories, for some it may not seem worth the costs of changing one’s self-identity (or 
of donning the stigma attached to being a victim/survivor of sexual violence) in order to 
describe these incidents as abusive or traumatic. This may make survivors reluctant to 
voice or acknowledge the impact of memories about which they are uncertain or to 
recognize boundary violations that seem minor enough to dismiss. In cases where 
identifying in relation to sexual violence conflicts with one’s personal sense of identity or 
with other identity groups to which one belongs, this may also create an added barrier to 
acknowledging and coping with experiences of sexual violence. For example, Lew writes 
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that for men the process of identifying as a victim can be “demasculinizing…If men 
aren’t to be victims (the equation reads), then victims aren’t men.”
140
 
Of course, victim or survivor identity need not be viewed as stigmatizing or 
totalizing. Taking on the identity of survivor can be a powerful and recuperative way of 
recognizing the effects of trauma and aligning oneself with other survivors. Brison, for 
example, writes that “the surviving self needs to be known and acknowledged in order to 
exist”
 
and that sharing stories of trauma and survival with responsive others is essential to 
rebuilding one’s sense of self and to “reintegrat[ing] the survivor into a community, 
reestablishing bonds of trust and faith in others.”
141
 Still, some might experience unduly 
sex-weighted constructions of identity—and the inherent inclination to identify or be 
identified in relation to trauma—as restrictive. As I discuss in the next chapter, Dianna 
Taylor argues that the language of “victim” and “survivor” is limiting to the degree that 




Further, within the logic of modern normative discourses of sexuality, to be a 
victim of sexual violence is to be fractured, damaged, broken, and scarred. Where being a 
whole subject requires having a sexual identity, and having a sexual identity requires self-
knowledge and coherence, victims and survivors find themselves in a paradoxical 
position. They must articulate an unspeakable violence and integrate their fracturing 
experiences into a coherent sense of self. The construction of desire also requires that 
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they be able to project themselves into the future, yet as Susan Brison writes, “The 
undoing of the self in trauma involves a radical disruption of memory, a severing of past 
from present, and, typically, an inability to envision a future.”
143
 Within this framework, 
the survivor must in some sense always be an incoherent, coherent subject—both broken 
and recovered/recovering, and neither. 
Where survivors are uncertain about their memories or where they do not have 
full access to their memories, as is often the case given the nature of trauma and our 
mechanisms for coping with it, this incoherency is compounded. Survivors in these 
situations often describe feelings of being in an in between space with respect to their 
own identity and understanding of what happened to them. Becky Birtha, writes, “I still 
cannot say that I am a survivor of incest. But I cannot say that I am not.”
144
 Another 
survivor, Lynne Yamaguchi Fletcher, says that without clear memories “much of [her] 
healing has…taken place, and continues to take place, in a void of sorts.”
145
 She writes, 
“I don’t have specific, concrete memories of being sexually abused as a child, but so 
certain am I that I was that being a survivor has become part of my identity. Even without 
the mental images, my body tells me that I was….I recognize that I may never remember: 
After some five years of exploring and processing, I realize that this near certainty may 
be the closest I ever come to knowing my past.”
146
 It is common for survivors to exist in 
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these sorts of ambiguous spaces, which would seem to place them on the outside of 
modern normative discourses of sexuality. 
A sense of otherness for victims and survivors also shows up in the 
intersubjective relationships that follow from experiencing sexual violence. Brison points 
out that to be identified as a victim or survivor is to be detached from others, both 
because of the sense of trust in humanity that is lost through abuse and violence but also 
because there is a tendency to distance ourselves from survivors as a form of self-
preservation. Brison says that after surviving rape and attempted murder by a stranger 
while on vacation, she faces “massive denial” about the events from many of the people 
around her. She writes, 
They cannot allow themselves to imagine the victim’s shattered life, or 
else their illusions about their own safety and control over their own lives 
might begin to crumble. The most well-meaning individuals, caught up in 
the myth of their own immunity, can inadvertently add to the victim’s 




Yet, the inability to have one’s experience confirmed by compassionate others can be 
further retraumatizing and disorienting or fracturing to one’s sense of self.
148
  
What are Acts of Sexual Violence? 
In addition to challenging modern notions of sexual identity, we saw that Foucault 
also calls into question modern understandings of sex itself. According to modern 
conceptions of “sex,” sexual acts should be clearly identifiable and have marked starting 
and ending points. Insofar as such a view of sexual acts lends itself to a similar view of 
sexual violence, modern notions of sex render some narratives of sexual violence 
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incoherent. That is, following particular conceptions of sexual acts, there is a tendency to 
think of acts of sexual violence as having a clearly marked beginning and end, as being 
easily recognizable. This view of sex is challenged by sexual violence that takes the form 
of non-penetrative sexual assault, covert incest, non-enthusiastic assent, verbal street 
harassment, and sexual boundary violations that for whatever reason do not cohere to 
widely known and accepted figurations of what constitutes sex, rape, abuse, or 
harassment. These events challenge our understanding of sexual acts, but our 
understanding of sexual acts also poses challenges to identifying these events as 
constituting sexual violence though they may be experienced as such. 
For example, philosopher Rebecca Reilly-Cooper writes about her experiences 
with uninvited touching at an academic conference: 
Just over a year ago, at an academic conference, something unpleasant 
happened to me….Over a period of perhaps twenty minutes, another 
delegate at the conference—repeatedly and without my consent—touched 
my head, hair, neck, lower back, inside of my forearms, all the while 
indifferent to my distress and discomfort.
149
 
Reilly-Cooper goes on to explain that part of what was distressing about this incident is 
that she was not entirely sure how to explain what had happened, “what type of incident 
this was; what label to give it, what category to assign it to.”
150
 Without language to 
describe the incident (Is it sexual? Is it an assault? Is it harassment?), Reilly-Cooper 
reports that she has difficulty making sense of it or communicating what happened to 
conference organizers or others.  
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Bass and Davis maintain that one can experience sexual trauma without 
undergoing an overt assault. They write that there are, “times when women don’t have 
memories of sexual abuse because no specific incidents took place. Instead you may have 
been subjected to an environment of inappropriate boundaries, lewd looks, sexually 
suggestive behavior, or emotional incest.”
151
 One woman writes, for instance, “My father 
made me his wife. After my mother died, he put me in her place. He’d send me bouquets 
of flowers addressed to ‘My darling,’ he’d bring me fancy chocolates, he’d dress me up. 
He even bought me a ring with a diamond chip and put it on my finger. Everyone thought 
he was so devoted, so charming. But it was sick and it left me hopelessly confused.”
152
 
Randi Taylor, whose story is mentioned above, describes a home environment where she 
frequently felt sexually violated or unsafe though she was unsure how to classify her 
father’s actions. For example, she says, “A lot of times while he was tickling me, he’d 
reach his hand around and cup my breast…I’d tell him to stop, and he’d say ‘Oh gee, did 
I slip? I didn’t mean to.’ It was in the same tone as someone who just poured a glass of 
water on you and said, ‘Oops! I didn’t mean to do that.’ He made a mockery of it.”
153
 
The tone of these incidents and the possibility of dismissing them as “accidental” 
leaves Taylor confused about how to categorize her father’s actions, though she describes 
feeling “invaded and ashamed” and “always afraid of what [he was] going to do.”
154
 
Ultimately it is a more overt incident that keeps her from dismissing her feelings and that 
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she says “allowed [her] to feel anger at him later on.”
155
 She describes the incident as 
follows: 
He’d brought home some felt-tipped pens, and the game he had in mind 
was to decorate my breasts. He made me pull up my nightgown and he 
drew on my body. He made my two breasts into eyes, and then he drew a 
nose and a mouth below it. His hands were shaking and his breath was 
really hot while he was doing that. And all the time, he was joking and 
teasing. It was horrible for me.
156
 




These examples highlight an internal tension in modern conceptions of “sex.” On 
the one hand, as Foucault points out, the concept of “sex” brings together a wide range of 
objects and experiences (“anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, 
sensations, and pleasures”).
158
 There is accordingly some ambiguity in what counts as 
“sex” (and precisely what constitutes a “sex act” or a “sexual” act). This ambiguity leaves 
confusion about how to describe actions that feel intrusive and sexual without being 
clearly or overtly so. At the same time, the “quasi-scientificity”
159
 of sex implies the 
possibility of objective knowledge about sex. We should know, or should at least be able 
to know, what constitutes sex, sex acts, and sexual acts. Where the assumption is that 
“sex” is a naturally occurring, coherent, scientific phenomenon, the parenthetical 
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assumption is that sexual acts (and acts of sexual violence) are easily identifiable. But, of 
course, this is not always the case. 
In addition, domestic sexual abuse is often intermixed with emotional, verbal, or 
psychic abuses that extend into and traverse the many terrains of daily life, such that it 
may be counterintuitive to try to conceptualize acts of sexual violence as being clearly 
identifiable, as having a clear starting and ending point. Challenging modern conceptions 
of “sex” thus has the potential to broaden our understanding of sexual violence to be 
more inclusive of survivors whose experiences are caught up in these internal tensions. 
On this note, a case could be made (and perhaps it is a case Foucault himself 
would make) that the ideas of covert incest or abuse that is ambiguously sexual are 
themselves a symptom of the repressive hypothesis, of the inclination to produce “sex” as 
being present everywhere. Yet, the issue in cases of covert or emotional incest, for 
example, is that the child’s emotional needs are made secondary to the parent’s. Kenneth 
M. Adams writes that in these instances, “Children feel icky, too close, and enmeshed in 
the adult world of the marital and sexual frustrations of the parent.”
160
 I suggest that the 
problem with the repressive hypothesis here is not so much that it tells us these 
relationships are “sexual” but rather that, as I argue in this chapter, it frames the issue in 
terms of intent and desire. In Randi Taylor’s case or in the case of the daughter who 
reports feeling like a surrogate wife after her mother’s death, modern notions of sexuality 
are such that to call such a relationship incestuous or abusive is to attribute sexual intent 
to the father and cast him as a pervert, which is likely to impede acknowledgement of 
perceived harms. 
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As we can see, extending Foucault’s critique of modern, normative conceptions of 
sex and sexuality can help us to pinpoint some of the obstacles faced by contemporary 
survivors in contexts where these conceptions persist. Though this chapter paints a 
somewhat bleak picture, I draw out these obstacles with an eye toward spinning out the 
possibilities that open up for survivors when we begin challenging the assumptions that 
create these obstacles. Part of the goal of my project is to demonstrate that situating 
survivors more clearly within Foucault’s critical philosophy can help us to more readily 
imagine the place of survivors within positive projects that draw on Foucault. In the next 
chapter, I look at some of these positive projects and suggest directions for positively 









QUEERING IDENTITY FOR SURVIVORS 
AND OTHER POSITIVE PROJECTS 
In the previous chapter I outlined key components of Foucault’s critique of 
modern sexuality as he presents it in History of Sexuality, Vol. 1. I then argued for the 
relevance of this critique for contemporary survivors in terms of how we think through 
identity and naming acts of sexual violence. As we saw, modern ways of figuring 
sexuality do not fully capture the complexities of all experiences of sexual violence. 
These figurations also amplify the damages of sexual violence and complicate the 
identification of instances of sexual violence by figuring this violence as necessarily 
central to one’s identity (for victims or survivors as well as for perpetrators). 
Yet, the question remains how to go about challenging normative conceptions of 
sexuality and creating alternative ways of thinking through sexual violence and survival. 
Where victims/survivors have frequently been silenced through threats from abusers or 
through shame, stigma, or taboo around speaking openly about sexual violence, 
movements to eradicate sexual violence have often formed around the paradigm of 
“breaking the silence.” In the early nineties Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray observed, 
This strategic metaphor of “breaking the silence” is virtually ubiquitous 
throughout the movement: survivor demonstrations are called ‘speak 
outs,’ the name of the largest national network of survivors of childhood 






titles such as I Never Told Anyone, Voices in the Night, Speaking Out, 
Fighting Back, and No More Secrets.
1
 
More recently, as we saw in the previous chapter, Susan Brison, has advocated telling 
one’s story to empathic others as essential to surviving sexual violence.
2
 And 
contemporary groups such as Speak Up Speak Out, SOAR (Speaking Out About Rape), 
and Hollaback!
3
 continue the theme of speaking out against sexual violence and 
harassment. Because survivors frequently report that shame and pressure not to talk about 
sexual violence (or not to talk about it too much) is in itself damaging, the movement to 
make space for survivors to speak is a potentially powerful one. As Ann Cvetkovich 
writes, “many narratives by survivors of incest and sexual abuse indicate that the trauma 
resides as much in secrecy as in sexual abuse—the burden not to tell creates its own 
network of psychic wounds that far exceed the event itself.”
4
 Thus, challenging the 
stigma around speaking about sexual violence would seem to be an important component 
of political change and personal healing around this violence. 
At the same time, given Foucault’s points about discourse and power, we may 
wonder about the effectiveness of strategies centered on breaking the silence or on 
speaking out about sexual violence. The idea that victims and survivors have been 
silenced by taboos (and that breaking this silence is key to liberating victims and 
survivors) sounds somewhat similar to the repressive hypothesis (which states that we are 
sexually repressed and need to speak more about sex in order to liberate ourselves). 
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Given Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis, we may then be suspicious of 
enjoinders to speak out about sexual violence or wary of assumptions that this speaking 
out will necessarily be transgressive or transformative. Whether or not survivor speech is 
analogous to the discourses of repression and liberation that Foucault critiques,
5
 his 
analysis nonetheless raises questions about how to challenge modern conceptions of 
sexuality. Given the pervasiveness of these conceptions in structuring our thinking and 
given the seeming inescapability of the disciplinary entanglements of discourse, how do 
we make certain that survivor discourse does not simply reinforce systems of thought that 
are limiting or harmful for survivors? How do we ensure that this discourse is actually 
transformative in the spaces where assumptions about sexual violence, survival, and 
sexuality need to be transformed? 
Foucault tells us in the second volume of History of Sexuality that, as in many of 
his other histories, his aim in this series is to “free thought from what it silently thinks, 
and so enable it to think differently.”
6
 But Foucault was notoriously reluctant to tell us 
very specifically how we ought to think differently. While he offers some clues along the 
way, his own critique of normalizing discourses leaves him understandably cautious 
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about potentially replacing one rigid set of norms with another or limiting the 
possibilities for shaping our own lives. Given the pervasiveness of the structures of 
sexuality that Foucault critiques and our immersion in complex networks of discourse 
and power, the project of thinking differently will also likely be complex, ongoing, and 
ever shifting. 
So how should we think survival differently? Can we think survival differently? 
Our answers to these questions will of course depend on the context in which they are 
asked as well as on what we want this different thinking to accomplish. Given the 
problems raised in my previous chapter, I suggest that what are needed are alternative 
conceptions of sexuality and selfhood that challenge the necessity of making “sex” 
central to one’s self-relation and that can better account for the ambiguities involved in 
survivor/perpetrator identity and in conceptions of sexual violence. In this chapter I draw 
out some of these alternatives as they show up in Foucauldian and queer theory 
scholarship, and I suggest some future directions for positive projects on survival. 
Toward this end, I look at one of the positive hints that Foucault offers in History 
of Sexuality, Vol. 1—“bodies and pleasures [les corps et les plaisirs]”
7
—and the uptake 
of this theme within queer theory. I also bring these Foucauldian conversations together 
with Ann Cvetkovich’s work on queer projects of survival. The projects she highlights 
speak to concerns regarding discourse-centered responses to rebuilding the self after 
sexual violence (through traditional talk therapy, for instance), and they aim for an 
embodied approach to healing and working through selfhood and survival. I argue that 
Cvetkovich’s approach is connected to queer interpretations of “bodies and pleasures,” 
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and thereby offers an example of what a Foucauldian rethinking of survival could look 
like. 
In spite of Foucault’s controversial treatment of sexual violence and his 
subsequently strained relationship with feminist theorists of sexual violence, Cvetkovich 
does refer to Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis as useful for queer 
approaches to survival. But the repressive hypothesis is the extent of her explicit 
engagement with Foucault. In fact, where Foucault has typically been thought of as an 
important intellectual benefactor of queer theory, his negative record on sexual violence 
has the potential to put those who would create queer projects on survival in an 
unusual—perhaps queer—position. By more fully developing the connections and 
compatibility between Cvetkovich’s work on survival and Foucault’s critique of sexuality 
(and its positive offshoots) I aim to open up further spaces for queer projects on survival 
and add History of Sexuality as an additional resource for related positive projects. 
In another vein, feminist Foucault scholar Dianna Taylor draws extensively on 
Foucault in order to suggest ways of positively rethinking subjectivity and survival in her 
essay “Resisting the Subject.” However, D. Taylor does not explicitly engage History of 
Sexuality (or queer theory) in this piece, focusing instead on some of Foucault’s later 
lectures on modern subjectivity where he proposes parrhesia as a source of positive 
insights for rethinking relationships to the self. D. Taylor’s approach is promising, and, in 
my view, also speaks to concerns that are highlighted when we reread History of 
Sexuality for survivors. Also, as we saw in chapter three, Lynne Huffer argues that 






American sense) has been underdeveloped in queer theory.
8
 Connecting D. Taylor’s 
essay to History of Sexuality and to the projects undertaken by Cvetkovich and Hart 
brings this more robust understanding of sexuality to the forefront and helps to forge 
additional interdisciplinary connections between feminist, Foucauldian, and queer 
treatments of sexual violence and survival. 
For my own part, I suggest another interdisciplinary turn, in this case to critical 
race theory on identity as offering some possible directions for future projects on 
survival. In particular, I look at Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres’s conceptualization of 
political race around the metaphor of the miner’s canary. As I will argue, their approach 
provides a viable alternative for thinking through survivor identity at a practical and 
political level. Applying Guinier and Torres in this context helps to illustrate that the 
challenges faced by survivors are not just problems of survivors but rather these 
challenges indicate broader cultural problems and weaknesses in modern conceptions of 
identity. Guinier and Torres’s approach also provides a model for uncovering shared 
interests and linking groups together to find creative solutions. I suggest Louise 
Wisechild’s anthology She Who Was Lost Is Remembered as an example of one such 
approach.  
Queer Theory, Bodies, and Pleasures 
Given Foucault’s critique of sexuality and the problems inherent in modern 
categories of sexual identity (to the degree that they essentialize and overemphasize “sex” 
as an intrinsic identity marker, especially for those deemed “abnormal”) one response has 
been to eschew identity categories such as gay, lesbian, homosexual, or bisexual in favor 
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of the term “queer.” Queer theory is thus connected to, or at least has some of its roots in 
LGBT studies.
9
 At the same time, queer theory challenges these sexual categories 
themselves to the degree that they are treated as normative or essentializing. As Shannon 
Winnubst puts it, “To be queer is to not know exactly who or how one ‘is.’ It is to have 
confused the categories of identity so deeply that they no longer provide meaningful 
residence.”
10
 Along these lines, Donald E. Hall and Annamarie Jagose describe queer 
studies as entailing a “commitment to non-normativity and anti-identitarianism.”
11
 
Rather than referring to a stable identity, “queer” thus differs from traditional 
sexual identity categories (and identity politics) by signifying resistance to norms and a 
rejection, not just of rigid sexual categories themselves, but also the requirement to define 
oneself primarily in relation to “sex” or “desire” at all.
12
 To emphasize this difference, 
“queer” is frequently used as a verb rather than as a noun to help designate it as an active 
and shifting mode of being and a creative rethinking of norms, boundaries, and 
relationships to the self. Nikki Sullivan defines “to queer” as “to make strange, to 
frustrate, to counteract, to delegitimize, to camp up…heteronormative knowledges and 
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Definitions of “queer” thus typically begin with a number of reservations and 
tensions. On the one hand, putting forth a singular definition for queer raises issues given 
that the term is meant to disrupt categories altogether. Yet, leaving “queer” too open may 
result in the misguided conclusion that anything can be queer. Winnubst writes that “this 
lack of specificity becomes both the radical potential and the Achilles’ heel of queer: it 
serves as both the resistance to domestication and the submissiveness to 
commodification.”
14
 That is, if we cannot say what “queer” means, then it is left open to 
cooptation by anyone or anything, and it risks saying nothing at all. At the same time, we 
must be careful not to apply too rigid a definition such that the possibilities of “queer” are 
limited in advance. 
Similar dilemmas arise when trying to identify the roots and the domain of queer. 
Though the term “queer theory” has come into use in academic contexts, the label 
“theory” is somewhat fraught in itself, if understood to imply an organized system. As 
Tasmin Spargo writes, “Queer theory is not a singular or systematic conceptual or 
methodological framework.”
15
 She suggests thinking of it as a “collection of intellectual 
engagements.”
16
 Whether these engagements should be considered a cohesive discipline 
is somewhat of a discursive, conceptual, and practical problem, highlighted by the term 
“discipline” itself. (Sullivan tells us that queer theory “is a discipline that refuses to be 
disciplined.”
17
 Winnubst says it “is constantly in danger of being domesticated.”
18
) 
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Fueled by concerns about the disciplinary entanglements of the academy along with those 
familiar worries about theory becoming a purely intellectual exercise divorced from 
practice, queer theorists (thinkers? writers? activists?) have wondered whether queer 




Nonetheless, Hall and Jagose note that queer studies and queer politics began 
emerging in the early nineties both in activist communities and in the academy, in the 
latter typically as a sub-discipline or interdisciplinary field in the humanities and social 
sciences.
20
 Queer theorists have tended to employ an integrative approach, looking at the 
intersections between sexual identity and other identity categories to which individuals 
may belong. Hall and Jagose write that “rather than separating sexuality from other axes 
of social difference—race, ethnicity, class, gender, nationality, and so on—queer studies 
has increasingly attended to the ways in which various categories of difference inflect 
and transform each other.”
21
 Though queer theory generally began with a focus on sex 
and sexuality, as it has developed it has also picked up and connected with other 
disciplines or sub-disciplines that have problematized essentializing notions of identity. 
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Given queer theory’s dedication to disrupting academic borders and canons, there 
are some tensions in listing Foucault as a primary founding influence on queer theory. As 
Winnubst writes, “Despite the impact of Foucault’s History of Sexuality, Volume One on 
early queer theory, current work in queer of color critique challenges the politics and 
epistemology of placing this text in such a canonical position, particularly for the 
adamantly anti-foundational field of queer theory.”
22
 Even so, Foucault’s work on 
sexuality is still frequently cited as foundational or at least as widely influential in queer 
theory.
23
 In Hall and Jagose’s list of sites of influence and cross-pollination in queer 
studies, Foucault is the one specific figure included among “feminism, radical 
movements of color, the lesbian and gay movements, AIDS activism, various sexual 
subcultural practices such as sadomasochism and butch/femme stylings, poststructuralist 
thought—particularly the work of Michel Foucault—postcolonialism and diasporic 
studies, transgender and disability studies.”
24
 
The diverse (or, to borrow from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, rhizomatic)
25
 
roots of queer theory are such that one need not explicitly engage Foucault or endorse his 
works in order to create queer projects on survival. Therefore, Foucault’s contentious 
treatment of sexual violence need not be viewed as a problem for queer projects on 
survival, which could just as easily draw on other queer thinkers or pick up Foucault here 
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or there and then branch away. Yet, underlying this tension between Foucault and 
survivors is a problem that I think queer theory must address, which is this: How does an 
anti-normative, boundary averse, anti-disciplinary “discipline” deal with sexual violence? 
A word is thus in order here regarding norms and what it means to be anti-
normative. In the previous chapter we saw that in Foucault’s thought, the norm is a 
statistical standard that is formed through a descriptive and prescriptive interpretation of 
data. The norm performs a disciplinary function in regulating individuals in accordance 
with a statistical curve that presents itself as objective while concealing its evaluative 
elements. In the case of “sex” the flipside of the normal curve is that sexualities marked 
as statistically “abnormal” are taken to be not just examples of variation (which may have 
a positive, negative, or neutral value) but indications of pathology.
26
 According to 
Michael Warner the “trouble” with combating sexual shame by asserting that gay people, 
for instance, are normal (just like “everyone else”) is that it bolsters the normal curve. It 
reinforces hierarchies by which some sexual groups are legitimized at the cost of 
“throw[ing] shame on those who stand farther down the ladder of respectability.”
27
 For 
example, monogamous same sex couples may gain acceptance at the expense of 
stigmatizing those who are polyamorous. For Warner, “queer” is thus “a way of saying: 
‘we’re not pathological, but don’t think for that reason that we want to be normal.’”
28
 To 
be anti-normative in this sense, I suggest, is not necessarily to challenge all evaluative 
                                                 
26
See  Warner, Trouble with Normal, 57–58; Mader, Sleights of Reason. 
27
 Warner, Trouble with Normal, 60. 
28






norms but rather to undermine the interweaving of descriptive and evaluative norms 
around sex. 
Along these lines, Warner argues that challenging sexual norms need not imply a 
rejection of all ethical standards,
29
 and in fact, he suggests that shame against some 
acts—such as “violence toward women, sissies, and variant sexualities”—may be “well 
deserved.”
30
 Warner is not alone in maintaining that one can have a queer or Foucauldian 
ethics.
31
 And some authors have pointed out that Foucault himself did not reject all 
sexual “norms.” For example, Kelly Ball draws our attention to the following statement 
from Foucault: “There are sexual acts like rape which should not be permitted….I don’t 




Chloë Taylor also reminds readers that when Foucault advocates “decriminalizing 
non-coercive sex between adults and minors” he is not arguing in favor of coercive sex 
acts or even in favor of decriminalizing all adult-child sexual relationships.
33
 In the 
relevant interview, when asked about setting an age at which someone can give “definite 
consent,” Foucault responds as follows: 
Yes, it is difficult to lay down barriers….Where children are concerned, 
they are supposed to have a sexuality that can never be directed at an 
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adult, and that’s that. Secondly, it is supposed that they are not capable of 
talking about themselves, of being sufficiently lucid about 
themselves….They are thought to be incapable of sexuality and they are 
not thought to be capable of speaking about it. But, after all, listening to a 
child, hearing him speak, hearing him explain what his relations actually 
are with someone, adult or not, provided one listens with enough 
sympathy, must allow one to establish more or less what degree of 
violence if any was used or what degree of consent was given. And to 
suppose that a child is incapable of explaining what happened and 
incapable of giving his consent are two abuses that are intolerable, quite 
unacceptable…. 
In any case, an age barrier laid down by law does not make much sense. 




We may disagree with Foucault about the capacity for children to consent to sexual acts 
with adults, the ability of children to speak freely and be listened to, and the possibility of 
non-coercive sexual relationships between adults and minors or children. However, it 
does not seem to be the case that Foucault’s position constitutes a complete rejection of 
all sexual “norms,” in the ethical/evaluative sense. That Foucault distinguishes 
“consensual” and “non-consensual” adult-child sexual relationships and argues only for 
the former suggests that he maintains an ethical distinction between the two. In so doing, 
he seems to be employing a set of sexual norms, though given the shape of his 
philosophical projects perhaps not universally so. Thus, although he does not put forward 
a normative ethical system, we need not assume that his philosophy requires absolute 
moral relativism that would preclude limiting coercive sex acts. (And even if it did, we 
could still reject this aspect of his philosophy while exposing and challenging the limits 
of particular normative networks.) 
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My aim here is not to put forward a particular version of queer ethics but to 
demonstrate that queer and Foucauldian projects that challenge normalizing approaches 
to sexuality are compatible with a rejection of acts that constitute sexual violence, abuse, 
or coercion. Next, I look at some specific examples of queer projects on survival that 
challenge normative conceptions of identity and subjectivity. I bring in these examples to 
demonstrate that they are not just compatible with but also benefit from Foucault and 
from queer interpretations of his positive suggestion of “bodies and pleasures.” 
Queering Survival 
In her book An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public 
Cultures, Ann Cvetkovich briefly mentions Foucault, arguing that his critique of the 
repressive hypothesis can help to demonstrate why “disclosure” of traumatic experiences 
“doesn’t always provide relief” in therapeutic contexts.
35
 Cvetkovich draws attention to 
three sets of projects that she views as “point[ing] to healing as a process that engages the 
body and consists in rituals of performance that defy simple notions of disclosure.”
36
 The 
examples that she brings in include works by Margaret Randall, Dorothy Allison, and 
Staci Haines. Randall’s This is Incest is a collection of photos, poems, and essays in 
which she explores an intense mushroom phobia as a way of recalling and healing from 
child sexual abuse by her grandfather. Cvetkovich notes the physicality of Randall’s 
process, as she overlays photos of her grandfather and photos of herself with mushrooms 
and then photographs these scenes.
37
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In Allison’s case, she writes in her semi-fictional, semi-autobiographical novel 
Bastard out of Carolina about a protagonist, Bone, who masturbates to sadomasochistic 
fantasies as a way of coping with physical and sexual abuse by her stepfather.
38
 
Cvetkovich notes that 
the pleasure they [the fantasies] produce cannot be separated from the 
trauma to which they are also connected; to ask for one without the other 
is to demand that Bone tell her story of violence and leave out her 
fantasies. Rather than offer a truncated narrative that makes her an 
innocent victim, she will remain silent….The shameful fantasy also 




Haines’ self-help book The Survivor’s Guide to Sex also includes discussion of S/M as a 
potential healing practice and in so doing brings together, in Cvetkovich’s view, “two 
feminist communities that are not often linked: sex-positive communities and incest 
survivor communities.”
40
 Haines also emphasizes “somatic forms of therapy,” which 




Though Cvetkovich’s only reference to Foucault in this discussion is to his 
critique of the repressive hypothesis, I argue that her approach is also linked to his 
positive proposal of “bodies and pleasures” as a potential site for challenging normative 
conceptions of sexuality. In the next section I look at this positive proposal in order to 
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further develop the connections between Cvetkovich’s analysis and Foucault’s positive 
philosophy. 
Sex-Desire vs. Bodies and Pleasures 
Toward the end of History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Foucault hints, in characteristically 
open-ended fashion, that “the rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment 
of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire but bodies and pleasures [contre le dispositif de 
sexualité, le point d’appui de la contre-attaque ne doit pas être le sexe-désir, mais les 
corps et les plaisirs].”
42
 The project of untangling this enigmatic phrase “bodies and 
pleasures” has largely been the inheritance of queer theory, where, as mentioned, scholars 
and activists have carried on Foucault’s challenge of modern, normative conceptions of 
sexuality and continued building alternative ways of shaping “sex,” sexuality, identity, 
and experience. 
By the end of History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Foucault has laid out his main 
arguments concerning the disciplinary functions of discourses on sex and desire, which 
we saw in chapter three. However, he leaves the reader to determine how “bodies and 
pleasures” might help us escape or resist these discourses that keep us locked into a 
particular form of identity and subjectivity. Unsurprisingly, interpretations of what 
Foucault means by “bodies and pleasures” vary. Mark G.E. Kelly remarks that “It is 
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undoubtedly a mark of how little practical advice Foucault gives us that this tiny kernel 
of advice for resistance should have been seized on to such an extent.”
43
 
One way of thinking through the difference between desire and pleasure is in 
terms of temporality. Desire is future-oriented and anticipatory, while pleasure is 
experienced in the moment, in the present.
44
 In addition, desire involves interpretation of 
an experience (or a future experience, or inclination) as a form of understanding one’s 
inner self. David Halperin suggests that pleasure, unlike desire, “is desubjectivating, 
impersonal: it shatters identity, subjectivity, and dissolves the subject, however fleetingly, 
into the sensorial continuum of the body, into the unconscious dreaming of the mind.”
45
 
For Halperin’s part, he draws on some of Foucault’s interview comments on 
sadomasochistic practices to propose sadomasochism as representative of pleasures that 
de-center the subject and that challenge traditional conceptions of “sex” by “detach[ing] 
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In a completely different vein, Ladelle McWhorter writes in her book-length 
exploration, Bodies and Pleasures, about line-dancing as an experience of pleasure that 
brings her into a different form of self-relation. She explains, “It wasn’t a matter of 
knowing how the dance was supposed to look. I could feel the dance from the inside. 
What I knew was what it felt like to be that dance.”
47
 
In either case, in the switch from “sex-desire” to “bodies and pleasures” there 
seems to be a movement to create, or open oneself up to, a different kind of embodied 
experience that is not about uncovering the truth about oneself. I propose that Cvetkovich 
and her interlocutors similarly gesture toward experiences, physical movements, and 
motions that take the survivor out of the process of transforming trauma into coherent 
self-knowledge (and a “normal” sexuality) through discourse. Randall confronts us with a 
disjointed “narrative” of trauma. Allison refuses (through her fictional character, Bone, 
but also in her own personal essays) to reshape her sexuality to separate violence and 
pleasure and be the “right” kind of victim/survivor.
48
 Haines insists on allowing for a 
range of sexual experiences and pleasures for survivors (though the therapeutic context of 
her text is such that the connection back to self-knowledge still figures fairly prominently 
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 I suggest then that Cvetkovich offers us some possible examples of 
what “bodies and pleasures” could mean for survivors or what a Foucauldian project of 
survival could look like. 
Subjectivity and Survival 
Another example of a Foucauldian approach to survival comes from Dianna 
Taylor in her essay, “Resisting the Subject.” In this essay, Dianna Taylor draws on some 
of Foucault’s later lectures on subjectivity to argue that feminist strategies of asserting 
survivors as subjects inadvertently reinforce a restrictive form of self-relation. While she 
maintains that asserting the subjectivity of those who have been treated as objects is 
sometimes necessary and not entirely without merit, it also sets in motion a “normalizing 
cycle of self-assertion and self-renunciation” that she views as harmful.
50
 As an example, 
she offers the practice of asserting victims as survivors, which is meant to be an 
empowering way of refiguring the self after sexual violence. Yet, she points out, “such 
approaches to resistance maintain the harm of sexual violence as central to women’s self-
relation.”
51
 That is, in asserting the victim (who lacks agency) as a survivor (autonomous 
subject), we uncritically reproduce the same normalizing discourses that figure the 
experience of sexual violence as self-constituting. In so doing, we renounce those aspects 
of self or experience that do not fit with this vision of selfhood, closing off other possible 
ways of relating to the self. Shani Orgad, for example, argues that where survivorhood is 
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characterized by speaking out, silence (on the victim’s part) is precluded as a legitimate 
or empowering response to sexual violence, viewed instead as a sign of weakness.
52
 
The assertion of the victim as an autonomous subject (survivor) is thus also an act 
of self-renunciation that simultaneously conceals the act of self-renunciation. In D. 
Taylor’s view, parrhesia, which Foucault locates in ancient Greek and Roman cultures, 
provides a potential alternative. In chapter three, we saw that confession plays an 
important role in disciplining individuals. Individuals are supposed to speak their 
“innermost” thoughts, feelings, and desires in order to reveal and “uncover” the truth 
about themselves. This process of revelation is supposed to be liberating and freeing—the 
speaker no longer has to “hide” his/her true self. And this “true” self must be known in 
order to live authentically in pursuit of one’s inner desires. Yet, this framing and process 
of confession conceal its disciplinary effects. It requires an individual to insert herself 
into an already established mold, and it produces for the individual her sense of self and 
self-relation, as one who relates to herself in terms of having innate desires which must 
be uncovered. Rather than the individual engaging in a creative process of shaping her 
self-relation according to an array of endless possibilities, her subjectivity is shaped and 
produced by discourses about her. At the same time, these discourses are presented as 
natural, as though objectively uncovering an already existing essence. Thus, as D. Taylor 
puts it, “individuals or groups are deprived of their capacity to act and are instead merely 
acted upon or determined.”
53
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To take an example connected to sexuality, gay pride movements challenge the 
stigma around identifying as LGBT(Q?) and call for community and self-acceptance of 
sexual diversity. In so doing, these movements perform a crucial function in terms of 
challenging homophobic discourses that produce shame, violence, and political 
disenfranchisement. At the same time, this seemingly politically necessary process keeps 
individuals entangled in asserting and reasserting normative modes of self-relation (in 
terms of “sex” and “desire”). In this process individuals ostensibly thereby also foreclose 
and distract from engaging in a creative process of shaping their lives and relationships 
differently. To some degree, this process of self-assertion is therefore also a renunciation: 
of alternatives, of the process of creatively shaping one’s own life, of those aspects of self 
that do not fit into the pre-given mold.
54
 
Confession ultimately serves the goal of curing or making the individual “normal” 
(or closer to normal). This mode of confession and becoming/asserting oneself as a 
subject thus offers a certain kind of safety. D. Taylor writes, “By radically reducing not 
merely alternative modes of thought and existence but also the possibility for their 
development, a normalizing self-relation simplifies the world. In doing so, it also holds 
out certainty as attainable and, thus, offers security.”
55
 Foucault contrasts this process 
with parrhesia, which is also “a verbal act of truth-telling,” but one which has different 
effects in terms of self-relation.
56
 Of parrhesia, D. Taylor writes, “Impermanent, open, 
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and dynamic, there is neither a pre-given notion of what one is nor the renunciation of 
what one was, but rather an ongoing process of self-cultivation. In the place of certainty 
and security are possibility and more risk.”
57
 
D. Taylor thus advocates “desubjectification,” which “entails constituting, 
understanding, and relating to oneself in ways other than as a subject.”
58
 She 
recommends trying to recreate, not parrhesia itself, but acts or movements that produce 
similar effects to that of parrhesia.
59
 For example, desubjectification could, in D. 
Taylor’s view, disrupt the victim/survivor binary which maintains trauma and violence as 
integral to one’s sense of self. As an example of what a contemporary analogue to 
parrhesia could look like D. Taylor offers the Garneau Sisterhood, a grassroots group 
that formed in 2008 in Edmonton in response to a series of rapes and a dissatisfying 
police response which included lack of transparency and withholding of information that 
could help to keep women safe.
60
 The sisterhood hung posters in the area that “critiqued 
the police, confronted the rapist, and called attention to the underlying sexism that 
pervades and is thus rearticulated through prevailing constructions of and attitudes 
concerning sexual violence against women.”
61
  
D. Taylor argues that the campaign is striking precisely because it does not rely 
on traditional scripts of subjectivity.
62
 It also exhibits risk-taking insofar as the group is 
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not institutionally protected and challenges the authority of the police by encouraging 
people to contact them directly with information. Though the group does employ the 
terms “woman” and “survivor” in their posters, D. Taylor maintains that they do not do 
so “uncritically.”
63
 She argues that the campaign “destabilizes traditional gendered ways 
of characterizing, and thus responding to rape and sexual assault, and thereby unsettles 
the subject ‘women.’ Such destabilization and unsettling in turn decenters the harm of 
sexual violence by refusing to constitute women, and thereby requiring them to constitute 
themselves, in terms of that harm—either as victims or as survivors.”
64
 
Though D. Taylor does not directly appeal to queer theory or Foucault’s work 
specifically on sex/sexuality in this piece, her approach addresses concerns that arise 
from History of Sexuality (the centrality of sex in structuring our sense of identity), 
particularly as they relate to survivors. In bringing together survival and Foucault’s 
positive philosophy she thus inadvertently opens up avenues for queer projects on 
survival as well. 
Critical Race Theory and Survival 
Political Race and The Miner’s Canary 
To continue rethinking identity around survival, I suggest another 
interdisciplinary turn, in this case to critical race theory and in particular to Lani Guinier 
and Gerald Torres’s approach to racial identity and political race in The Miner’s Canary. 
They begin this text with discussion of the tensions involved both in employing and in 
eliminating racial identity categories, whether at a political or personal level. On the one 










hand, where the givenness and coherency of racial identity have been undermined and 
where race has been used to mark people of color as biologically, socially, or politically 
“other,” some have advocated eliminating the use of racial categories altogether in favor 
of a “colorblind” approach.
65
 However, others, including Guinier and Torres, worry that 
“colorblindness” amounts to simply a kind of pretending which precludes 
acknowledgement of the very real ways in which race does structure our interactions with 
each other. In addition, in eliminating the potentially negative content of racial identity, 
the positive is forfeited as well, where this positive content includes affinity, political 
potential, and sense of self or belonging.
66
 
Guinier and Torres thus propose “political race” as “a third way,”
67
 a middle 
ground between uncritical embrace of racial identity and wholesale rejection of it. 
Political race does not provide a model for shaping one’s own personal identity but for 
using identity categories loosely in order to drive political change. Their approach varies 
significantly from traditional identity politics in that it aims not to reinforce essentializing 
notions of identity but to disrupt single group centered politics in order to locate shared 
interests and articulate broader goals and initiatives. 
Guinier and Torres define political race as follows, “At its core it does not ask 
what you call yourself but with whom do you link your fate. It is a fundamentally 
creative political project that begins from the ground up, starting with race and all its 
complexity, and then builds cross-racial relationships through race and with race to issues 
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of class and gender in order to make democracy real.”
68
 To begin elucidating what they 
mean here, Guinier and Torres employ the metaphor of the miner’s canary. By way of 
explanation they note that in times past it was common practice for miners to bring a 
canary with them as they went to work in the mines. Because the respiratory system of 
the canary was weaker and thus more sensitive to poisonous gases than that of the miners, 
the canary functioned to warn the miners when the toxicity of the air was reaching 
dangerous levels. If the canary’s delicate lungs collapsed, it served as a signal, warning 
that conditions in the mine were unsafe for miners as well.
69
 
Guinier and Torres assert that “those who are racially marginalized are like the 
miner’s canary: their distress is the first sign of a danger that threatens us all.”
70
 That is, 
Guinier and Torres’s premise is that weaknesses in political, institutional, and cultural 
systems will be most palpably felt by those who are racially marginalized and who are 
thereby most vulnerable to oppressive and damaging forces in these systems. By 
indicating specific ways in which practices or discursive arrangements harm people of 
color, metaphorical “canaries” point us to harmful elements or weaknesses in larger 
systems. These practices and arrangements end up being harmful for others in various, 
though not always immediately visible ways. Guinier and Torres thus suggest that race 
can be used to perform a “diagnostic” function, helping us to point to systemic problems. 
This process of diagnosis forms the first step of political race projects, as Guinier 
and Torres envision them, where political is understood to mean “collective interaction at 
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the individual, group, and institutional level.”
71
 The next steps are “aspirational” and 
“activist,”
72
 as I will explain shortly. The practical examples Guinier and Torres offer for 
applying their notion of political race tend to be materially specific and to center on 
efforts to connect racial marginalization with class discrimination. To help illustrate what 
they have in mind for critical race projects, Guinier and Torres look at communal 
responses to the mid-nineties Hopwood vs. Texas case, where affirmative action 
admission policies at the University of Texas Law School (and therefore at other public 
university systems throughout the state) were ruled unconstitutional. The original 
complaint was lodged by Cheryl Hopwood, a white woman whose application to the 
University of Texas Law School had been rejected. She alleged that less qualified 
(according to the rubrics of GPA and LSAT scores) Mexican-American and black 
students had been accepted based on their races and that the admissions process therefore 
constituted a form of discrimination against white applicants.
73
 
As a response, people of color linked up with lower class and rural white people 
to draw attention to the ways that the need for affirmative action policies pointed to 
broader problems in the admissions process. Analysis of the process demonstrated 
exclusionary effects for applicants of color as well as for economically disadvantaged 
whites. When people of color began mobilizing to challenge the ruling against 
affirmative action admission policies, it was found that although the SAT and LSAT were 
supposed to measure academic skill and potential, they were failing to do so. In actuality, 
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high test scores did not necessarily correlate with future academic success but were rather 
a better indicator of “parental income (and even grandparents’ socioeconomic status) than 
actual student performance in college or law school.”
74
 Additional research also found 
that “10 percent of the high schools in Texas routinely filled 75 percent of all freshmen 
seats at the university.”
75
 Unsurprisingly, the high schools with greater representation 
tended to be “the more affluent suburban and private schools.”
76
 
The Hopwood ruling thus ultimately drew attention to problems in the University 
of Texas’s broader admissions process that extended beyond race. The use of test scores 
ultimately functioned to exclude not just people of color but also those who were at an 
economic or geographic disadvantage. After brainstorming solutions, the Texas 10 
Percent Plan was drafted and instituted across state public institutions. This plan involved 
accepting all undergraduate applicants graduating in the top ten percent of their class, 




This example illustrates the three steps of political race projects that Guinier and 
Torres propose. First, a problem is identified and diagnosed. In this case, the affirmative 
action admission policy was in place to begin with because white students were being 
admitted at a higher rate than students of color. When the admissions process was looked 
at more closely, larger problems were identified. The project thus began through attention 
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to race but moved to connect the interests of people of color with those who were 
economically disadvantaged: “Linking the fate of rural and poor whites to that of blacks 
and Mexican Americans….revealed that what had been thought of as a racial divide also 
masked a historic class divide in the provision of elite higher education.”
78
 This brings in 
the second step of political race projects, which is aspirational, “articulating a broader 
social justice agenda.”
79
 And finally, step three involves taking action, and in particular 
“a willingness to experiment with new democratic practices.”
80
 The Texas 10 Percent 
Plan, for example, represents the results of collaborative brainstorming in search of a 
creative solution for ensuring diverse socioeconomic and geographic representation 
without targeting specific identity groups. 
Gunier and Torres’s approach demonstrates that acknowledging the ways in 
which people of color are marginalized or harmed by oppressive systems does not require 
taking an essentialist view of race or racial identity. Rather, political race, as Guinier and 
Torres envision it, involves applying “race” loosely with awareness of its limits in order 
to diagnose a problem and institute broader change. Similar to queer theory, political race 
thus challenges traditional essentialist views of identity categories and identity politics.
81
 
And in fact, Guinier and Torres borrow from Foucault his “idea that identity is both a 
target of power and a vehicle for resistance.”
82
 
Political Race and Survival 
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I suggest that a similar approach is useful for thinking about identity and survival. 
In some cases those who have experienced sexual violence are reluctant to identify as 
victims or survivors. As we have seen, such identities can be stigmatizing, they may not 
fit with an individual’s sense of self, and they figure sexual violence as central to one’s 
identity and self-relation. Individuals may also be uncertain about their memories 
(whether precisely what happened or how to categorize them) or concerned about the 
implications of such identification for the aggressor or abuser. Some survivors also 
express worry about claiming the labels of victim or survivor if it means aligning 
themselves with others whose experiences they perceive to be “worse” than their own. 
Ellen Bass and Laura Davis note, for example, “Women who come to Ellen’s workshops 
[for survivors of child sexual abuse] are often afraid that their abuse wasn’t bad enough 
for them to be qualified to participate. They will say, ‘It wasn’t incest—it was just a 
friend of the family,’ or ‘I was fourteen and it only happened once,’ or ‘He just showed 
me movies,’ or ‘It was with my brother. He was only a year older than me.’”
83
 
Yet, people who have experienced varying kinds of sexual abuse or violence often 
share similar interests, whether therapeutically or politically. Applying the labels of 
“survivor” and “victim” loosely with recognition of their limits can help to bring these 
groups of people together. I offer She Who was Lost is Remembered: Healing from Incest 
through Creativity as an example of such a project. The anthology, which is a collection 
of creative works dealing with incest, includes a variety of art forms (prose, poetry, 
photography, paintings, drawings, sculptures, music, and performance pieces) and 
represents contributors from a range of backgrounds and experiences. The editor, Louise 
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Wisechild, herself an incest survivor, says that when putting the anthology together she 
received submissions detailing “abuse by fathers, uncles, brothers, step-fathers, mothers, 
baby-sitters, neighbors, preachers, teachers, and cults.”
84
 Placing these pieces alongside 
each other in an anthology on incest challenges easy assumptions about what counts as 
incest or family. Some of the submissions also challenge what it means to be a survivor. 
Becky Birtha, whose story was mentioned in the previous chapter, is upfront about her 
uncertainty as to whether or not she experienced child sexual abuse. Her statement, “I 
still cannot say that I am a survivor of incest. But I cannot say that I am not,” offered 
without apology in an anthology of incest survivors challenges normative conceptions of 
sexuality that require self-knowledge. 
In addition, feminist movements have been widely criticized for marginalizing the 
voices of women of color and shaping a movement that speaks primarily for white 
women while presenting it as being for all women.
85
 One of the concerns women of color 
have raised is the failure of white feminists to actively engage critiques of police force 
and correctional systems as perpetuating racial violence and marginalization. Instead, 
white feminists have tended to appeal to increased police presence as a way of making 
“women” safer without considering what this increased presence will mean for people of 
color who are disproportionately targeted by police.
86
 Taking a cue from Guinier and 
Torres I suggest that attention to racial injustices in our “justice” system can help bring 
together various groups to articulate a broader critique and mission. As my rereading of 
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Foucault’s History of Sexuality indicates, institutional systems in place to protect victims 
(or potential victims) from sexual perpetrators have negative effects on victims/survivors. 
Guinier and Torres’s approach urges us to bring together these critiques in order to create 




Future Directions and Potential Obstacles 
In this chapter I have looked at and proposed some approaches for shaping 
survival and challenging the normative conceptions of sexuality that negatively affect 
survivors. Together these approaches especially highlight the importance of 
interdisciplinary efforts and forging connections across identity boundaries. In particular, 
Guinier and Torres’s approach calls us to recognize that systems that are harmful for 
some are potentially harmful for all and to recognize “linked fates.” In the next chapter I 
look at some of the obstacles to linking fates with survivors and I also argue for 
theoretical application of Guinier and Torres’s guiding miner’s canary metaphor to the 
discipline of philosophy in order to help address these obstacles. 
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MADNESS, KNOWLEDGE AND SURVIVAL 
Could we hear Sophie Adam if the passageway of her throat were clear? If 
she did not have a lump, that ungainly Adam’s apple, lodged in her throat? 
  —Kelly Ball
1
 
So far I have argued that the possibilities for survival and for survivor narratives 
are limited in multiple ways by modern normative conceptions of sexuality. At the same 
time, to the degree that survivor narratives in turn challenge these conceptions of 
sexuality, survivor discourse has the potential to be disruptive and transformative. In the 
previous chapter I suggested, via Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, that recognizing a 
“linked fate” between survivors and others can help to mobilize resources toward 
transforming dominant systems in response to the practical needs of survivors. In this 
chapter I address some of the barriers to linking the political and theoretical interests of 
survivors with others, which I will speak to through Foucault’s work on madness. 
Looking to Foucault’s work on madness also helps to capture the transformative potential 
of survivor discourse. 
As we saw in chapter three, there are some cognitive and emotional hurdles to 
identifying with survivors. As Susan Brison points out, to empathize with survivors is to 
relate to “those whose terrifying fate forces us to acknowledge that we are not in control 
of our own.”
2
 She notes that there are thus “intense psychological pressures that make it 
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difficult for all of us to empathize with victims of trauma.”
3
 These obstacles can extend 
not just to those who have not experienced sexual violence but also potentially to many 
of those who have. Brison calls our attention to the fact that many women who are 
assaulted blame themselves precisely because “it can be less painful to believe that you 
did something blameworthy than it is to think that you live in a world where you can be 
attacked at any time, in any place, simply because you are a woman.”
4
 Victims and 
survivors may wish as much as anyone else, if not more so, not to shape their lives 
around sexual violence or to identify with/as victims/survivors. (Though, given the 
lasting effects of sexual violence, they may have less leeway not to do so.) 
The difficulty of identifying with survivors is therefore at least somewhat 
understandable. To move through the world and participate in all of life’s activities leaves 
little room for acknowledging one’s vulnerability to sexual violence in every moment. 
And, incidentally, constant attention to one’s vulnerability that interferes with day-to-day 
functioning (hypervigilance) is listed as a symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD).
5
 The implication is that to be healthy and normal requires to some degree that 
we not identify with survivors, at least not too much. Brison notes the irony in cultural 
acceptance of the frequency of sexual violence and concurrent seeming disbelief that it 
can happen to anyone at anytime. She writes, 
The everydayness of sexual violence, as evidenced by…mind-numbing 
statistics, leads many to think that male violence against women is natural, 
a given, something not in need of explanation and not amenable to change. 
And yet, through some extraordinary mental gymnastics, while most 




 Ibid., 13. 
5




people take sexual violence for granted, they simultaneously manage to 
deny that it really exists—or, rather that it could happen to them.
6
 
To some extent these mental gymnastics are necessary (for survivors and others) to go 
about daily life. Yet, if they keep us from empathizing with survivors, then survivors are 
forced to bear a disproportionate burden of the effects of sexual violence and normative 
conceptions of sexuality. Though of course empathic barriers to taking communal 
responsibility for sexual violence are not insurmountable, it is important to address some 
of the ways that these barriers can impede taking communal responsibility for sexual 
violence. Brison points out that even well-intentioned and presumably empathic listeners 
are susceptible to “victim blaming” in order to secure their own sense of safety. She 
writes, “One victims’ assistance coordinator…stressed that she herself had never been a 
victim and that I would benefit from the experience by learning not to be so trusting of 
people and to take basic safety precautions like not going out alone late at night.”
7
 
Victim-blaming responses such as this one have been widely criticized.
8
 Yet, the 
coordinator’s assumption that the attack took place at night and that Brison could have 
somehow prevented it (Brison was attacked from behind during the day) speaks to the 
pervasiveness of the inclination to reframe survivors’ experiences in ways that allow us 
to maintain some semblance of sense of safety. 
Aside from overt victim-blaming, Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray observe that one 
of the ways that listeners shift responsibility for sexual violence onto survivors is through 
distancing survivors by figuring them as “mad.” Looking at survivor narratives through 
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the lens of Foucault, they argue that “survivor discourse is closer to the discourse of the 
mad, as Foucault discusses it, than to the discourse of the repressed.”
9
 In coming to this 
conclusion, Alcoff and Gray draw on Foucault’s work on sexuality and discourse, but not 
specifically his work on madness.
10
 In this chapter I situate Alcoff and Gray’s claim in 
terms of Foucault’s History of Madness to help clarify and extend their analysis of what 
is happening when survivor discourse is cast as “mad.” This analysis is important, as in 
Alcoff and Gray’s view, the casting of survivor discourse as “mad” functions to absorb 
its transformative potential and the challenges that this discourse poses to normative 
assumptions about sexual violence and survival. It also hinders identification with 
survivors. Alcoff and Gray advise that we therefore be mindful of the contexts and power 
arrangements within which survivor narratives are framed. 
I propose that looking at survivor discourse in the context of History of Madness 
offers another way of framing the problem and solution. In this text, Foucault claims that 
modern diagnoses of clinical illness conceal a lost experience of madness as indicating a 
special kind of knowledge that has been precluded through modern psychiatry’s 
treatment of the “mad.” Foucault locates one such experience, which he refers to as the 
“cosmic, tragic [tragique et cosmique] experience of madness,” in the Renaissance.
11
 I 
suggest that survivor discourse similarly exhibits proximity to a kind of “mad” 
knowledge. Yet, when survivor discourse is cast as illness, at least two things happen. 
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First, as I will explain, the complexities of this discourse are obscured. Second, listeners 
are not forced to confront the knowledge that survivor discourse brings with it, and 
victims/survivors are left to bear a disproportionate burden of holding onto these “truths.” 
If we can reclaim survivor discourse as “mad” (or something akin) in the 
Foucauldian Renaissance sense then we can demonstrate that survivor discourse reveals 
something potentially dangerous. These dangerous elements cannot be simply attributed 
to a fault or temporary illness in the individual but require us to confront fissures in 
broader systems of meaning, much as Guinier and Torres call us to do through their 
conception of political race. In particular, what survivor discourse “knows” is the 
instability, limits, and artificiality of modern, normative conceptions of sexuality and 
identity (as we saw in chapter three) but also prominent beliefs about order, safety, 
knowledge, and temporality, as I demonstrate in this chapter. 
Of course, asserting survivors’ speech as “mad” poses some dangers. By 
suggesting in a contemporary context that the tragic experience of madness can tell us 
something about survivors’ epistemological positioning, we risk 1) further pathologizing 
survivors and legitimating accusations that survivors are either crazy, ill, or irrational 
(and therefore unreliable epistemological authorities); and 2) unduly romanticizing 
cognitive phenomena that occur as the result of a terrible violence that can be 
incapacitating. On the one hand, we must recognize the painful and debilitating effects of 
sexual violence on survivors and the importance of treating these effects and helping 
survivors return to “normal” life and to “normal” functioning. At the same time, survivor 




What I argue, however, is that Foucault’s theorization of the tragic experience of 
madness helps us to get at this ambiguity and ambivalence in survivor experience, insofar 
as it captures madness as both tapping into some sort of special knowledge, as well as 
positioning the “mad” such that their proximity to this hidden “truth” interferes with their 
intersubjective functioning, floating the mad outside what is alternately figured as reality. 
While claiming survivor discourse as “mad” in the Foucauldian Renaissance sense will 
not entirely resolve these issues, it can help us to better identify both what is gained and 
what is lost in modern therapeutic treatments of survivors’ symptoms as indicating a 
temporary and curable illness. In so doing, we can also help to challenge some of the 
movements by which survivors are distanced and precluded from linking fates with those 
who turn out to have similar interests. 
In building my case, I first outline Alcoff and Gray’s arguments to demonstrate 
how they are using the term “madness” and the problems in survivor discourse to which 
they are drawing our attention. In particular, what emerges from their discussion is the 
tension between the problems in diagnosing trauma symptoms as mental illness and in 
not diagnosing them as mental illness. Next, I move to History of Madness and outline 
overlaps between this text and History of Sexuality to bring together Foucault’s thinking 
on sexuality and madness and to argue for the importance of looking at these two texts 
together. I then explain Foucault’s distinction between tragic and critical responses to 
madness (and concealment of the tragic experience of madness in modern psychiatric and 
therapeutic treatments of “madness” as clinical illness). Finally, I look at what kinds of 
tragic knowledge are revealed in survivor discourse and explain how reclaiming 




and transforming modern assumptions about sexuality, sexual violence, and knowledge 
away from survivors and onto larger communities. 
Survivor Discourse: Alcoff and Gray’s Argument 
According to Alcoff and Gray, survivor discourse has the potential to be 
culturally and politically transformative. They write, “Survivor speech is positioned (or at 
least has the potential to be positioned) not in an oppositional but still harmonious 
complementarity with the dominant discourse but rather in violent confrontation with it: 
its expression requires not a simple negation but a transformation of the dominant 
formulation.”
12
 For instance, by juxtaposing terms like “rapist” and “husband,” which are 
supposed to be incompatible, survivors have challenged the traditional narrative in which 
a husband is understood to be “the man to whom a woman has given unconditional 
sexual access,” leading to legal and cultural recognition of marital rape.
13
 In addition, by 
reporting partner violence and sexual abuse by family members or relatives, survivors 
have challenged widely held myths that home is synonymous with safety.
14
 
Yet, in line with Foucault’s analysis of discourse, if therapeutic or popular 
discourses are able to contain and defuse these challenges, trauma/survivor discourse may 
simply function to bolster dominant discourses of sexuality as that against which the 
norm is defined as stable and coherent. Alcoff and Gray argue that the casting of survivor 
discourse as “madness” is a prominent way in which the challenges posed by survivor 
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discourse are effectively absorbed and managed. In making this claim, Alcoff and Gray 
seem to be using the term “madness” in primarily two ways. 
First, in cases where they are disbelieved, survivors’ claims are sometimes 
explained away by casting them as systems of mental illness and delusion. Listeners may 
dismiss claims of sexual violence (and abdicate responsibility for determining the source 
of survivors’ claims) by insisting that the survivor/accuser is confused about reality or is 
posing terms that do not make sense.  Alcoff and Gray write, “When we claim, for 
example, that our husband/father/brother/boyfriend is our rapist we are often faced not 
with disagreement but with charges of delusion, hysteria, and madness.”
15
 Survivors’ 
claims are dismissed and reframed at times not by being simply silenced or cast as false, 
but as not making sense, as being representative of illness. As Alcoff and Gray put it, 
“the point of contention between dominant and survivor discourses is not over the 
determination of truth but over the determination of the statable.”
16
  
Second, in cases where survivors’ claims are believed, subsuming survivors’ 
symptoms under diagnoses of mental illness can sometimes (though not always) function 
to distance survivors from others and impede recognition of these symptoms as indicating 
communal rather than individual problems. As an example, Alcoff and Gray examine 
how survivors are presented on television talk shows. They observe that these programs 
tend to perpetuate hierarchies between victims/survivors and “experts” who are brought 
on to mediate, theorize, and comment on survivors’ stories. Survivors are typically cast as 
highly emotional, broken, and disordered; experts (usually white, by the way) are 








presented as professional, objective, rational, and calm. This setup, combined with other 
framing techniques that sensationalize, objectify, and distance survivors, perpetuates a 




A tension emerges here, as therapeutic discourses cast survivors’ symptoms as 
both normal and pathological. That is, “experts” explain that symptoms such as 
hypervigilance, heightened startle reflex, memory loss, anxiety, depression, dissociative 
identity disorder, etc. constitute a “normal” response to sexual trauma. These reactions 
serve a self-protective function that helps individuals survive sexual abuse and violence. 
Yet, when these coping mechanisms persist once the violence is “over,” they become 
debilitating and are thus marked as a “pathological” way of continuing to be in the world. 
Therapist E. Sue Blume argues that pathologizing what are essentially adaptive 
techniques of survival does a disservice to those who develop these “cognitive 
adaptations” in order to survive. As she puts it, 
the after-effects of Post-Incest Syndrome are not “problems” to be 
“overcome,” but coping mechanisms with negative side-effects. By 
attaching the concept of “disorder” to these consequences, we damn the 
incest survivor to weakness instead of attributing to her the strength of 
spirit, creativity, and endurance that she deserves—that she has earned.
18
 
In contrast, I am not sure it is the case that casting survivors’ symptoms as illness 
precludes recognition of the strength behind developing them. It seems that the 
therapeutic response can and does acknowledge the function of these coping mechanisms 
and the negative effects of continuing to live with them. 
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I suggest that what is at stake in the pathologization of survivors’ symptoms is the 
implication that these coping mechanisms are not needed in “normal” life. To pathologize 
survivors’ symptoms is to cast these symptoms as a normal response to an anomalous 
situation. While doing so does not preclude recognition of the communal problems that 
produce sexual violence (and victims/survivors with trauma disorders), it softens some of 
the challenges that survivor discourse poses to broader systems by casting these 
challenges as curable at an individual rather than communal level. Along these lines, Ann 
Cvetkovich cautions that while psychiatric diagnoses of trauma related disorders such as 
PTSD serve an important function in securing treatment for survivors, we should “remain 
vigilant about the hazards of converting a social problem into a medical one.”
19
 
Underlying this caution is a tension between recognizing the debilitating effects of 
trauma and pathologizing survivors rather than the violence itself. Shani Orgad similarly 
states that “the celebration of agency, personal empowerment, self-responsibility, and 
self-management has contributed to deflect discussion away from the responsibilities of 
the community, the state, and the society at large.”
20
 That is, where survivors’ symptoms 
are viewed as temporary and curable, there is a sense in which the effects of sexual 
violence can be managed individually. 
In both cases (where survivors are disbelieved and where they are believed but 
distanced), figuring survivors’ discourse as “mad” (in the sense of “mentally ill”) 
performs a negative function in Alcoff and Gray’s view, potentially impeding empathic 
responsiveness and recognition of the challenges survivor discourse poses. Yet, Alcoff 
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and Gray hint that this alterity in survivor discourse is also part of its transformative 
power. I suggest that Foucault’s distinction between tragic and clinical experiences of 
madness can help to capture these positive or potentially transformative aspects of 
survivors’ “mad” discourse and shed light on both the positive and limiting effects of 
modern psychiatric and therapeutic discourses on trauma disorders. 
Madness in Foucault 
Connecting Sexuality and Madness 
Before moving to explanation of Foucault’s distinction between Renaissance 
madness and modern clinical illness we should first contextualize Foucault’s project in 
History of Madness. As it happens, there are good reasons for including History of 
Madness in studies of Foucault’s work on sexuality. On a surface level, Spencer Jackson 
suggests a parallel between Foucault’s descriptions of the story of Jouy in History of 
Sexuality and the ship of fools in History of Madness. In the latter case, the ship functions 
for Foucault as a symbolic illustration of the place of the mad during the Renaissance. 
The ship of fools, which appears in artwork and literature around the fifteenth century, 
carries madmen who have been banished from cities and abandoned to an “itinerant 
[facilement errante]” life at sea.
21
 Foucault describes the ship as thus representing “the 
liminal [liminaire] situation of the mad” who is “confined [enfermé] at the gates of the 
cities.”
22
 In this narrative the madman’s “exclusion was his confinement [son exclusion 
doit l’enclore],” he exists in a “threshold [seuil]” that is his “prison,” and he is “detained 
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[retient] at this place of passage…placed on the inside of the outside, or vice versa [à 
l’intérieur de l’extérieur, et inversement].”
23
 
Jackson reminds us that in History of Sexuality the sexual act between Jouy and 
Adam similarly takes place at “the border of a field [au bord d’un champ],” and that 
Foucault describes the sexual acts as having occurred “at the edge of the wood [à la 
lisière du bois], or in a ditch [le fossé] by the road to Saint-Nicolas.”
24
 The pleasures Jouy 
experiences essentially take place, Jackson notes, between “cultivated land” and 
uncharted countryside.
25
 And building on Jackson’s case, we could add that Foucault 
begins his description of Jouy by noting that he too exists as a wanderer “employed here 
then there…sleeping in barns and stables.”
26
 
Subtler though are Foucault’s allusions to water in this passage, which link Jouy 
to the madman, particularly if we consider Foucault’s History of Madness statement that 
“the link between water and madness is deeply rooted in the dream of the Western 
man.”
27
 In his description of the Jouy case Foucault refers to the promiscuous children in 
the town as “village urchins [gamins].”
28
 Jackson points out that the double meaning of 
the term “‘urchin’ identifies Jouy and his companions as mischievous paupers” but also 
metaphorically connects them to the sea.
29
 Additionally, he notes Foucault’s curious 
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reference to “the road leading to Saint-Nicolas” in his History of Sexuality telling of 
Jouy’s story.
30
 As we learn in Foucault’s more formal account of the case in Abnormal 
(and, as is confirmed by Bonnet and Bulard’s original report) the rape took place not on a 
road to Saint-Nicholas but on a road to Nancy.
31
 Jackson suggests that this substitution 
recalls “the fourth-century Bishop of Myra who served as an inspiration for the modern 




Besides this artistic connection between the two figures, Jouy is of course locked 
up in a madhouse, and History of Sexuality deals extensively with the role of modern 
“therapeutic” discourses and institutions in regulating and producing particular sexual 
subjects. Lynne Huffer also reminds us that homosexuality was only removed from the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1973, meaning that 
History of Madness “was produced within a scientific ethos sure of homosexuality’s 
ontological status as mental illness.”
33
 
Yet, studies that bring together Foucault’s thinking on the construction of 
madness and the construction of sexual deviance are not as common as one might expect. 
Huffer, for instance, notes queer theorists’ inattention to Foucault’s writings on madness 
in spite of their role in his thinking on sexuality and the crucial role Foucault’s work on 
sexuality has played in queer theory. She argues that the focus on History of Sexuality 
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and subsequent lack of engagement with History of Madness has resulted in a woefully 
incomplete understanding of Foucault’s thinking on sexuality. This omission is at least 
partly explained by politics of publication. Until fairly recently, the version of History of 
Madness most widely circulated (in French and in most other languages) was the 
abridged edition, roughly one-third the length of the original text, published in English 
under the title Madness and Civilization. Since the release of the unabridged English 
translation in 2006 the role of sexuality in Foucault’s account of madness has become 
evident to a wider audience.
34
 
Prior to this publication, and working with the unabridged French text, Didier 
Eribon also argued that madness and sexuality “form, in Foucault’s vision, two fragments 
of the same inquiry.”
35
 That is, both indicate a process of exclusion, of marking 
individuals as “abnormals…those defined by the norms that reject them.”
36
 As I 
demonstrate shortly, in History of Madness Foucault traces the movement of madness 
from indicating a kind of tragic knowledge in Renaissance times through classical 
confinement to modern treatment of “madness” as an exclusively clinical object and 
illness. Over time, madness shifts from being viewed as having something important to 
tell to being studied primarily in order to contain and cure it.
37
 The movement from 
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Renaissance madness to modern illness is thus one of splitting madness away from 
reason such that the two can no longer communicate with each other. Foucault writes, 
Modern man no longer communicates with the madman….There is no 
common language: or rather, it no longer exists; the constitution of 
madness as mental illness, at the end of the eighteenth century, bears 
witness to a rupture in a dialogue…and expels from the memory all those 
imperfect words, of no fixed syntax, spoken falteringly, in which the 
exchange between madness and reason was carried out. The language of 
psychiatry, which is a monologue by reason about madness, could only 
have come into existence in such a silence.
38
 
To be “mad” is therefore to be placed outside of reason, and where reason defines what is 
communicable and intelligible, to be mad is in a sense to be placed outside of discourse. 
In the modern discursive world of reason, one can instead speak as someone who is 
“mentally ill” (and potentially curable), which we will see does not retain precisely the 
same meaning. 
The splitting of madness and reason is thus also a movement by which certain 
individuals and possibilities of thought and experience are excluded, a theme which also 
appears in Foucault’s work on sexuality. As we saw in chapter three, part of what 
normative discourses on sexuality do is render incoherent experiences or discourses that 
fall outside the norm. For an individual to say that he does not have a sexuality—or that 
she both is and is not an incest survivor, or that his father both is and is not a rapist—is to 
challenge the coherency of modern constructions of sexual identity. Thus, in some sense, 
I will argue, it is to speak in the “nonsense” language of a “mad” person. 
Tracing Madness: Tragic Knowledge and Critical Consciousness 
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Initially, Foucault begins History of Madness with the idea of reaching back in 
time to try to get at that something that is lost when reason and madness cannot 
communicate with each other. In his original preface to the book, Foucault suggests that 
what he really wants to uncover is the “degree zero of the history of madness, when it 
was undifferentiated experience,”
39
 or “madness itself, in all its vivacity, before it is 
captured by knowledge.”
40
 Foucault locates the hints of such an experience in the 
Renaissance. He identifies two different though sometimes entwined threads that emerge 
in this period: 1) the tragic, which figures primarily in the visual arts and 2) the critical, 
which predominates in the literature and philosophy of the time. This split between the 
tragic and critical prefigures for Foucault the widening gap between reason and madness, 
which will grow ever more asymmetrical through confinement and fear in the classical 
age to the modern, psychiatric figuring of madness as exclusively clinical object, a 
condition to be cured, an illness with nothing to communicate to reason. Foucault 
maintains that this modern treatment of “madness” (illness) is always incomplete, 
eclipsing the “cosmic, tragic experience of madness.”
41
 What modern psychiatry and 
similar therapeutic discourses treat (and produce) is not madness in the Renaissance sense 
but a distilled and altered version of it. Yet, according to Foucault, this tragic experience 
of madness persists and threatens to return: “Behind the critical consciousness of 
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madness in all its philosophical, scientific, moral and medicinal guises lurks a second, 
tragic consciousness of madness, which has never really gone away.”
42
 
To elucidate the differences between Renaissance madness and modern clinical 
illness, I begin with Foucault’s explanation of Renaissance madness, where the tragic and 
critical begin working themselves loose. What Foucault means by the tragic experience 
of madness is not entirely straightforward, but his elusiveness here is fitting with his 
project in that he says he is grasping at an experience that cannot quite be recovered. We 
cannot get hold of this “wild” madness in its “primitive purity,”
43
 both because to 
comprehend madness and put it into language would be to capture it and because we exist 
in the world in which the division between madness and reason has already taken place. 
In enigmatic fashion, Foucault says that what is at the heart of artistic 
engagements with madness in the Renaissance is “the nothingness [néant] of 
existence.”
44
 By way of getting at what he means here, he notes that in the late Middle 
Ages leading up to the Renaissance the theme of death comes up frequently in paintings, 
reflecting the ever-present reality of war and plagues. As Foucault puts it, there is a 
proliferation of “grinning death’s head imagery,” exemplified in the fifteenth century 
series of Dance of Death or Danse Macabre paintings. Foucault describes these artworks 
as exhibiting a persistent preoccupation with death as “an order and an end that no man 
can escape” and as that which “reduces man to dust.”
45
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In Renaissance art, Foucault alleges, the focus shifts from death to madness. The 
Dance of Death is replaced with the dance of fools and ship of fools,
46
 and the army of 
skeletons in Pieter Brueghel’s Triumph of Death are “conquer[ed],” in Foucault’s view, 
by “the cries of Mad Meg” in Brueghel’s Dulle Griet.
47
 Foucault tells us that at this point, 
The fear before the absolute limit of death becomes interiorised in a 
continual process of ironisation. Fear was disarmed in advance, made 
derisory by being tamed and rendered banal, and constantly paraded in the 
spectacle of life….Death as the destruction of all things no longer had 
meaning when life was revealed to be a fatuous sequence of empty words, 
the hollow jingle of a jester’s cap and bells.
48
 
Foucault moves through this argument fairly quickly, but the turn that he describes is 
reminiscent of Friedrich Nietzsche’s discussion of the ancient Greeks in Birth of Tragedy. 
Looking to Nietzsche could thus help us to fill in what Foucault means here, and in fact, 
the parallels here suggest that Foucault’s unexplained use of the term “tragic” to describe 
the Renaissance experience of madness could potentially be a nod to Nietzsche.
49
 
The question that Nietzsche puts before Birth of Tragedy is the question of how 
the ancient Greeks could simultaneously exhibit such cheerfulness and such pessimism.
50
 
That is, they acknowledge that life is full of suffering, as evidenced in their tale of the 
wisdom of Dionysus’s companion, Silenus. When Silenus is asked what “the best and 
most desirable of all things for man” is, he responds: “What is best of all is utterly 
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beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you 
is—to die soon.”
51
 That the Greeks have such a pessimistic view represented here leads 
Nietzsche to conclude that “the Greek knew and felt the terror and horror of existence.”
52
 
However, Nietzsche notes that in spite of this pessimism, the Greeks are nonetheless 
“high-spirited.”
53
 In Greek mythology, the lives of the gods are filled with tales of 
deception, affairs, gluttony, suffering, jealousy, lust, and rage. The Greeks thus glorify 
their own lives and suffering in the world of the Olympian gods, and Nietzsche sees in 
this a “triumphant life in which all things, whether good or evil, are deified.”
54
 
In Nietzsche’s view, to celebrate and deify “earthly” life even with knowledge of 
such extreme pessimism is to express a radical affirmation of life, to be able to say yes to 
suffering and even to extreme suffering without meaning. It is to delight in life to such a 
degree that one would rather suffer and accept whatever facets of life there may be—even 
the wisdom that one might be better off not living at all—than not live. Indeed, the 
Greeks seem fascinated by suffering (even their gods suffer and make suffer) so that 
suffering itself becomes an enticement to rather than an argument against life. In this 
way, Greek mythology becomes, according to Nietzsche, “a transfiguring mirror” in 
which the wisdom of Silenus is accepted, celebrated, and finally reversed so that it is just 
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Foucault seems to be tracing a similar kind of turn in the early Renaissance. 
Constant confrontation with death leads into “a contemptuous contemplation of the 
nothingness that is life itself,”
 
which thereby “disarm[s] the fear of death.”
56
 That is, 
pessimism in the face of the ever-present threat of death calls the meaning of life into 
question. And as life loses meaning, the meaningfulness of loss of life loses some of its 
power. In an ironic reversal, the seeming arbitrariness of life neutralizes the menace of 
death whose very image showed life to be meaningless. Now, instead of being haunted by 
the “grinning head” of death, humans are haunted by the “carnival mask” and “the laugh 




It is suspicion of and fascination with the possibility of this kind of “tragic” 
knowledge or insight that Foucault says preoccupies one side of Renaissance thought at 
this time and which gets localized in the figure of the mad. “The seriousness of death” 
thus turns to “derision of madness,”
58
 where madness signifies some kind of hidden 
knowledge that threatens to undo the ordered world of meaning and existence. Caught up 
in the sweeping undertow of this knowledge, is a system of meaning structured by 
religion, explaining why Foucault also terms this knowledge/experience “cosmic.” 




 Foucault, History of Madness, 14. 
57
 Ibid., 15. 
58




Around this time, Gothic texts, such as Mirror of Human Salvation, Foucault notes, had 
become so overburdened with proliferating, esoteric symbolic meanings that they almost 
ceased to be meaningful at all. Eventually, these symbolic meanings drop out altogether, 
and we are left with “nightmarish silhouettes” that suggest an opaque, menacing kind 
truth lies beneath them.
59
 
Foucault points us, for instance, to the depiction of animals in paintings during the 
Renaissance. Where previously, religious thought had humans in charge of animals, 
paintings such as Matthias Grünewald’s depiction of the Temptation of Saint Anthony has 
the saint surrounded by wild, otherworldly beasts. Unlike the prior images of animals as 
imparting wisdom to humans through divine symbols, Grünewald’s beasts are unruly and 
chaotic, haunting viewers with a kind of “mad” knowledge to which we do not have 
access. This forbidden, inaccessible knowledge reserved for the mad is, Foucault 
suggests, of an apocalyptic sort, foretelling a global collapse and disorder.
60
 On this side 
of Renaissance madness it is  a sense that there is nothing undergirding existence—
impending doom and disorder as constituting the real “order” of things, a cosmic 
splintering of meaning—that makes up the knowledge of the tragic figuring both madness 
and the mad. 
At the same time, as mentioned, there is another approach to madness that 
Foucault notes as surfacing in the literature and philosophy of the time, such as in 
Desiderius Erasmus’s In Praise of Folly. This is madness not as insight but as foolishness 
and vice, the mistaking of what is not real for what is real, a kind of false knowledge that 
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can be staved off with wisdom and carefulness. Critical Renaissance consciousness takes 
madness to be not some invidious menace to a broader order but a fault of individuals 
owing to delusion and a faulty relationship to the self.
61
 In contrast to the tragic madness 
encapsulated in the images of Renaissance painters, madness as figured by critical 
consciousness is superficial, “a shiny, reflective surface, with no dark secrets lurking 
below.”
62
 It is mastered and held at a distance by wise observers, taken as an object of 
examination from the outside.
63
 But more notably, critical madness also turns the 
objective gaze back on itself, provoking the observer to introspection, to searching 
him/herself for traces of vice and madness. The lessons disclosed by the mad under 
critical consciousness are thus cautionary instead of captivating and moral rather than 
metaphysical. The wise are not haunted by the laughter of critical madness; instead, it is 
the wise who laugh at madness in order to keep it at bay.
64
 
Yet, in Foucault’s view, the critical does not erase the tragic experience of 
madness but merely obscures it in a vision of madness that is “erroneously taken as 
complete.”
65
 This division between the critical and tragic views of madness in the 
Renaissance foreshadows for Foucault the complete split between reason and madness 
that will happen over the centuries to follow. In the classical age, Foucault says, the 
haunting fascination with madness as exhibiting a kind of tragic knowledge drops from 
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view, and the mad are “reduce[d] to silence.”
66
 During this time, the mad are moved into 
places of confinement alongside all of those others whom communities do not seem to 
know what to do with—criminals, the poor, the unemployed, prostitutes, and 
homosexuals, to name a few.
67
 
Gradually, an understanding of madness as treatable develops; the places of 
confinement “become the place of cure;” and modern psychiatry emerges.
68
 Under the 
objective “gaze” of psychiatry, the “mad” are allowed (and even compelled) to speak, but 
in the language of psychiatry, in the direction of bringing themselves back in line with 
reason.
69
 As Huffer puts it, in this setup, “the patient’s part…is a silent one….The patient 
functions as a negative foil, the blank of a placeholder, for the productive imagination of 
a truth-wielding scientific project that will eventually fabricate, in the nineteenth century, 
our modern ‘pathological forms.’”
70
 In Foucault’s view, much as in the case of sexuality 
and the repressive hypothesis, psychiatry creates the illusion of giving the “mad” a space 
in which to speak while structuring and managing this speech to fit with specific, 
normalizing discourses. Thus, Foucault maintains that what emerges under the clinical 
gaze of psychiatry is not madness in the cosmic, tragic sense that we saw in the 
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Renaissance. Rather, it is “madness, disarmed” and mastered by science, “alienated from 
itself through its promotion to a new status as object.”
71
 
Reclaiming Tragic Knowledge: Survivor Discourse and Madness 
So then, if clinical treatment of mental illness eclipses some lost experience of 
madness or tragic knowledge (as Foucault suggests), and if the figuring of survivor 
discourse as symptoms of illness neutralizes a threat (as Alcoff and Gray suggest), then 
what is the threat that survivor discourse represents? What are the difficult truths with 
which survivor discourse confronts us? In the sections that follow I argue that the content 
and character of survivor discourse places survivors in a position similar to that of the 
“mad” in the Renaissance. Yet, where contemporary therapeutic discourses figure 
survivors’ knowledge and ways of knowing as temporary (even if necessary) disorders 
that can be contained and cured, the full transformative potential of survivor discourse 
drops out and is obscured. I do not propose that we abandon contemporary therapeutic 
practices or leave survivors to suffer the debilitating effects of trauma. Rather, I argue 
that claiming survivors’ proximity to tragic knowledge helps to link the fate of survivors 
with others and ensure that in making life livable for survivors again we do not miss 
taking communal responsibility for the challenges this knowledge brings. 
What Do Survivors Know? 
If survivor discourse hints at proximity to a world-shattering kind of knowledge, 
it would be most obvious to say that what survivors know is the reality of the 
pervasiveness of sexual assault, abuse, and coercion, that this violence is not anomalous 
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but widespread and systemic. The content of this knowledge in itself likely upsets many 
of our basic beliefs about the levels of cruelty that are humanly possible or our vision of a 
meaningful and ordered world in which we (and the people we care about) are 
moderately safe. Survivor discourse challenges the common belief that sexual violence is 
an isolated rather than endemic problem, a belief that, as mentioned, maintains the 
stability and coherence of many of our institutional and familial structures. 
But where the mad of the Renaissance confronted human beings with difficult 
truths, therapeutic discourses promise to cure survivors’ symptoms, and thus potentially 
let us off the hook. To return to the example of hypervigilance, medicine, therapy, 
support groups, or self-help books can “cure” survivors of this symptom but without 
really resolving the social problem of the pervasiveness of sexual violence or the 
philosophical/existential problem of human vulnerability. This seems to be part of the 
worry that Cvetkovich expresses when she urges that we be “vigilant” about the limits of 
medicalizing trauma. Medical diagnosis and cure of hypervigilance does not preclude 
addressing these larger issues, yet it potentially simplifies and contains the “tragic” 
knowledge underlying this symptom. 
The terminology of survival itself points to the ways in which our basic 
understanding of sexual violence lends itself to the assumption that this violence must be 
rare. Sexual violence and incest are prohibited precisely because they qualify as an 
assault to the self that one is not meant to live through. That our homes and familial 
systems are not in greater crisis, that women, children, and vulnerable populations have 
not disappeared from public or private spaces, indeed suggests that sexual violence must 




survivors that exist) testify to the prevalence of sexual violence and to the sometimes 
relative quietness of survival—the pervasiveness of this violence having required 
adaptive behaviors so widespread and common that they nearly become invisible.
72
 
To survive sexual violence is thus to live through something one is not meant to 
live through and to bear witness to an event that is not supposed to happen.
73
 As Hart 
reminds us, the DSM at one time defined a traumatic event as one “that is outside the 
range of usual human experience.”
74
 Finding language to communicate a traumatic 
experience (to oneself or to others) can thus be difficult, if not impossible. Some have 
argued that one cannot speak from the place of trauma because trauma obliterates the 
self; it is only retrospectively that one can try to articulate the experience from the 
outside.
75
 Brison thus asks, “How can we speak about the unspeakable without 
attempting to render it intelligible and sayable?”
76
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We could say then that trauma cannot “speak” the language of reason, much as 
madness and reason can no longer communicate in Foucault’s view. When psychiatry 
gets hold of survivors they are given the opportunity to speak. Therapeutic discourses 
help the survivor to put her experience into language (particular, therapeutic language). 
These discourses help her in essence to become a survivor, to tell and retell her story until 
it can be integrated and healed, at least as well as possible. This is a positive development 
insofar as it makes it possible for survivors to function and eventually maybe even 
flourish in the aftermath of sexual violence. But the question remains: What happens to 
those inarticulable parts of traumatic experience? What is held there? By representing 
that which discourse and reason cannot reach, the untellable parts of survivor experience 
point to a limit. These untellable parts confront us with an experience that we, as modern, 
rational subjects cannot quite language our way into. 
If this is the case, then much as with the tragic, cosmic experience of madness, we 
(survivors and others) cannot really “capture” whatever this tragic knowledge/experience 
is that gets lost in the unsayable. I suggest, however, that there are some hints in what 
survivors can and do say. As we have seen, the limits of survivor discourse point to 
internal tensions and incoherencies in modern conceptions of sex and sexuality. Survivor 
discourse also exposes and undermines assumptions about our own (in)vulnerability to 
sexual violence. In the next section I argue that the unsayable in survivor discourse also 
points to survivor discourse as challenging not just the content of our knowledge but 






How Do Survivors Know? 
Lynda Hart observes that in most contexts the discursive order in which survivors 
must find a way to interject their experiences is one in which there is a sharp division 
between fact and fiction. Yet, survivors frequently operate according to an epistemology 
in which the straddling of multiple contradictory positions collapses and blurs various 
distinctions. As we saw in chapter three, incest survivors are often faced with making 
sense of how an abuser can occupy seemingly incompatible positions, such as provider 
and loved one as well as someone who is abusive or cruel. Survivors may even find 
themselves in the position of protecting abusers on whom they depend for shelter and 
familial stability.
77
 As Hart writes, “Incest survivors exist in a psychic space in which the 




Along these lines, incest survivors frequently describe a feeling of existing in an 
in between space, not just in terms of identity, as we saw in chapter three, but also in 
terms of reality. In an essay on surviving incest Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha 
describes her childhood as follows, “There was Normal World and Secret World, which 
you couldn’t talk about.”
79
 Similarly another survivor, Marie-Elise Wheatwind, says, 
“During those grammar-school years, I lived in two different worlds, or time zones. 
There was school, and there was home.”
80
 Kim Newall writes of the “Liar” part of 
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herself, “At seven she has mastered the split between what is hidden ‘back there’ and the 
unreachable future ‘out there.’ She is never fully either place. She is stuck in-between the 
two worlds I live in. She protects the secrets of the unseen side.”
81
 
Holding onto multiple incompatible truths, combined with the shock of 
experiencing a traumatic event, can lead to a sense of unreality for many survivors. 
Brison describes life after she was raped: 
I felt as if I was experiencing things posthumously. When the 
inconceivable happens, one starts to doubt even the most mundane, 
realistic perceptions. Perhaps I’m not really here, I thought, perhaps I did 
die in that ravine….For the first several months after my attack, I led a 
spectral existence, not quite sure whether I had died and the world went on 
without me, or whether I was alive but in a totally alien world….I felt as 
though I’d somehow outlived myself."
82
  
In her description we can see that Brison’s experience disrupts her sense of what is real 
but also her sense of time. In fact, survivors often report fragmented experiences of time 
both during and after trauma. Because victims/survivors often dissociate during trauma as 
a protective mechanism they may not fully experience the event in the moment and may 
continue to re-experience the trauma well “after” the fact through flashbacks.
83
 Sensory 
flashbacks continually move many survivors in and out of the present, such that the 
distinction between present and past may not hold the same meaning for the survivor as it 
once did or as it does for others. Brison writes, “The undoing of the self in trauma 
involves a radical disruption of memory, a severing of past from present, and, typically, 
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an inability to envision a future.”
84
 Where survivors experience a sense of foreshortened 
(one of the symptoms of PTSD), they will find themselves at odds with discourses of 
desire (which are future-oriented) as self-defining. Survivors’ experiences of disjointed 
time can thus fundamentally dislodge them from the dominant discourses in which their 
narratives must become legible if they are to be intelligible to others.  
Survivors are likely to experience their bodies in relation to knowledge differently 
from the “norm” as well. Brison writes that given the experience of flashbacks, “the most 
salient traumatic memories…are more tied to the body than memories are typically 
considered to be.”
85
 Trauma survivors are, of course, not the only ones who experience 
sensory flashbacks; our senses can trigger vivid memories at any time. Yet, Brison points 
out that for survivors, trauma “changes the nature and frequency of sensory, emotional, 
and physiological flashbacks.”
86
 And when survivors lack conscious memories the 
trauma is held primarily within the body, shifting the locus of memory itself. One 
survivor describes having flashbacks “that would have no pictures to them at all.” She 
explains, “I would just start screaming and feel that something was coming out of my 
body that I had no control over….I would remember in my body, although I wouldn’t 
have a conscious picture, just this screaming coming out of me.”
87
 Another survivor, 
Catherine Houser, also describes remembering her abuse through her body before being 
able to consciously remember what had happened to her: 
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My first conscious memories of the abuse were vague, elusive, difficult to 
put into words, yet they were the most real memories, most true feelings I 
had ever experienced—because they were visceral. More than 
remembering with my brain, I was reliving, refeeling the abuse in my 
body—the choking, the gagging, the hands wrapped around my wrists, the 
force of being held down.
88
 
While for some survivors, these body memories help to confirm what happened to them, 
for others remembering through the body makes these memories more difficult to trust. 
Judy Bierman, for example, says, 
Believing my own story is very difficult. For the most part my memories 
have been kinesthetic—my body reliving rape and its aftermath, my body 
re-enacting the abuse. I rarely have any “pictures” at all during these 
experiences, and more often than not I walk away from them feeling 
crazy, unwilling to believe I have been the victim of anything more than a 




As these examples demonstrate, to speak the language of sexual trauma may 
involve attesting to contradictory or distorted truths, accepting ambiguity, eschewing 
normal narrative conventions like the linear movement of time, “knowing” with the body, 
or it may mean having language fail altogether. By thereby drawing attention to the 
fragility of some of the characteristics of the modern subject—as knowable, rational, 
firmly inserted in a chronological movement of time—survivor discourse (where it can be 
perceived as discourse) is connected to broader postmodern philosophical critiques of 
identity and knowledge. It also constitutes in these respects, a way of speaking (or not 
being able to speak) “madness” to “reason,” at least the reason of the modern subject. 
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To return to Guinier and Torres’s metaphor of the miner’s canary, if we take their 
suggestion that those most vulnerable to the “toxicities” or cracks in various systems can 
alert us to problems in the systems themselves, then the limits of survivor discourse point 
to larger philosophical problems in how we conceptualize identity, sexuality, 
safety/vulnerability, knowledge, and temporality. Acknowledging these limits in survivor 
discourse and their connection to broader postmodern philosophical critiques can help us 
to link work on survival with other sub-disciplines (such as queer theory and race theory). 
It can also help us to challenge the distancing mechanisms that hinder identifying with 
survivors and mobilize philosophical resources to reshape those conceptions of identity 
and knowledge that leave the most vulnerable on the outside. 
Concluding Remarks 
In spite of the noted weaknesses of Foucault’s approach to Sophie Adam, I 
maintain that Foucault’s critiques of sexuality and madness make a powerful contribution 
to feminist work on sexual violence and survival, and I maintain that survivors have a 
particular stake in queer theory and in other positive uses of Foucault. Additionally, 
drawing out Adam as a crucial character in unfolding discourses of normative sexuality 
helps us to create more nuanced accounts of the reach and limits of sex-centric 
conceptions of identity and selfhood. By neglecting to attend to Adam, we (and Foucault) 
miss important facets of modern conceptions of sexuality, and, similarly, feminist 
approaches that do not consider Foucault’s critique of sexuality miss crucial aspects of 
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survival. Namely, what is missed is the impact of modern conceptions of sexuality on 
survivors and the stake survivors have in challenging them. Creating space for Sophie 
Adam within Foucault’s critique thus allows us to build the foundation for more inclusive 
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